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policies in the face of a negative international economy. 
In 1985 a group of economists, political scientists, anthropologists, and 
others attended a conference at the University of Toronto on poverty- 
related policy in developing countries. The six papers in this volume were 
originally presented at this conference; they explore a range of policies 
which affect the poor. An introductory paper provides an overview. 
Two papers discuss broad issues, agricultural policy and stabilization 
policies. The other four deal with how government fiscal policy affects 
the poor, both through taxation and through key areas of government 
expenditure. Each of these papers uses household data to show that 
ostensibly equity-oriented government policies are often far from that in 
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The exhaustive state-of-the-art literature surveys combined with case 
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R.M. BIRD AND S. HORTON 
The study of economic development is, by definition, concerned with the 
poor, understood broadly as those who inhabit poor countries. In recent 
decades, however, this concern has become more sharply focused on the ef- 
fects of growth, change, and government policy on the poorest people in the 
developing countries - often defined as the lower 40 per cent of the income 
distribution. The earlier, sanguine view that the benefits of generalized 
economic growth would inevitably `trickle down' to the lower strata of 
society faded during the 1960s in the face of the increasing evidence of per- 
sistently large income disparities in many developing countries, even fast- 
growing ones, and the realization that the poor may not gain much from 
development immediately, even in absolute terms. 
A new view, therefore, became dominant in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Those concerned with the well-being of the poor in developing countries were 
henceforth both to pay special attention to the effects of development 
policies on the poor and also to introduce policy measures specifically 
designed to help them directly. The resulting change in policy emphasis was 
perhaps most marked in the adoption, at least in part, of the `basic-needs' ap- 
proach to development (which focused on the provision of basic services such 
as food, water, shelter, and health care to the poor) by such agencies as the 
World Bank. An increasing number of researchers, both within and outside 
the agencies, also began to attempt to analyse and quantify the effects of 
government policies on the poor - both policies intended specifically to assist 
the poor, and other, more general policies, such as monetary and trade 
policy. 
Over the last decade, a substantial body of research on the effects of dif- 
ferent policies, both foreign and domestic, on the poor has thus accumulated. 
At the same time, however, two new factors have led to yet another change in 
emphasis both in the policies of the major international lending agencies and 
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on ways of charging users and hence recovering costs in some of these 
expenditure areas - although one might think that such plans may run into 
the same obstacles that have generally made attempts to make tax systems 
more progressive in developing countries both difficult to carry through and 
disappointing in their results. 
The new emphasis in development policy on `getting the prices right,' like 
the marked stress on cutting down the scale and scope of government activ- 
ities, also makes the question of the compatibility of these policies with 
improving the well-being of the poor in those countries especially impor- 
tant. Like the concern with the efficacy of specifically 'pro-poor' policies 
mentioned above, this question underlines the importance both of under- 
standing the effects of what has been done in the past and of trying to think 
through as best we can the lessons suggested for the future by this experi- 
ence. 
One important aim of the conference at which the papers in this book 
were first presented was thus to survey the extensive research that has been 
done in recent years on government policy and the poor in developing coun- 
tries. The unanticipated difficulties encountered in implementing policies 
aimed at the poor and the current constraints on such policies make it espe- 
cially important at the present time to learn as much as possible from 
previous experience. 
In addition to depicting the `state of the art' with respect to research and 
knowledge in their respective areas, the authors of the papers were also 
asked to reflect on the implications of their discussion for future research in 
the field. Partly to make the discussions more concrete and partly to illus- 
trate the variability of the development experience - and the consequent 
fragility of generalizations - authors were also asked, if possible, to incor- 
porate one or more case studies into their papers. In the customary fashion 
of academics, each author of course interpreted these instructions in his or 
her own way, the result being a medley of variants more or less within these 
terms of reference. Finally, although all but one of the authors are econo- 
mists, the obvious need to complement the economic approach by other 
perspectives was recognized by assigning discussants and inviting partici- 
pants from such disciplines as political science, sociology, anthropology, 
and public health. 
Although the resulting papers by no means constitute an exhaustive 
review of government policy and the poor in developing countries, they do 
encompass a wide range of experience and research in a variety of relevant 
senses. The topics covered included short-run stabilization and adjustment 
programs, long-run sectoral development policies in the agricultural sector, 
budgetary policies (both taxes and expenditures), and specific programs 
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intended to aid the poor (such as food subsidies and sites-and-services pro- 
grams). The specific cases referred to in different papers range from `suc- 
cesses' in Asia (agricultural development in Taiwan) through more mixed 
experiences in India, Brazil, and Jamaica, to apparent `failures' in sub- 
Saharan Africa (the food-subsidy program in Tanzania). The experience of 
the authors and conference participants similarly ranges from active offi- 
cials of international lending agencies, to long-time academic observers of 
the development process in one or another part of the world, to actual parti- 
cipants in that process, as well as across the spectrum of disciplines noted 
earlier. 
The papers presented here in most cases incorporate revisions made as a 
result of the conference discussion. Nevertheless, they by no means encom- 
pass the full scope of the broader issues that were raised about economic 
and non-economic dimensions of the impact of government policies on the 
poor in developing countries. The remainder of this introductory chapter, 
therefore, attempts to fill in some of this missing context, first by sum- 
marizing briefly the main issues raised in each of the papers nad the subse- 
quent discussion and then by identifying several recurring themes that seem 
central both to our present perception of the effects of government policy 
on the poor in developing countries and, perhaps more important, to the 
further research that is obviously needed on this subject in the future. 
1 Stabilization and the Poor 
Perhaps the major stimulus for this volume lay in our perception that 
governments throughout the developing world were cutting back on 
poverty-oriented programs as part of their adjustment to their present dif- 
ficult economic circumstances. It is appropriate, therefore, that the first 
paper, by Gerald Helleiner, focuses specially on this issue and that this 
paper gave rise to some of the liveliest discussion at the conference. 
Helleiner's focus is one the immediate, short-run effects of International 
Monetary Fund - `IMF-type' - adjustment programs on the poor, with 
special emphasis on conditions in sub-Saharan Africa. He divides such pro- 
grams into three distinct components: restructuring, restraint, and policy 
change. While he recognizes that the three are often closely related, in his 
view the debates over development policy that have taken place between the 
international lending agencies and the governments in a number of coun- 
tries are usually not directly related to the resolution of the immediate crisis 
at which stabilization programs are supposedly aimed. They rather illustrate 
the tendency to use the occasion of a crisis to press ideological or other 
7 Introduction 
points. Consequently, his discussion concentrates on the more relevant 
short-term policies that are customarily implemented in the course of such 
programs. 
Helleiner repeatedly emphasizes the danger of applying what he sees as 
the generalized `cookbook' recipes of the typical stabilization program to 
the wide variety of circumstances found in developing countries. Identical 
policies will have very different effects depending on the particular condi- 
tions prevailing in a country at the time they are applied. He is especially 
concerned that inadequate attention has been paid to the effects of adjust- 
rhent programs on the poor - a concern strengthened by his perception that 
government expenditures are, as a rule, more equitably distributed than are 
private expenditures, so that cutting back public expenditures is likely to hit 
the poor especially hard. Finally, while he notes that this proposition has 
not been tested, he also mentions the common belief that such cut-backs 
often affect social programs most - and hence, again, the poor. 
These general concerns about the 'anti-poor' nature of most stabilization 
programs are illustrated in the particular case of Tanzania. Helleiner 
argues, for example, that while problems such as the inefficiency of public- 
sector operations may well be central to Tanzania's future economic perfor- 
mance, they are not particularly relevant to its short-run stabilization 
problems and should not, therefore, be seen as central in discussion on an 
appropriate adjustment program. He also objects strongly to the failure to 
consider explicitly the distributional impact of such programs, noting that 
in principle a given restraint target can be reached in many ways, each with 
different distributional implications. He is particularly concerned about the 
need for much more attention to this problem in the very low-income coun- 
tries of sub-Saharan Africa, where, he argues, there is often an especially 
strong case for financing a more gradual adjustment program, with more 
attention being paid to its impact on the very poorest. 
The two formal discussants of the Helleiner paper took very different 
approaches. To oversimplify, one focused on the relationship between the 
international financing agencies and the developing countries in the formu- 
lation of stabilization programs and the other focused on the political 
dimensions of such programs within developing countries. The argument of 
the first discussant was essentially that adjustment was necessary with or 
without international financial assistance, that when adjustment packages 
were negotiated the results reflected not any kind of `cookbook' approach 
but rather the outcome of prolonged consideration of all feasible alter- 
natives by both sides, and that to the extent the required policy measures af- 
fected the poor adversely it was hard for the international agency to do 
anything about it. 
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More specifically, this discussant noted that it was often difficult to pro- 
vide for more gradual adjustment programs because the resources available 
were limited and because the governments in power in many developing 
countries were often too politically volatile to make commitments for more 
than a few months in advance. With regard to the impact of stabilization 
programs on the poor, three points were made. First, the absence of adjust- 
ment would also, in most cases, be detrimental to the poor. Second, in prac- 
tice it is difficult to protect the poor both because few feasible selective 
policy instruments exist and because the urgency of the situation usually 
forces recourse to blunt instruments that may not rate very high on the 
equity scale. Few countries can effectively implement, on short notice, 
targeted policies to help the poor; most can increase import duties and ex- 
cise taxes overnight, once they choose to act. Third, government policies in- 
evitably reflect the existing political structure, and that structure seldom 
gives the poor much weight. 
The second discussant essentially elaborated this last point, stressing in 
particular the need to take into account not only the reality of policy actions 
but also the perceptions by different groups of the costs and benefits of such 
actions. For example, the economic crisis preceding a stabilization program 
has usually caused political unrest. Whether the program adds to, or allevi- 
ates, that unrest depends on a variety of factors, not least of which is 
whether groups think they bear the burden of adjustment and the ability of 
such groups to make their protests felt politically. The perceived equity of 
an adjustment program may indeed be an important factor in this calculus - 
but it is perhaps unlikely that in most countries the politically significant 
upper and middle classes are especially concerned with the treatment of the 
poor. Even in those countries with more economic room to manoeuvre than 
exists in the poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa, this discussant 
argued, the result was more likely to be pressure to spare the middle classes 
and organized labour than to protect the poor. For these and other reasons, 
the political issues with respect to stabilization were often quite different 
from the equity issues. 
The ensuing discussion touched on a number of additional points of 
interest, ranging from the appropriateness of conventional macro-economic 
policy prescriptions in developing countries to the role of the construction 
sector in adjustment. In traditional macro-economics, for example, stabili- 
zation policy refers to the appropriate mix of monetary-fiscal policy; in 
some developing countries it appears that the problem is sometimes the 
absence of any such coherent policies and also that such conventional 
remedies as tight money may easily make things worse rather than better, 
particularly in less-diversified countries suffering powerful external shocks. 
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As one participant noted, in a sense the acid test of the new classical macro- 
economics, with its emphasis on the expectations of agents and adjustment 
paths, lies precisely in the developing countries. 
While there was by no means complete agreement with Helleiner's view 
on the relative equity of public expenditure, there was also substantial 
discussion of the sectoral impact of adjustment programs, particularly in 
terms of the composition of public expenditures. One participant argued 
that the major impact of cut-backs was on construction. Other participants 
suggested that investment in machinery and equipment, particularly im- 
ported equipment, was more often affected severely. While others noted 
that there was little evidence that social programs were especially adversely 
affected, it is hard to say what this means in terms of effects on the poor. 
Education expenditures, for example, may be maintained to protect the 
jobs of middle-class teachers rather than for any higher purpose: schools 
may be built and teachers paid even in the face of crisis - but there may be 
no funds for books, chalk, or pencils and paper. What much of this discus- 
sion perhaps revealed as much as anything else was the extent to which 
everyone tends to generalize from his or her particular experience, as well as 
the lack of any systematic and detailed study of the expenditure impacts of 
adjustment programs. 
2 Taxation and the Poor 
With the second paper on taxation, the conference moved from the high- 
profile area of stabilization policy to the less dramatic, but in the long run 
perhaps no less important, area of the impact of budgetary policy on the 
poor in developing countries. The paper by Richard Bird and Barbara 
Miller reviews an extensive array of studies on the incidence of taxes and 
user charges and reaches a number of clear conclusions. First, the tax 
systems in most developing countries are not, contrary to popular belief, 
particularly regressive. Second, taxes nevertheless still account for a signifi- 
cant fraction of the income of the poor, particularly the urban poor, so that 
the design of tax systems and their impact on the poor remain important 
policy issues. Finally, it is particularly important in considering this area to 
carry out detailed analysis, preferably on micro-data sets, because of the 
great heterogeneity of those classified as `poor' in most developing coun- 
tries and the consequently widely varying effects of different tax regimes 
within the group of the poor. 
Bird and Miller consider in some detail two particular aspects of revenue 
systems: urban finance and indirect taxes. The financing of urban services 
through property taxes and user charges is shown to have widely different 
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effects depending upon the precise structure of the policy instruments, how 
they are administered, and the economic and political environment within 
which they are applied. Similarly, in the case of indirect taxes - by far the 
most important taxes affecting the poor - they again stress the heterogeneity 
of results and the need for detailed quantitative studies, illustrating the 
point with a case study from the authors' ongoing work on Jamaica. In par- 
ticular, they make a strong case for the need for some exemptions from 
general sales taxes on equity grounds. 
Although both formal discussants of this paper seconded its conclusions 
on the hazards of generalizing about taxes and the need for more attention 
to equity within, as well as between, groups, they also raised some questions 
on the approach taken in the paper and introduced a number of additional 
considerations. One discussant, while supporting the use of micro-data, 
emphasized in particular the need to use more explicit models of fiscal inci- 
dence than those employed in the studies reviewed in the paper. Allowing 
for saving and the openness of the economy, for instance, might affect the 
results considerably. As another example, if taxes affect the real value of 
urban wages, then the decision to migrate from rural to urban areas might 
be affected, with implications that can only be traced out - albeit imper- 
fectly - in a more explicit general equilibrium framework. 
The second discussant argued that administrative considerations cast 
serious doubt on the argument by Bird and Miller for sales-tax exemptions 
and, more important, that it did not make much sense in the context of 
many developing countries to discuss the effects of taxes on the poor with- 
out simultaneously discussing the effects of inflation both on taxes and on 
the poor. Indeed, the two discussants in different ways raised a question 
that received substantial attention in the ensuing general discussion also: 
Are the effects of taxes really very important in the face of such pervasive 
phenomena as inflation, exchange-rate overvaluation, price controls, and 
other economic forces affecting the well-being of the poor on both the 
sources (income) and uses (expenditure) sides? The answer given by Bird 
and Miller is essentially twofold. First, as noted above, taxes on the poor 
are important, even in light of all these other factors. Second, in any case, 
governments and others constantly act as though equity in taxation does 
matter - even though it may well be true, as suggested in the discussion of 
the Helleiner paper, that they are not primarily concerned with the plight of 
the poor, let alone that of different subgroups within this broad category. 
Another point raised in the general discussion that recurred at various 
times throughout the conference concerned the treatment of the parallel (or 
underground) economy. While the discussion of this issue was quite incon- 
clusive, it was apparent that there was a strong divergence - perhaps based 
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in part on experiences in different countries - between those who felt that, 
on the whole, the parallel economy was a natural and perhaps even healthy 
reaction to fumbling government intervention, and those who argued 
strongly that the development of a parallel economy usually brought with it 
all kinds of undesirable economic and political problems. It was also ap- 
parent that the amount of actual knowledge on the precise level, nature, and 
implications of the parallel economy was not large. 
3 Education, Health, and the Poor 
While the Bird and Miller paper argued that taxes do have important effects 
on the poor in developing countries, it did not take issue with the conven- 
tional view that the most important budgetary impacts on the poor are 
through expenditure policies, particularly `social' programs. The next three 
papers discuss, in turn, four of the most important areas of social expendi- 
ture: education, health, housing, and food subsidies. Their general conclu- 
sion is that most of these programs do not, in fact, seem to have done much 
for the poor. 
In his paper on health and education expenditure, for example, Emman- 
uel Jimenez first demonstrates that the public sector plays a dominant role 
in the provision of these services in most developing countries and that 
expenditures on health and education constitute a significant proportion of 
total public expenditures. He then evaluates these expenditures in a number 
of countries in terms of their efficiency and equity aspects, and finds them 
to be severely deficient on both counts. 
In terms of equity, Jimenez argues that education in particular is pro- 
vided in such a way in most countries as to give more benefits to the rich 
than the poor for a whole series of reasons, ranging from the relative degree 
of subsidization of particular services to the nature of the rationing systems 
applied (as illustrated in particular for Colombia). Similarly, in terms of ef- 
ficiency also, he concludes that too many resources go to higher education 
rather than primary education. The situation in health, while perhaps not so 
dramatic, is similar. His recommended solution is on the one hand to lower 
the subsidies on those services used primarily by the rich through imposing 
user charges and to use the funds thus obtained to expand the services bene- 
fiting the poor, and on the other hand to relax the prohibitions on private 
provision of health and education services that exist in most countries. 
Although the two formal discussants of this paper took quite different 
tacks, one concentrating on health and one on education, in fact the general 
tenor of their comments was similar. Both raised questions about the sense 
of orienting the paper around the concepts of equity and efficiency in the 
12 R.M. Bird and S. Horton 
abstract without recognizing explicitly the political reality that in many 
countries expenditure patterns serving the needs of the elite were precisely 
what was wanted and not an unintended result to be `cured' by the applica- 
tion of a quick policy fix. The very different characteristics of health and 
education were also stressed, as was what was considered to be the evidence 
that the general underfunding of these fields was at least as important as the 
misallocation of that funding stressed by Jimenez. Doubt was also cast on 
both aspects of his proposed solution. If private expenditures or user 
charges are increased, for example, does it make sense to assume that the 
level and composition of public expenditures will change as assumed in the 
paper, given the underlying political structure? And is private-service provi- 
sion likely to be any better on equity grounds? 
The subsequent general discussion again raised, even more strongly than 
in the case of the tax paper, substantial questions about the underlying 
model of incidence in this paper. It is far from clear, for instance, that 
allocating the budgetary costs of particular programs to income groups is a 
particularly meaningful exercise in either political or economic terms. 
Politically, grouping people by area, occupation, or ethnic category may be 
more relevant; economically, the `benefit incidence' may be much more 
obscure than these calculations assume and the `expenditure incidence' (that 
is, who actually receives the funds - doctors, teachers) more important. 
4 Housing and the Poor 
The second paper on expenditure programs, by Stephen Mayo and David 
Gross, takes a narrower focus. Rather than giving a broad survey of hous- 
ing in developing countries, Mayo and Gross concentrate on a particular 
type of housing program launched some years ago in an attempt to over- 
come some of the problems of public housing in reaching the poor in such 
countries: the site-and-service approach. Their discussion of the extensive 
experience with sites-and-services programs in a variety of countries, like 
that in most of the other papers, stresses strongly the importance of the 
details, in this case of both housing demand and the design of housing 
policies, in determining the impact of these programs on the poor. In 
particular, they argue that most programs have consistently overestimated 
the willingness and ability of the poor to pay for housing and have conse- 
quently either not reached the intended target group or have done so only as 
a result of heavy and unsustainable subsidization. Their suggested solution 
to this problem is to lower housing standards even further and also to design 
the subsidy element more explicitly to assist the poor. 
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While neither formal discussant of this paper raised any objections to its 
characterization of sites-and-services programs as basically ineffective 
in reaching the poor, both noted that the housing problem in developing 
countries really had to be considered in a broader context. One discussant 
stressed that it was not possible to assess the effects of sites-and-services 
programs on the micro basis used in the paper; what was needed, for exam- 
ple, was a clearer understanding of the historical situation at the time the 
program was introduced. The other discussant emphasized the quantitative 
unimportance of sites-and-services programs, which had housed perhaps 
only 3 million of the 270 million people who moved to urban areas in 
developing countries in the 1972-84 period. As well, the discussant ques- 
tioned the extent to which such projects were little more than political show- 
cases for governments. This discussant's preferred approach would be to 
have less government intervention directly in housing and more concentra- 
tion on providing infrastructure to create income-generating opportunities 
for the poor. 
In the ensuing discussion, it became apparent that the sites-and-services 
approach had its detractors and defenders among the conference partici- 
pants. Some argued that these projects, usually sponsored by the interna- 
tional agencies, undermined the capacity of local governments to provide 
housing. Others picked up some of the points raised in earlier discussions, 
noting the extreme difficulty, even in theory, of analysing the incidence of 
such programs and their political implications. The principal arguments in 
support of the sites-and-services approach appeared to be twofold. First, it 
was better than the only viable alternatives, that is, either doing nothing or 
else building so-called public housing, which really went almost entirely to 
the middle class, especially to government employees. Second, the indirect 
effects of sites-and-services projects in training officials and others in the 
realities of housing, finance, and other aspects of urban planning had 
generally been beneficial. Whether `doing good by stealth' in this way was 
an efficient use of scarce resources is a question that remained unanswered. 
5 Food Subsidies and the Poor 
Unlike the developed countries, the developing countries do not have a large 
and varied spectrum of income-transfer programs that can be deliberately 
manipulated to achieve any desired distributive outcome. In a number of 
developing countries, however, in recent years an explicit attempt has been 
made along these lines in a limited way in the form of food-subsidy pro- 
grams. Susan Horton's paper first reviews the extent and importance of 
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such programs and then examines in detail the case of one particular food- 
subsidy program in Tanzania. As she notes, food-subsidy programs can be 
implemented either implicitly (through producer taxes or quotas, for exam- 
ple) or explicitly, through budgetary outlays. Such programs may also to 
some extent have specific nutritional goals as a target in addition to a 
distributional intent. In practice, however, food-subsidy programs often 
have a strong urban bias, not least for political reasons. Horton's examina- 
tion of the Tanzanian case generally conforms with her general discussion. 
She finds, for example, that instead of the subsidy alleviating inequality, its 
removal would do so because the benefits went not only to urban areas but 
often to the better-off inhabitants of those areas. The Tanzania example is a 
particularly negative one: programs in other countries have been more pro- 
gressive. There are also ways to restructure existing programs so as to bene- 
fit the poor more directly; however, the paper concludes that food subsidies 
are probably not a good policy instrument in African countries. 
The first discussant again sounded a familiar note, raising a number of 
questions about the nature of the incidence analysis and noting the need to 
consider how subsidy programs are financed and the desirability of probing 
into the `black box' of the family in order to understand the effects of sub- 
sidies on nutrition and productivity. In some countries, for example, the 
diets of men, women, and children may differ significantly, so that the 
choice of the food to be subsidized might be strongly targeted in unforeseen 
ways. 
The second discussant of the Horton paper reverted to another theme 
that had come up several times in earlier discussion: the need to consider 
such policies in an appropriate macro-economic context. Food-subsidy pro- 
grams may, for example, sometimes be a way to maintain aggregate de- 
mand. More important, their effects on agricultural prices and hence agri- 
cultural development need to be taken into account explicitly in any analysis 
of their impact. Finally, the dearth of knowledge about the comparative 
administrative costs of different delivery programs, in this or in other fields, 
was also stressed. 
This last point was picked up in the subsequent discussion from a political 
perspective, when one participant noted that the question from the govern- 
ments' point of view was partly whether such subsidy programs were the 
most cost-effective way of keeping their clientele happy. Other commenta- 
tors noted that in some countries (e.g., Bangladesh) food subsidies had 
proved almost the only way to get anything to the rural poor, even if not 
very efficiently. Still others, while agreeing that food-subsidy programs 
were inevitably blunt instruments, noted that this was true of almost all 
policies in developing countries. Finally, various questions were raised 
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about Horton's analysis of the Tanzanian case. In particular, it was noted 
that the effectiveness with which the program was policed was an important 
determinant of the size of black markets and hence of the leakage away 
from the poor - and this characteristic of the program was said to have 
deteriorated over time. 
6 Agriculture and the Poor 
A common theme running through all the papers dealing with public expen- 
ditures and revenues is that the major impact of such policies is almost 
invariably on the urban poor (or rich). Most poor people in poor countries, 
however, live in rural areas. It is, therefore, particularly appropriate that 
the last paper in this volume, by Albert Berry, deals with the effects of agri- 
cultural and rural policies on the poor. Berry essentially sets out a `profes- 
sional's model' of agricultural policy, based largely on Taiwan, and then 
examines why this model seems so seldom to be followed elsewhere, illustra- 
ting his analysis by case studies of India and Brazil. 
In the course of his discussion, Berry makes a number of general points 
that are of interest. Noting, like every other author, the very considerable 
differences between countries, he argues that in the absence of any convinc- 
ing general development model, history is our best and almost only guide to 
what works. One important lesson he derives from his own analysis of 
historical experience in a number of countries, for instance, is that the 
precise manner in which a policy is implemented is often more important 
than the details of the policy itself. In an expression that should be familiar 
to all students of public policy in any country, policy without implementa- 
tion is nothing, policy plus implementation is policy - and implementation 
without policy is also policy. That is, what matters is not what people say 
they are doing or want to do but what they actually do. 
More specifically, Berry considers that there are three ingredients of a 
successful agricultural-development policy: increased output, widespread 
distribution of the benefits, and some control on population increase. The 
principal policies he identifies as key to achieving these results include 
agricultural research and technical improvements, population policy, land 
reform in at least some instances, and the implementation of adequate 
health, education, and food policies in rural areas. 
The first discussant supported the emphasis on research and population 
policy but argued that the set of policies influencing pricing and financial 
conditions - monetary, fiscal, and exchange-rate policy, for example - was 
considerably more important than Berry indicates. If these policies were off 
base, both agricultural and general development would be very adversely af- 
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fected. In Kenya, for example, inappropriate policies had exacerbated the 
external crisis of recent years, while in Botswana generally sound policies 
had greatly moderated its effects. 
Picking up two themes that had surfaced at several earlier points, the 
second discussant noted first that it was essential to relate policies to 
politically relevant groups and not just to such statistical abstracts as 
deciles. Second, this discussant again stressed that politicians were endoge- 
nous to the system and simply could not be treated as something to be 
tacked onto the end of the economic analysis. For example, could one learn 
anything useful from the Taiwan experience without knowing that the 
government was authoritarian in character? 
A related important point made in the subsequent discussion was that the 
Berry paper - indeed, all the papers in this book - follows the conventional 
rather than the radical or Marxist approach to the problems with which it is 
concerned. That is, it ignores what some consider to be the basic issue of 
conflict between classes and the role of government in this conflict as an 
instrument of the dominant class. A recent survey suggests that the implica- 
tions of this radical perspective have not really been thought through in 
detail or empirically tested, but that there is much more scope for careful, 
scientific work along these lines (Griffin and Gurley, 1985). 
It was also argued that the fashionable plea for adopting the `right prices' 
was not well founded if it was assumed, as often seemed to be done, that 
development would follow automatically without a good deal of govern- 
ment intervention. Countries such as Taiwan, Korea, and Brazil are by no 
means models of liberalism in trade policy, for example. In reply, other par- 
ticipants noted the obvious and avoidable damage done by mistaken trade 
and interest policies in various countries. Perhaps the best conclusion on 
this issue as it affects agricultural development came from one participant 
who noted that to say a country must get prices `right' means nothing in the 
absence of a great deal of information about specific circumstances. Mexi- 
can wheat is not Thai rice, and generalized advice to raise agricultural 
prices, for example, is probably just as wrong now as was the generalized 
advice to squeeze prices in agriculture that was current twenty years ago. 
7 Policy Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
While many different points are raised in the papers included in this volume 
- or were touched on in the conference discussion summarized in part above 
- four themes recurred again and again: the need to identify precisely the 
poor with whom we are concerned; the heterogeneity of the developing 
countries and the consequent difficulty of establishing the valid generaliza- 
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tions; the relative desirability of government intervention; and the diver- 
gence between the conventional economic approach to these problems and 
broader 'political-economy' approaches. In addition to illustrating the 
diversity of the experience and the prior beliefs of conference participants, 
as well as the relative newness of research on these subjects, each of these 
themes also suggests potentially fruitful areas for further research, which 
are developed briefly in this section. 
It is not a trivial matter to define who `the poor' are. Clearly, the absolute 
level of poverty is important: if those who are already poor become abso- 
lutely poorer in the course of economic development, there are obviously 
grounds for concern. Even if such an increase in absolute poverty were 
thought to be only transitory, or perhaps even an almost inevitable part of 
the structural changes accompanying development, such an outcome would 
obviously be most undesirable, given the low initial level of well-being of 
the poorest people in developing countries. In a sense, therefore, perhaps 
the most fundamental concept of poverty is in terms of absolute income 
standards. As the debate on `poverty lines' in this country has shown, how- 
ever, it is not that easy to define precisely who is to be considered poor in 
absolute terms. Because even the lowest poverty line that might be reason- 
ably drawn in Canada would probably include 99 per cent of the population 
in many developing countries, it is clear that the application of `absolute' 
poverty standards has a strong relative component. 
It is also clear that most of us are not concerned with absolute poverty 
alone. Relative position enters into people's perception of their well-being, 
so that if the poorest fall behind only in relative and not in absolute terms, 
there is still reason for concern. As a rule, therefore, income or expenditure 
deciles (or some similar percentile measures) tend to be used to identify the 
poor within any particular country. The `bottom 40 per cent,' for example, 
is perhaps the most common definition of the poor in the literature. This 
approach, too, has its problems. Should per capita or per household mea- 
sures be used? Income, expenditure, or consumption (that is, including 
services from durable goods such as housing)? Weekly, monthly, annual in- 
come, or income over some longer period? Apart from such definitional 
questions, there is also the problem that undue focus on relative measures 
may lead us to miss the more important changes in absolute levels of well- 
being. If the level of living of the poor is doubling every ten years - as has 
probably happened in Japan, for example - are they likely to be too upset 
by the fact that their relative share of the rapidly growing national pie is 
simultaneously shrinking? Should anyone be concerned? Why? 
One reason for raising this essentially philosophical question is that 
abstract measures such as income deciles are not likely to have any very 
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direct relation to policy matters in any case. Whether one is a Marxist, a 
neo-classical economist, or a pragmatic policy-maker, what matters is not a 
decile grouping but a class (the urban labour force), a factor of production 
(labour), or such politically relevant groups as the urban employed or 
landless rural labourers. However one looks at them, the fact is that the 
poor is most countries come from very heterogeneous groups. About all 
they have in common is their lack of productive assets such as physical 
capital, human capital, access to infrastructure, and access to political 
power. This commonality is obviously important, although not a very 
useful basis for policy interventions. What is even more important in the 
present context are the considerable differences that exist among different 
groups of the poor in different countries. In some countries, for example, 
urban labourers may be the poorest of the poor; in others, they may be 
thought of as well up the social and economic ladder. In all countries, dif- 
ferent policies are needed to help different poor groups - and the same 
policy may have very different effects on different groups. Poor urban 
labourers with jobs, for instance, are clearly helped by effective labour 
legislation such as minimum wages; those who do not get jobs as a result of 
the higher costs of employing labour are just as clearly hurt. 
Even within any well-defined group of the poor, there are still substantial 
problems in discovering and appraising the effects of any particular public 
policy. There may well be serious problems of horizontal equity. Two poor 
households equal in all respects except that in one someone smokes and in 
the other no one does, for example, will be treated very differently by a tax 
system relying heavily on tobacco taxes. Does this difference matter? There 
is no simple answer to this question. This same example can be used to bring 
out another problem in analysing the impact of public policy on the poor, 
namely, the tendency to treat the household as a `black box.' Does it make 
any difference if only men smoke? Or if men and women pool their earn- 
ings? Or if only the income of women goes to feed children? There is almost 
an infinite variety of such questions that might be asked about relationships 
within the variety of basic social groupings that constitute the essence of 
social reality in different developing countries. Again, it is hardly surprising 
that there are unlikely to be any simple answers. 
What seems needed to improve knowledge - and ultimately policy - with 
respect to these problems is, first, a much clearer definition of the precise 
nature of the object of inquiry (the poor) than is found in much of the 
literature. Second, it would also be helpful if we were told more precisely 
why this particular definition was chosen and what the implications of 
choosing it are. Third, more effort needs to be made to distinguish among 
different groups of poor people in terms of their relevance to policy, 
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whether as politically salient groups or as possible target groups for particu- 
lar policy measures. Fourth, in an increasing number of developing coun- 
tries, more use can be made of micro-data sets to explore these matters. 
And, finally, a good deal more thought needs to be devoted to the precise 
meaning and interpretation of the very differentiated results of particular 
policies that tend to be revealed when one does look closely at their micro 
effects. 
Just as the heterogeneity of the poor in any one country makes it both dif- 
ficult and perhaps dangerous to generalize too quickly about the effects of 
particular policies on them, so the heterogeneity of developing countries 
makes generalizations equally difficult. Very different effects may result 
from implementing the same policy in different economic and institutional 
circumstances. The person who initially receives a subsidy or pays a tax, for 
example, is not necessarily the one who ultimately receives the benefit or 
bears the tax burden. The ultimate effect of taxes and subsidies upon in- 
come distribution depends on the elasticity of supply of factors, the elas- 
ticity of demand for products, factor mobility, the degree of openness of 
the economy, and the degree of monopoly power prevailing in the markets 
in question, among other things. All these factors obviously vary greatly 
from country to country. 
Similarly, the effects of macro-economic policies and structural- 
development policies depend very much on the precise circumstances of the 
country in question, on the precise design of the policies, and - by no means 
least - on precisely how they are implemented. As in the case of fiscal 
policies, the indirect or secondary effects of such policies may turn out to be 
as important as their direct effects if not more important. All in all, despite 
the very considerable amount of research surveyed in this volume, the inevi- 
table conclusion is that we do not as yet know nearly as much as we should 
before making pronouncements about the effects of this or that policy on 
the poor in developing countries. 
Two types of research that may help alleviate this situation are compara- 
tive studies and detailed historical case studies. Although both of these 
approaches are decidedly out of fashion in economics today, work along 
these lines, especially quantitative work at both micro and macro levels, 
seems more likely to add to knowledge in these important areas than do 
either abstract theorizing or simplistic empirical studies based on published 
aggregate data. Several examples of such research are offered in the papers 
in this volume. Many other useful studies obviously remain to be done on 
such questions as the composition of expenditure cuts in countries under- 
going adjustment programs and the administrative costs of different ways 
of delivering relief to the poor. 
20 R.M. Bird and S. Horton 
To do such studies correctly requires not only intimate institutional 
knowledge of the countries in question but also considerable analytical and 
technical skills in order to be able to piece out a coherent and accurate story 
from the usually fragmentary and contradictory data and information that 
can be unearthed. As Bent Hansen (1985) recently noted, `protection of the 
poor is ... a serious matter and a difficult one to solve in a satisfactory way, 
at least in LDCS.' Only a very close examination of the successes and failures 
of actual policies in a variety of developing countries, and an attempt to 
disentangle the universal from the particular features of these cases, seem 
likely, over time, to provide enough of the kind of information needed to 
enable us to get a firm grasp on this serious and difficult problem. 
In the absence of an adequate accumulation of careful case studies and 
comparisons, what most commentators on policy and the poor tend almost 
inevitably to do is to draw on their own limited experience and perspectives 
as the basis for often sweeping generalizations. In no respect is this more 
likely to be done than with regard to the desirability of government inter- 
vention. Given that there appears to be virtually general consensus in the 
literature that the effects of government policy on the poor in most cases 
has in practice been less beneficial than hoped, what is to be done? 
One extreme view is that not only is there nothing that the governments in 
most developing countries should do - or at least nothing that they can do, 
given their limited (and often shrinking) administrative capacity - but that 
they should cease doing much of what they are now doing, precisely because 
it is inappropriate and fumbling government intervention that lies at the 
roots of much of the observed failure. At the opposite extreme, there are 
still those who hold the faith with respect to the ability of governments to 
resolve most of the ills of mankind, once freed from the toils of the interna- 
tional capitalist system and the evils of political systems controlled by the 
economically powerful. 
Although most researchers who have studied this subject would not 
adhere to either extreme view, many clearly lean in one direction or another. 
Some, for example, would like to see less government and more private ac- 
tivity in such fields as housing, food marketing, and even health and educa- 
tion. Others, noting the prevalence of market imperfections and externali- 
ties in some of these areas, doubt the benevolence of the workings of the 
unfettered market with respect to the poor and assert the continued need for 
government intervention in these and other areas. Even the latter group, 
however, nowadays appears often to agree that governments in most devel- 
oping countries would be well advised to confine their activities to those im- 
portant areas in which they must and can do something - and should collect 
better information about the effects of what they are doing. 
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The papers in this volume, for example, contain many suggestions about 
ways in which government policies might be reoriented and improved in im- 
plementation in order to improve their effects on the poor. More emphasis 
on primary education and preventive health care, particularly in rural areas, 
some downgrading of housing standards and increased affordability, in- 
creased targeting of food subsidies, and more explicit attention to the 
distributional aspects of stabilization programs are instances of the sorts of 
recommendations that are made. In almost all cases, however, it is also 
noted that a good deal more work is needed in order to do such things right, 
such as research on the parallel economy and particularly on the administra- 
tive aspects of public policy. 
Finally, apart from ideological or other reasons for favouring govern- 
ment over private action or vice versa - or for attributing the present ills of 
the poor in developing countries primarily to external or internal forces - 
another clear dividing line in the literature surveyed here is between those 
who take a conventional economic approach to this problem and those who 
insist that only a broader, interdisciplinary, 'political-economy' approach 
can get us very far with respect to these issues. Like most of the authors in 
this book, the editors are economists and are therefore inclined by training 
and preference to analyse problems as economists customarily do. More- 
over, we are firmly of the opinion that such analyses, as exemplified by 
several of the papers included here, make an invaluable contribution to the 
study of poverty in developing countries. More and better studies along 
these lines are therefore essential in the future if we are ever to get a handle 
on this serious and important problem. The marginal social utility of such 
contributions, it seems to us, will as a rule surely be much greater than that 
of yet another twist on some well-honed theoretical model or another 
econometric run at some set of published numbers. 
Nevertheless, it is also clear from the papers in this book that economics 
is not enough. What determines the success of particular policies? Why are 
some policies implemented in some countries and not in others? What are 
the relationships between economic position and political power, and how 
do these relationships affect what is done - or what can be done? Are policy 
changes that will help the poor easier or harder to bring about when times 
are difficult? Under what conditions is it possible to `do good by stealth,' 
that is, to introduce policies that aid the poor in addition to achieving some 
other, more obvious, purpose? What are the most policy-relevant character- 
istics of the poor, and how do these characteristics relate to the policy 
instruments available? Is it possible for the design and implementation of 
policy to be, so to speak, insulated from the pressing realities of daily life 
(as seems often to be assumed implicitly in economic analyses), and, if so, 
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under what conditions? There is an almost infinite variety of such questions 
that are highly relevant to the problem of protecting and improving the lot 
of poor people in developing countries - and the answer to none of them lies 
in economic analysis alone. 
Interdisciplinary work in the social sciences is in some disrepute today, in 
part for good reasons. Nevertheless, it is our firm conviction that further 
progress in understanding the interaction between poverty and policy lies 
not only in the further refinement and development of the tools of each 
discipline - as urged above for economics - but also in the greater openness 
and willingness of each to learn from the others. Economists, for instance, 
must learn to pay much closer attention to the institutional details that are 
usually - for good and understandable reasons - neglected in their standard 
disciplinary tool-kit, but which are so often critical in determining the out- 
come of their recommendations in the real world. At the same time, politi- 
cal scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and others would do well to pay 
more attention to the important lessons economics has to offer with respect 
to the workings of markets and the effects of different incentive structures 
on human behaviour. And both groups would do well to spend much more 
time first learning from those engaged in actually doing things - educators, 
physicians, builders, tax collectors - exactly what they are doing and why. 
Social scientists can then try to fit these realities into their disciplinary 
paradigms to the extent possible, rather than assuming they have the 
answers before they understand the questions. 
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Stabilization, Adjustment, and 
the Poor 
GERALD K. HELLEINER 
The impact of stabilization and adjustment programs upon income distribu- 
tion and the poor is a matter over which argument rages. `Usually,' Lance 
Taylor has said, `income [re]distribution against labour and the poor is im- 
plicit in stabilization attempts' (Taylor, 1983, p. 200). Particularly contro- 
versial in this context is the appropriate role of'the international financial 
institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in the con- 
struction and support of such programs. On the one hand, the managing 
director of the IMF declares (de Larosiere, 1984): 
It is often said that Fund programs attack the most disadvantaged segments of the 
population, but people forget that how the required effort is distributed among the 
various social groups and among the various public expenditure categories (arms 
spending or social outlays, productive investment or current operations, direct or 
indirect taxes) is a question decided by the governments ... A question that may be 
raised in this connection is whether the Fund should exert pressure in the determina- 
tion of government priorities and even make the granting of its assistance contingent 
on measures that would better protect the most disadvantaged population groups. 
An international institution such as the Fund cannot take upon itself the role of dic- 
tating social and political objectives to sovereign governments. 
On the other hand, `by remaining aloof from such questions [of income 
distribution] the Fund tacitly accepts the distributional policies of the 
government in power, whether it likes them or not. This, more often than 
Permission to reprint an edited version of this paper, which first appeared in World Devel- 
opment 15, no. 12 (Dec. 1987), has been granted by the publisher (published by Pergamon 
Journals, Ltd., Oxford, United Kingdom). 
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not, implies a de facto alignment with forces opposed to reduced inequali- 
ties ... the politics are inescapable' (Killick et al., 1984, p. 198). 
No less important are the instances in which Fund programs seem to be 
resisted by equity-oriented governments on the ground that they do not take 
sufficient account of their likely effects upon poverty and income distribu- 
tion. There are many sovereign governments, like that of Tanzania, that 
profess a particular interest in such objectives as `avoiding measures which 
would place the burdens of short-term adjustment on the most vulnerable 
groups' (United Republic of Tanzania, 1982, p. 5). An International La- 
bour Organization (ILO) mission report on Tanzania, addressing `the prob- 
lem of how to protect, strengthen and expand past achievements on basic 
needs against the threats that stem from the deterioration of the external en- 
vironment and from some failures of domestic policy' (1982, p. 2), notes 
that these threats `could be aggravated by orthodox remedies for balance of 
payments adjustments, such as cuts in recurrent Government expenditure 
on the social services and a drastic switch from food production for do- 
mestic consumption to export crops ... [Their] concern is to propose adjust- 
ment policies that would not hit the satisfaction of basic needs of the poor' 
(p. 3). 
UNICEF (1984, p. 169) has also offered a view quite different from that of 
the IMF: `The tendency for governments faced with recession to cut back on 
child-focused social expenditures (and measures which support poorer 
families) arises from many sources, domestic as well as international. But 
international influence is often critical, especially when linked to the 
negotiation of an IMF agreement or an international loan ... as a clear condi- 
tion of an agreement, as the technical advice of international experts or as 
the orthodox wisdom promoted in courses or less formal contacts.' 
There must always be a wide range of possible policy packages from 
which a borrower can and should choose in order to achieve precisely the 
same impact upon external balance, and therefore the capacity to repay in- 
ternational loans. Insistence upon any one policy package is analytically 
indefensible. (Realistically, the likelihood that any externally recommended 
policy package will `stick' clearly increases with the degree of local [bor- 
rower] input into its construction [see Stewart, 1984, pp. 203-4] - and that is 
true whether the borrowing government is interested in equity or not.) 
There can therefore be no analytical escape from consideration of the ques- 
tions of income distribution in assessments of global or national economic 
experience and policy alternatives. 
Not least among the reasons why professional attention must be directed 
at the effects of macro-economic experiences and policies upon distribution 
and/or poverty is the fact that these are now widely regarded as important 
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components of overall macro-economic performance. They also have obvi- 
ous political implications, although there is no easy link between poverty 
and political instability (Nelson, 1984). Whether they are consciously in- 
tended (or professionally analysed) or not, all policy packages imply certain 
distributional effects. One does not have to raise the fear (or hope?) that 
international lenders may `override a sovereign government on distribu- 
tional questions' in order to make the case that `distributional issues are a 
legitimate object of Fund concern' (Williamson, 1982, p. 34). Evidently, the 
effects of recent macro-economic experiences and policies upon poverty are 
already matters of grave concern to UNICEF and the ILO, among others 
(Cornia et al., 1987; ILO, 1986). They deserve more professional attention 
and analysis than they have so far received. In an admirable summary of the 
issues Killick et al. reaches a similar conclusion (1984, pp. 242-6, 285; see 
also Addison and Demery, 1985; Loxley, 1986). 
In this paper an attempt is made to survey the recent literature on the im- 
pact of stabilization and adjustment programs on the poor and to consider 
some of the key issues in the context of a particular equity-oriented low- 
income country. Section 1 considers some of the approaches and issues in 
earlier analyses. In section 2 the analysis of stabilization and adjustment is 
segmented into consideration of the effects of restructuring policies, macro- 
economic restraint, and strategic policy change. Section 3 reviews available 
evidence on the recent experience of Tanzania with external shock, efforts 
at stabilization, and relations with the IMF. A brief conclusion may be 
found in section 4. 
1 Previous Analyses and Approaches 
Most theorizing about income distributional effects of macro-economic 
change has addressed only the question of functional distribution and has 
done so in terms of comparative statics rather than via analyses of adjust- 
ment paths (Knight, 1976; Bruno, 1979; Ahluwalia and Lysy, 1981). The 
usual existence of a large informal sector and the frequent importance of a 
smallholder farm sector, within both of which incomes are an amalgam of 
returns to labour, capital, and land, greatly complicate theoretical analyses 
of the distributional impact of policy changes that depend upon expected 
changes in factor earnings. Functional distribution of income, while theo- 
retically tractable, therefore usually proves hopelessly unusable for the kind 
of distributional policy discussion at issue here. 
Until recently, the only publicly available analysis of distributional con- 
siderations in stabilization emanating from IMF sources was a theoretical 
paper (Johnson and Salop, 1980) that provided a promising beginning but 
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did not carry us too far. Its starting-point was the presumption that external 
imbalance is the product of over-expansion of demand, rather than exoge- 
nous shock, and that what is at issue is `reversal of the increased expen- 
diture ... [and] ... unwinding structural changes' (p. 8). Its main focus was 
upon functional, regional, sectoral, and public-private distribution rather 
than directly upon size distribution (by household or individual) or distribu- 
tion by socio-economic group, in which real-world analysts are generally 
more interested. Recent empirical study within the IMF of some of the 
distributional aspects of IMF-supported programs has been broader in its 
sweep but quite inconclusive in its results (Sisson, 1986). World Bank 
analysis of the distributional implications of structural adjustment pro- 
grams has also been perfunctory or inconclusive (Yagci et al., 1985, pp. 
129-32). 
What changes in size distribution of income ought one to expect during 
periods of macro-economic difficulty? Whatever the debates about its em- 
pirical verification (Anand and Kanbur, 1986), if the Kuznetsian U-curve 
were to be taken seriously, one might argue that at low levels of income, 
periods of unusual adversity might be accompanied by reduced concentra- 
tion in the overall distribution of income (although presumably not by any 
alleviation of poverty). In parts of sub-Saharan Africa, where non-market 
activities are still significant or constitute a realistic alternative for the 
energies of participants in a deteriorating market economy, recent experi- 
ence seems consistent with such expectations. Anecdotes abound, for exam- 
ple, of relatively buoyant (low-level) non-market and rural economies in the 
face of significant recent overall economic decline. At higher levels of per 
capita income, in contrast, on the right-hand side of the Kuznetsian U, 
deterioration of income might typically be accompanied by greater distribu- 
tional concentration. To the extent that some developing countries had been 
able to `advance' the Kuznetsian shift to increasing equity through policies 
of `redistribution with growth,' they, too, could expect macro-economic 
set-backs to reduce the equity of overall distribution. But the original Kuz- 
netsian hypotheses, and most other analyses of interrelationships between 
growth and income distribution, relate to long-run change rather than to 
short- or medium-term fluctuations. More to the point in current debates 
over stabilization and adjustment are the questions relating to changes in 
the distribution of income over relatively short periods and, particularly, to 
the welfare of the bottom end of the distribution. 
Analysis of the distributional incidence of short-term cut-backs in con- 
sumption of goods and services or sectoral restructuring requires knowledge 
of the context within which they are made. What may seem to be a `neutral' 
recommendation of proportional cut-backs for all (e.g., Feinberg, 1982) 
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will, in fact, generate greatly differing distributions of interpersonal or 
intergroup sacrifice depending on the initial distribution of income. What is 
regarded as `fair' or politically feasible can vary with the original distribu- 
tional context. That context may be the product of political circumstances 
as well as Kuznetsian ones. Suppose there has relatively recently been 
improvement in the level of living of bottom-end income recipients or 
reduction in their numbers or both - with or without overall income growth. 
(In some circumstances such improvements can contribute to external im- 
balance.) Can one expect these bottom-end gains to be protected during a 
subsequent macro-economic adjustment program, particularly one that re- 
quires overall retrenchment at least for a time? Should this be a domestic or 
international objective? Cross-national absolute standards have always 
proved exceedingly difficult to develop, and even more difficult to protect. 
Further complexities arise from the fact that immediate (short-run) distri- 
butional or poverty effects of macro-economic imbalances or stabilization 
and adjustment programs may be quite different from longer-run effects. 
Short-run cut-backs in the consumption levels of the poor may be out- 
weighed by future gains for them that current austerity helps to make possi- 
ble; then again, future social benefits may not accrue to them at all. Where, 
in addition to the usual distributional issues, there are also intertemporal 
reallocations of consumption, the appropriate methodology for assessing 
distributional effects is presumably the calculation of changes in the present 
value of future income streams, consequent upon the introduction of alter- 
native stabilization programs. Apart from the inherent difficulty of under- 
taking plausible calculations of this type with respect to an uncertain future, 
there is the usual analytical imbroglio over the choice of an appropriate dis- 
count rate. Wishful thinking on the part of policy-makers is likely to 
generate considerably smaller calculated effects upon the `permanent in- 
come' of the poor than upon their immediate income levels. Moreover, the 
poorest can be assumed to employ a significantly higher rate for the dis- 
counting of the future than others do. And the question as to whether there 
may have been other ways in which to assign the burden of short-run cut- 
backs always remains. For these reasons, while longer-run effects upon 
poverty and income distribution should also where possible be addressed, 
the prime issue should normally be the degree to which the immediate 
burden of adjustment falls upon the poor. 
Analytical problems and statistical deficiencies have long blocked 
satisfactory analysis - either at the level of specific countries or more 
generally - of the question of exactly `who are the poor?' There are even 
more ambiguities and unresolved issues relating to the question of the ade- 
quacy of the provision of basic needs (Streeten, 1984). The most convenient 
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procedure has typically involved the identification of certain socio- 
economic categories as `target groups,' e.g., small farmers, landless 
workers, unskilled labourers, informal-sector workers, members of particu- 
lar ethnic groups or castes, women, children. As far as global poverty issues 
are concerned, it should be self-evident that the lowest-income countries, 
where the largest numbers and proportions of `the poor' are concentrated, 
are those in which macro-economic difficulties are most likely to generate 
increased absolute poverty. 
Virtually all the available general equilibrium analyses of the distribu- 
tional effects of policy changes (summarized in Dervis, de Melo, and Robin- 
son, 1982, p. 406), which in their nature are comparative static and long-run 
in character, conclude that size distribution of income is remarkably stable, 
and thus difficult to alter through policy intervention. The composition of 
`the poor,' however, is highly susceptible, in these studies, to macro- 
economic and policy changes. Urban unskilled workers may replace rural 
smallholders at the bottom end of the income distribution, or conversely, 
even if there is no recorded difference in the proportion living at absolute 
poverty levels. Despite overall stability of size distribution, the welfare of 
the poorest and subgroups thereof can still be altered to a degree that is 
highly significant.for them by macro-economic experience and policy. For 
these and other reasons, there has been increasing interest in the impact of 
changes upon particular socio-economic groups. 
Simulation of the effects of external shocks and policy responses upon 
income distribution and poverty using computable general equilibrium 
models, whatever their limitations, is still in its infancy, and remains vir- 
tually untried in the lowest-income countries. It has nevertheless clearly 
demonstrated that `differences in economic environment alone suffices to 
make different groups gain or lose, even with the same adjustment policy. 
Different adjustment policies also have quite different effects on the distri- 
bution' (Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson, 1982, p. 458). The complexity of 
the interrelationships demands that, wherever possible, analytical ap- 
proaches allow for them to be pursued. But the effort required for such ex- 
ercises is considerable, and for most developing countries they remain out- 
side the bounds of possibility for some time to come. Typically one must try 
to make do with much cruder and more partial approaches. 
In more partial analyses, it is important to distinguish between the 
effects upon distribution and poverty of (i) efforts at restructuring the 
economy towards the production of relatively more (and the consumption 
of relatively less) tradable goods and services (exportables and import 
substitutes), principally via the rejigging of relative product and factor 
prices, e.g. through (real) exchange-rate devaluation, and necessary in- 
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vestments; (ii) macro-economic contraction or reduction in absorption, of 
various kinds; and (iii) changes in overall strategy that sometimes accom- 
pany stabilization and adjustment programs, e.g., financial or trade 
liberalization, reduction in the size of the public sector, new approaches to 
income distribution. 
Structural adjustment programs, including those promoted by the World 
Bank, usually lump elements of the first two together with questions of the 
third type in what their advocates describe as an inseparable package. 
However, clarity in the analysis of short- to medium-term effects of 
stabilization and adjustment programs, per se, is aided by the clear separa- 
tion of matters of longer-term strategy. This paper will not explore the in- 
terrelationships between longer-term strategies and distribution or poverty. 
2 Stabilization and Adjustment Programs 
A Restructuring 
Efforts to restructure incentives so as to increase the production of 
tradables may take many forms, including various administrative devices, 
but typically involve attempts to alter the real exchange rate by nominal 
devaluation. Devaluation must have immediate distributional conse- 
quences. An IMF staff member has put the point well: `An exchange rate 
action becomes a highly charged political decision precisely because it pro- 
duces change in the distribution of income between producers (or potential 
producers) of foreign exchange and consumers of foreign exchange' 
(Mohammed, 1984, p. 188). In cases of severe initial imbalance, it may also 
`validate' price changes that have already occurred in local markets, thereby 
reducing economic rents enjoyed by those previously enjoying favoured ac- 
cess to under-priced foreign exchange. 
This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the likely impact of 
devaluation. But there is a rising consensus that the short-run effects will 
frequently be both deflationary for demand and inflationary for prices. 
Such demand deflation may reduce employment in the shortrun. If there is 
excess capacity in the tradable-goods sector, however, employment may 
soon rise again. Whether these employment effects translate directly into 
conclusions as to poverty effects depends on the nature of the economy. In 
some cases, the urban unemployed are not the poorest. 
In the first instance, those who consume tradables will be hit the hardest 
by increased prices. The effects of the changing structure of prices cannot 
be understood without knowledge of domestic market structures, price- 
control systems, and the like, and the typical budgets at different income 
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levels or in different socio-economic groups. (Strictly, one also needs infor- 
mation as to the substitutability of various items in consumption as relative 
prices alter.) If more generalized inflation results, the consequences become 
even harder to unravel. 
The distributional implications of price inflation and financial disorder 
are not as simple as they are sometimes portrayed. One simply cannot 
generalize from the evidence of higher-income countries - to the effect that 
the poor are hit the hardest because 'lower-income groups tend to have the 
least access to assets whose values rise pari passu with inflation' (Johnson 
and Salop, 1980, p. 3). In sub-Saharan Africa those engaged primarily in 
subsistence activities, typically among the poorest, have been very little af- 
fected by raging inflation in the monetized sector. It has also been plausibly 
argued that the casual (and very poor) workers found in many of the devel- 
oping countries' labour markets, through the frequency of their recontract- 
ing, have built-in resistance to the real wage deterioration that typically 
follows from unexpectedly high rates of price inflation in more formal 
labour markets (Nugent and Glezakos, 1982). However, there are both 
theoretical reasons and some evidence to suggest that rapid price inflation 
will generate faster increases in food prices than in the general price level; 
and this circumstance will impact disproportionately upon major poverty 
groups: landless rural workers, urban labour, and the urban unemployed 
(Killick et al., 1984, p. 47). The evidence on inflation's effects (let alone the 
effects of varying rates of price inflation) upon poverty and income distri- 
bution is unfortunately still quite spotty. 
The restructuring, which it is the object of altered incentive structures to 
accomplish, will, of course, also carry distributional implications. Apart 
from the possibility of expanded employment through the use of previously 
underutilized capacity, what other overall effects upon employment, 
poverty, and distribution would one expect from shifts out of some produc- 
tive activities (notably non-tradables) into others (tradables)? Considerable 
research energy has been devoted to demonstrating that manufacturing for 
export is likely to be more labour intensive than import-substituting manu- 
facturing (e.g., Krueger, 1981). But rather less has been devoted to other 
no less interesting comparisons, e.g., the factor-intensity characteristics of 
import-competing food production versus various kinds of exporting; and 
comparisons of these and other characteristics relevant to distributional 
considerations of different types and patterns of export activity, e.g., small- 
holder agriculture, estate agriculture, other primary products, export pro- 
cessing zones, the use of excess capacity in what were originally import- 
substituting industrial establishments. Most important of all, we need to 
know how various categories of non-tradables typically compare with 
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tradables in respect of these various production characteristics. The 
presumption must be that most non-tradables are highly labour intensive, 
e.g., construction, government, and other services. Indeed, `switching from 
non-tradables to tradables' may sometimes be seen as little more than a 
euphemism for reducing wages and employment in government and the 
organized service sector, relative to other sectors. Clearly, much also 
depends on the intersectoral mobility of labour (and other resources and 
factors). The overall impact of restructuring upon total factor demand may 
thus generate redistribution at the expense of labour, particularly in the for- 
mal sectors, even when resources are shifted primarily in the direction of 
export activity that is labour intensive relative to most import-competing 
activity. 
How such changes affect income distribution and poverty depends very 
much on the specifics of each case. Where resources are shifted from urban 
services to smallholder farmers to permit them either to grow more import- 
substituting food or export crops, as occurs in sub-Saharan Africa today, 
equity may increase and poverty decline. This effect is even more likely if 
displaced urban workers still have the option of returning to their villages. 
However, similar resource shifts toward estate agriculture or mining activity 
may, in other cases, widen income disparities and worsen the problems of 
urban marginal groups. In one simulation of the primary-exporting Colom- 
bian economy, the results of which are obviously dependent on the detailed 
assumptions of the model, subsidies to expand exports appear to increase 
poverty whereas import tariffs lower it (Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson, 
1982). 
B Macro-economic Restraint 
Adverse external shocks of a long-run or permanent nature require restruc- 
turing towards tradables; but if this move cannot be achieved quickly and if 
there is inadequate offsetting expansion in external credit, external balance 
will require that overall spending contract. The degree to which such macro- 
economic restraint is required thus depends upon both the success of inter- 
nal restructuring and external circumstances over which a country has very 
little influence. While restructuring can itself, as has been seen, have either 
positive or negative effects upon the welfare of labour and the poorest (two 
categories which, again, are not synonymous), contraction of overall spend- 
ing is almost certain to lower the well-being of both. The pursuit of poverty- 
related objectives, therefore, would seem to require minimizing the need for 
such deflationary measures, and to call for special attention to supply-side 
policies - encouraging investment in bottleneck-breaking and relevant 
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restructuring activities. An appropriate incentive structure, particularly an 
appropriate real effective exchange rate and targeted domestic investment 
spending, via governmental and parastatal budgets, targeted credit, and 
tax-cum-subsidy arrangements, together with the necessary input of exter- 
nal credit, is the obvious requisite for minimizing the need for and the im- 
pact of deflation. 
Faster domestic structural readjustment or greater provision of external 
finance to ease the adjustment process means that less consumption and in- 
come have to be cut. Econometric models that allow for production and 
consumption elasticities and reallocations - and, implicitly, longer time 
horizons - will, therefore, simulate different (less devastating) results from 
external adverse shocks for the welfare of the poor. 
In recent years, despite significant restructuring success, inherent 
rigidities together with inadequate external credit have forced most of the 
non-oil developing countries to respond to major external shocks through 
severe cut-backs in overall spending. During the second major external 
shock of the past decade (1979-83), investment cut-backs accounted for 
proportionately a much larger share of these aggregate cut-backs than in 
1973-5 (Helleiner, 1986a). These cut-backs in investment, made necessary 
by the political limits to further reductions in consumption, have themselves 
slowed the restructuring process and thereby created a need for even longer 
maintenance of restraint policies. 
The roots of macro-economic imbalance may also lie in domestic `over- 
heating.' Macro-economic contraction in response to such domestic over- 
absorption may be thought normally to follow a course that simply reverses 
previous inappropriate expansion, and thus to reverse any associated in- 
come redistribution. But there should be no such presumption with respect 
to the incidence of contractionary monetary and fiscal policies. If, for 
example, previous over-expansion of demand was associated with attempts 
to improve the welfare of the poorest, it may be appropriate or even politi- 
cally necessary to allow for a `ratchet' that limits any reversal in their gains 
and imposes the required cut-backs somewhere else. Much may also depend 
upon whether cut-backs are achieved through consumption cuts (savings in- 
creases) or investment cuts. Where the adjustment mechanism primarily 
takes the form of domestic savings adjustment (upward) to permit con- 
tinued investment at previous rates, one can expect, on Kaldorian assump- 
tions (that capitalists save whereas wage-earners do not), that there will 
have to be a major redistribution of income from labour to capital or, on 
Keynesian ones (that, on the margin, the rich save proportionally more than 
the poor), from low-income earners to higher-income ones. Similarly, 
whether the cuts impact upon the public or the private sectors may have 
33 Stabilization, Adjustment, and the Poor 
significant distributional implications. While there may be some exceptions, 
and detailed empirical analysis is rare, the usual presumption is that overall 
government expenditures are more equitably distributed than private ones, 
and that public-sector cut-backs are more likely to harm the poor than are 
private expenditure cut-backs of equal size. (In fact, cut-backs in public 
expenditure may also engender further reductions in private expenditure.) 
The distributional consequences of particular fiscal and monetary 
policies may be quite difficult to establish. In principle, it should be rela- 
tively easy to identify ex post the losers from actual cut-backs in govern- 
mental expenditures and increases in governmental revenues by analysing 
their composition. As always, however, expenditure and accounting 
classifications are not usually those one would want for an exercise of this 
kind; and there remain difficult issues relating to the possibility of shifting 
the apparent incidence of tax and expenditure changes to others. It would 
be a useful exercise to seek cross-section evidence as to the `viscosity' of dif- 
ferent kinds of governmental expenditure in response to changing overall 
expenditure levels. `Ratchet effects' that vary in intensity across categories 
of expenditure may make revenue or, expenditure-elasticity data derived 
from periods of rising incomes and expenditures of limited use for the 
analysis of the likely composition of cut-backs. The Latin American and 
African experience of the past decade, and particularly the last five years, 
should offer plenty of scope for careful testing of the popular proposition 
that, whatever the composition of expenditures when they are rising, cut- 
backs typically impact disproportionately upon social programs and the 
poorest. Some (inadequately disaggregated) analysis has suggested that 
social sectors suffered less than others when cut-backs occurred in the 1970s 
(Hicks and Kubish, 1984). There is also evidence that the poorest may not 
be major beneficiaries of social expenditures; if this is the case, they will ob- 
viously not lose from cut-backs in them. In principle, again, at least at the 
technical level, it should be possible to target cut-backs and taxes so as to 
minimize the effects upon the poorest. The particular mix of revenues and 
expenditures actually selected in any restraint program is obviously only one 
of an infinite range of possibilities. 
In this context, the issue with respect to food or other consumer subsidies 
is not so much whether they always raise the welfare of the poorest or how 
they might be constructed so as to achieve that result (Horton, 1984) as the 
likely effects of their removal, on fiscal policy grounds, in specific country 
cases. While the principal beneficiaries of such subsidies are typically urban 
dwellers, and these are not always the poorest, a number of careful analyses 
of specific country cases demonstrates that food subsidies can have signifi- 
cant poverty-alleviating effects. The Egyptian food-pricing and rationing 
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system, for example, significantly redistributes income toward both the 
urban and the rural poor (Alderman and von Braun, 1984). In Thailand, 
raising the (artificially depressed) price of rice would have minimal effects 
upon rural poverty because most of the gains would be realized by large 
commercial farmers, while in the short-to-medium run it would noticeably 
reduce the incomes of the urban poor (Trairatvorakul, 1984). The restruc- 
turing of Sri Lanka's rice subsidy system in 1978-9, which assuredly saved 
on the government budget, appears to have had a strongly negative impact 
upon nutrition among the poor (Edirisinghe, 1984; Isenman, 1980, p. 240). 
These cases illustrate the naivety and possible perversity of generalized ad- 
vice to reduce or eliminate governmental interventions in food (or other) 
markets purely on stabilization and adjustment grounds. There exists a 
distinct possibility, contrary to much received wisdom (e.g., Finch, 1982, p. 
78; Adelman and Robinson, 1978), that raising agricultural prices may ac- 
tually worsen poverty problems (see also Ghai and Smith, 1983). None of 
this account is meant to suggest that existing subsidy schemes cannot be im- 
proved or that all ostensibly poverty-oriented market interventions achieve 
their objectives. The point is, rather, that each country case deserves careful 
analysis, that there exist governments effectively pursuing equity objectives 
through market intervention and even rationing measures, and that simple 
generalized answers to adjustment problems are of dubious value and cer- 
tainly not distributionally neutral. 
The analysis of the effects of generalized monetary contraction or credit 
ceilings upon poverty or income distribution is particularly difficult because 
these effects are mediated through a complex system of credit rationing and 
financial markets. In all economies, credit restraint and interest-rate in- 
creases hit some groups with much greater impact than others. Those who 
can finance themselves are least affected, and those who are most depen- 
dent upon credit, least flexible, and least influential in financial institutions 
are hit the hardest; but who these groups are obviously varies from place to 
place. `Generalized' monetary restraint is never `neutral' in its impact. Par- 
ticularly deserving of analysis, however, are governmental attempts ex- 
plicitly to influence the distribution and cost of credit to identifiable lower- 
income groups. 
Financial liberalization and interest-rate `reform' are matters that prop- 
erly belong in the category of strategic choice. The evidence that interest 
rates are significantly correlated with aggregate domestic-savings rates is by 
no means unambiguous, and orthodox argument has gradually eased away 
from firm pronouncements in this regard (Giannini, 1983; Arida, 1984, pp. 
26-32; Khan and Knight, 1985, p. 14). Higher interest rates are unam- 
biguously likely to draw savings into the formal financial intermediation 
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sector, including, in many countries, parts owned or controlled by the state, 
and thus to reduce `financial repression' where it exists. In some instances - 
but by no means all - such a policy may also reduce capital flight abroad or 
even engender inflows of both previously expatriated domestic capital and 
fresh foreign capital. Whether redirecting savings into organized financial 
markets improves allocation, stability, or equity remains a matter of some 
dispute. It may reduce the role of efficient curb markets and even lower the 
total supply of loanable funds. It may also reduce the credit rationing role 
of the state. In both these instances the welfare of lower-income groups may 
suffer from the change in allocation mechanisms. It is also quite possible to 
overshoot, from a social standpoint, both with interest-rate increases and 
with financial liberalization. And such reforms can stimulate inflation. 
These matters are clearly not inherently matters purely, or even primarily, 
of stabilization and adjustment policy (e.g., Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Roe, 
1982; Taylor, 1983). 
Whatever one may conclude about distributional effects, there must be a 
strong presumption that, other things being equal, macro-economic con- 
traction will worsen poverty. While the relationship is not tight, and there is 
room for offsetting policies, there must also be a presumption that the 
greater the reduction in overall absorption, the greater the adverse impact 
upon poverty. 
C Strategy Change 
Changes in overall strategy may be initiated at the same time as a stabiliza- 
tion and adjustment program; particularly is this likely if the latter program 
is the product of a change of government. Pressure from international 
financial institutions today directs borrowing governments toward in- 
creased reliance upon market forces, trade and financial liberalization, and 
a reduced role for the state and state-owned enterprises. Only a few years 
ago the World Bank exerted pressure upon prospective borrowers to pursue 
policies and projects that would improve the welfare of the poorest; but this 
thrust has been abandoned in recent discussions of structural adjustment, at 
least in part because of diminished confidence that ostensibly poverty- 
oriented programs were actually helping the poor. It may be extremely dif- 
ficult in practice to disentangle changes in overall strategy from programs 
of stabilization and adjustment in some countries. Indeed, proponents of 
the more extreme versions of current `orthodoxy' would seem to have it that 
today's macro-economic imbalances usually originate primarily, or in large 
part, from strategic deficiencies and that adjustment necessarily implies a 
strategic (pro-market) change of direction. Recent and current macro- 
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economic difficulties reflect, in their view, the piling of external shocks 
upon more deep-seated underlying problems of strategic misdirection. More 
plausible to most harassed decision makers in developing countries is the 
possibility that traditional advocates of market-oriented approaches are 
using the current opportunity of an unusually severe global economic 
environment to press their unchanged views upon countries now desperately 
in need of external assistance. 
Issues of development strategy relating to such matters as the role of the 
public sector, the degree of `openness,' and the appropriate degree of atten- 
tion to be devoted to income distribution remain matters of political and 
professional disagreement, in which ideology and politics are at least as 
important as economic analysis. In principle, therefore, changes in these 
strategic dimensions should be analysed separately from programs of 
stabilization and adjustment, pure and simple, in which what is at issue is 
simply some combination of deflation and restructuring. Much of the Latin 
American stabilization debate has been confused by the consideration of 
cases in the Southern Cone where stabilization objectives were coupled with 
another, strategic, agenda (e.g., Foxley, 1981). 
3 The Tanzanian Case 
A proper test of the inherent interrelationship between shocks, stabiliza- 
tion, and poverty and income distribution requires analysis of cases in 
which there was no sharp break in the government regime during the period 
of observation. A stronger test of whether shocks and stabilization efforts 
must impact particularly severely (or for that matter impact at all) upon the 
poor is offered by analysis of cases in which governments retain clear com- 
mitments to equity objectives. Such cases are also likely to reveal equity- 
based sources of conflict, if they exist, between governments and the 
orthodoxy of the international financial institutions. 
The limits to the capacity of even an unusually equity-oriented govern- 
ment of a low-income country to protect the welfare of the poor in the face 
of a deteriorating macro-economic environment are sadly evident in Tan- 
zania. It can be argued that Tanzanian development strategy had been mis- 
guided in some of its particulars during the 1970s but, until 1978, its growth 
rate was well above the sub-Saharan African average (World Bank, 1981, 
p. 144), macro-economic management was cautious, the inflation rate was 
fairly modest (13 per cent), and the economy had successfully weathered the 
severe external shocks of 1974-5 (Green, Rwegasira, and Van Arkadie, 
1981). At the same time, accomplishments in the realm of basic needs provi- 
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sions were impressive. In the twenty years after independence, Tanzania 
raised life expectancy from 42 to 51 years, and adult literacy from 10 per 
cent to 79 per cent, among the very highest rates in the World Bank's 'low- 
income' category (World Bank, 1984). Fifty per cent of the population ac- 
quired access to potable water. Rural health centres and dispensaries greatly 
expanded in number as part of a general health policy emphasizing preven- 
tive medicine, though the very low starting-point still left Tanzania sadly 
deficient in medical facilities, by global standards. 
External shocks in the form of terms of trade collapse took rising shares, 
averaging over 10 per cent (nearly 15 per cent in 1983), from prior levels of 
Tanzanian gross domestic product (GDP) during the 1979-82 period 
(Balassa and McCarthy, 1984, p. 83). Further blows were imparted by the 
costs of the 1979 Uganda war, the breakdown of the East African Com- 
munity, and an unusual succession of droughts. Green estimates that Tan- 
zania obtained no more than 15-20 per cent of the financing it would have 
required to offset the external blows to its current account in the 1978-84 
period. Barely 1 per cent was in the form of low-conditionality finance or 
`liquidity' (Green, 1984, pp. 42-3). `Exceptional' financing in the form of 
supplier credits and accumulation of arrears on external payments, and, 
above all, massive cut-backs in import volume and thus in output were the 
inevitable results. 
Per capita income is estimated (by the World Bank) to have dropped by 
between 15 and 20 per cent in 1980-2, and it probably fell by about that 
much again in the subsequent two years. It seems safe to assume that per 
capita income fell by at least 25 per cent between 1979 and 1984-5. (Green, 
1984, p. 43, arrives at a comparable figure.) Whereas there was a reasonable 
degree of success with efforts both to stabilize and to protect the poorest in 
the 1974-5 period of external pressure, events this time overcame the possi- 
bilities. 
The principal macro-economic policy measures employed by the Govern- 
ment of Tanzania during the first half of the 1980s were: 
- currency devaluations - a small `technical adjustment' in 1982, followed 
by two major devaluations in 1983-4, making a total of roughly 50 per 
cent (in terms of U.S. dollars) between 1980 and 1984; 
- major real cuts and reorientation towards agriculture in the development 
budget; 
- reductions in real public expenditures on defence and social services, and 
reorientation of public expenditures on the productive sectors towards 
rehabilitation and maintenance; 
- increased taxes on beer, cigarettes, and other consumer goods; 
- holding nominal wages fixed from 1981 until 1984, and then raising them 
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by significantly less than required to make up the effects of inflation in 
the interim; 
- substantially raising nominal producer prices for agricultural cash crops 
so as at least to limit real declines. 
Despite these and many other more `structural' policy changes, for exam- 
ple, in marketing and distribution (reduced price controls, increased flex- 
ibility and restoration of the role of the cooperatives in agricultural 
marketing, concentrated efforts to raise marketing efficiency) and in 
governmental institutions, these measures fell far short of what was 
required to restore macro-economic balance. The government resorted to 
significant borrowing from the Central Bank with inevitable consequences 
for the domestic rate of price inflation. Rapid domestic inflation was less 
than offset by currency devaluations, so that the real effective value of the 
currency continued to rise. Even after the 1984 devaluation, it remained 
substantially over-valued relative to its level in the early 1970s (before exter- 
nal shocks made even that level unsustainable). Major restructuring 
towards increased production and reduced consumption of tradable goods 
was and is still required. And it is difficult to see how it can be achieved, 
even with further rejigging of incentives, as long as total absorption, and 
particularly intermediate goods imports and investment, must be so con- 
strained by the need to maintain short-term, external balance. Only a major 
infusion of foreign exchange - such as might result from vigorous global 
recovery or from increased external assistance - seems likely to be able to 
break the current bottlenecks. 
It is difficult to work out the details of the distribution of the effects of 
shock, restraint, and adjustment efforts in Tanzania. Such crucial data as 
those on GDP, the rate of price inflation, and informal sector and parallel 
market activity are among those that are either unavailable or extremely 
shaky. (An assessment of some of the major data limitations may be found 
in ILO, 1982, technical appendices.) Certainly urban real wages plunged by 
proportions greater than those for the economy as a whole, and the reduc- 
tions were even greater for higher income earners. Official price indexes 
may understate the real rate of urban inflation as items in the `basket' are 
frequently not available at all, and unofficial premiums may be paid above 
shop prices by buyers who can afford them in order to assure their supplies. 
As well, there has been increasing unrecorded resort to urban subsistence 
activity (chickens, food crops, etc.) and `grey' activities, notably trading, on 
the part of urban dwellers; opportunities for these possibilities are un- 
doubtedly greater for those at higher income levels. For what they are 
worth, the data on real minimum wages suggest a decline in the order of 
nearly 40 per cent over the 1980-4 period. (In 1980 the real minimum wage 
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was already about 25 per cent below the level of a decade previously.) An 
upward adjustment of nominal wages in the mid-1984 budget was offset by 
simultaneous removal of the previous heavy subsidy on maize flour 
(sembe), the basic foodstuff, and other tax and price increases associated 
with a 26 per cent devaluation. Under the new (1984) nominal wage and tax 
structure, with continuing price inflation of at least 35 per cent (annual 
rate), the real wage probably dropped to less than half the level of 1980 in 
1985. Most observers agree that the urban unskilled worker was already liv- 
ing at a lower level than the average subsistence farmer in the early 1980s 
(Green, 1984; u.o, 1982, p. 256). Employment in the formal sector was 
maintained (indeed, some figures suggest it even grew, though at a less rapid 
rate than previously); this protection of employment was obviously at the 
cost of significant declines in labour productivity as utilization of capacity 
and overall economic activity declined. The sharp drop in urban real in- 
comes must have generated parallel reductions in the incomes of urban 
small and informal-sector business, and declining real wages and employ- 
ment in this sector. (In a survey of firms in the Dar es Salaam informal sec- 
tor in 1981 [ILO, 1982], unpaid family labour made up 50 per cent of total 
labour input and hired labour earned less, on average, than the minimum 
wage.) Government expenditures on both capital and recurrent accounts 
were severely cut in real terms - to the cost of the availability of services; 
maintenance of roads, buildings, and equipment; and the supply of crucial 
inputs to schools, dispensaries, and other social services. The decline in the 
overall quality of life in the capital city is instantly visible and much com- 
mented upon by returning visitors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
rural/urban migration has stopped, and there has probably been a reverse 
flow (at least from Dar es Salaam) in the last few years. 
The urban formal sector is too small for even very severe cuts in its in- 
come to cushion the rest of the economy from the effects of such sharp 
overall decline. Real grower prices for cash crops - for both export and 
domestic food - dropped significantly, along with other measures of 
economic activity. Domestic real prices for export crops had been permitted 
to decline over the 1970s largely in consequence of rising domestic 
marketing margins but also in response to a new policy emphasis on food 
production (Ellis, 1982). They now dropped even further - more or less in 
parallel with the decline of real world prices. The real price declines for cof- 
fee shown in table 2.1 were about 45 per cent between 1969 and 1980, and 
another 49 per cent over the 1980-4 period. Cotton price declines, while 
severe, were not quite as steep. (Coffee and cotton have been the most 
important smallholder export crops. Similar real producer price declines oc- 
curred in other Tanzanian agricultural exports, with the single exception of 
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cashew nuts.) The effects of these declines upon smallholder incomes were 
undoubtedly moderated by the opportunities for expanding both subsis- 
tence activities and sales of increasingly profitable food crops in uncon- 
trolled or `parallel' local markets. How much rural real incomes actually 
fell is therefore impossible to quantify accurately. The burden of the overall 
external shock seems, however, to have been borne disproportionately by 
urban dwellers. (The further shocks imparted by bad weather are, of 
course, another matter.) 
It became a matter of conscious adjustment policy, beginning in 1983, to 
raise real producer prices for export crops (by 5 per cent per year). While in 
1983-4 inflation continued slightly to outstrip nominal grower price in- 
creases, the government was now firmly committed to halting and reversing 
the previous downward slide in real grower prices. As has been seen, urban 
real incomes and incomes in the formal sector, primarily in government ser- 
vices, probably continued to decline. 
The net effect of this `adjustment' experience - and effective stabilization 
and adjustment are still far from achieved - was further to narrow intra- 
urban real wage differentials (though some of this effect may be offset by 
increased `grey' income at the higher end); to eliminate and probably even 
reverse previous rural/urban unskilled labour differentials; and to reduce 
accessibility and quality in the previously widespread provision of health 
services, basic education, and water supplies. Urban poverty has certainly 
increased, although real declines have probably been somewhat buffered by 
the possibility of return migration to rural areas. Weather effects may have 
been just as severe as external ones in the creation of significant, though 
smaller, increases in rural poverty. The heaviest blows outside the capital 
city were probably registered by the decline and decay of public social ser- 
vices. 
Disagreement between the Government of Tanzania and the IMF centred 
on the handling of agricultural prices and the exchange rate, the degree of 
`shock' that the economy and polity could sustain, the role of the public sec- 
tor, and the attention to be paid to income distribution. There can be no 
doubt that the Tanzanians erred in allowing many agricultural producer 
prices and the exchange rate quickly to reach inappropriate values and, 
subsequently, in being too slow to correct their massive currency over- 
valuation. But, once out of line, it is not so evident that Tanzanian advo- 
cacy of a more gradual process of price adjustment and devaluation - as 
opposed to the `shock,' once-for-all attempt to restore real grower incen- 
tives and an appropriate real exchange rate through a massive nominal 
devaluation that the fund recommended - was incorrect. 
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TABLE 2.1 
Indexes of real minimum wage and selected real producer prices 
for export crops, Tanzania, 1969 and 1980-5 
Real producer pricesb 
Real minimum wages Coffee Cotton 
1969 100 100 100 
1980 74 54 65 
1980 100 100 100 
1981 96 85 84 
1982 76 80 76 
1983 59 63 74 
1984 63 53 72 
1985 48 57 86 
a 1969-80 data calculated from ILO, 1982, p. 268. Post-1980 wage data from official 
announcements; price data were calculated from price inflation figures cited in the 
Speech of the Minister for Finance to the National Assembly, 14 June 1984 (moving his 
year-to-year price-change data one year forward). Inflation rate for 1984-5 has been 
estimated at 30 per cent. 
b Ellis (1982), for 1969-80. For later years, data are those of the Tanzanian Ministry of 
Agriculture, converted to 1979-80 base. 1985 data estimated on basis of announced crop 
prices and assumed 30 per cent inflation rate. 
Inefficiencies in the public sector, particularly in the agricultural 
marketing boards, which were much discussed in Fund/Bank consultations, 
are matters of longer-run concern. The previous Tanzanian record of exper- 
imentation, assessment, and reform suggested that they could and would, in 
time, restructure their institutions if they were not effectively functioning; 
and so, in substantial degree, they have done. While they certainly are rele- 
vant to future Tanzanian economic performance, these `strategic' matters 
will not be regarded here as part of the stabilization and adjustment effort. 
It is not evident, in retrospect, that there were great disagreements of 
distribution-related policy substance between the Fund and the Tanzanians 
so much as there were differences of principles and of approach. Major dif- 
ferences with respect to distributional policy were not possible in the face of 
such severe macro-economic constraints. The Fund's missions resolutely 
refused to analyse matters of distributional equity or the broader much- 
publicized aspirations (and considerable successes) of the Tanzanian 
government with respect to the reduction of poverty. (The World Bank, 
which had been deeply involved in the development of strategies designed to 
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meet basic needs in Tanzania and elsewhere, was much more sensitive at 
that time in these matters.) The Tanzanians insisted that they were funda- 
mental. 
Tanzania's `social' achievements can be regarded as long-gestation- 
period investments that many would argue will eventually yield high returns 
provided they are not permitted to depreciate unduly. The World Bank, 
which actively encouraged a basic-needs-oriented strategy, as did many 
other aid donors in the 1970s, specifically warned, in its 1980 World 
Development Report, of the `serious danger that economic stringency in the 
next few years will lead to cutbacks in human development programs, 
despite the importance of their contribution - often exceeding that of addi- 
tional physical investment - to Africa's long-term development potential' 
(p. 86). For the international community now to demand severe cut-backs 
on the ground that Tanzania could not afford its anti-poverty programs 
would have seemed, at best, tactless and, quite possibly, cruelly false 
economy. Whatever else it may have advised, the Fund did not apparently 
directly target poverty-oriented programs for cuts. 
One informed observer summarizes as follows: 
The linked issues of absolute poverty eradication and of income distribution have 
certainly been ones on which Tanzania and the Fund have not seen eye to eye. 
However, because Tanzania's rural bias and the Fund's desire to raise the real price 
of exportables ran in parallel ... the actual income distribution debates have turned 
largely on agreeing prudent levels of export crops ... Fund missions have avoided tar- 
geting health, education and water specifically as areas for expenditure cuts ... Thus 
in fact income distribution and basic services have not, at least since 1979, surfaced 
in an overtly ideological way. (Green, 1984, p. 30) 
As has been seen, changes in the structure of prices for consumed 
products can have profound distributional consequences and, particularly, 
increases in basic foodstuff prices can severely impact upon the poor. 
Though more difficult to measure, changes in the availability of basic con- 
sumer goods or in access to free or cheap public services may also have 
important effects upon poverty. The main point at which differences of ap- 
proach toward distributional issues generated sharp policy disagreement 
between the IMF and the Government of Tanzania was on the question of 
the sembe subsidy. The IMF wanted it removed because of the substantial 
drain it represented on the government's recurrent budget (and, indirectly, 
its effect on monetary expansion). In later years, it could argue that parallel 
markets already so dominated urban markets that the removal of the sub- 
sidy probably would have the prime effect of eliminating economic rent 
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(earned by the fortunate few who received sembe at the subsidized price and 
enjoyed - through resale or consumption - its full market value), and 
thereby could actually improve the equity of income distribution. When the 
argument began, however, it seemed clear that the subsidy's elimination 
would further reduce the welfare of urban income-earners, already hard hit 
by the overall macro-economic shocks, and would disproportionately affect 
the lowest-income urban groups whose budgets were most heavily oriented 
towards essential food. Although the sembe subsidy was not originally in- 
tended to be more than an interim measure (Green, 1984, p. 32) - a similar 
one introduced to offset world grain price increases in 1973-4 was subse- 
quently removed - its retention acquired symbolic importance in the context 
of the dispute with the IMF. When finally eliminated in mid 1984, the 
resulting 160 per cent official retail price increase for maize-meal was more 
than compensated for, at least in the first instance, by a 35 per cent nominal 
increase in minimum wages (government wages and salaries increased by be- 
tween 8 and 35 per cent, the smallest proportionate increases offered at the 
highest levels of income). Sembe could not have accounted for more than 20 
per cent of low-income consumer budgets, and obviously much less for the 
better-off. (Sembe and rice, together, made up 21.8 per cent of the weights 
in the calculation of the Dar es Salaam minimum-wage-earners' price index. 
Food of all kinds makes up 71.4 per cent.) At least in the first instance, 
then, and particularly if they were already paying higher black-market 
prices for sembe, low-income workers were not made worse off by the com- 
bination of wage increase and food-subsidy elimination in mid 1984. (As 
has been seen, however, their real incomes probably continued steadily to 
decline thereafter.) Such a compensated abolition of the subsidy could have 
been introduced earlier, but the IMF insisted throughout, again for obvious 
budgetary reasons, that nominal wages should be held to increases much 
below anticipated major nominal price increases. In the end the Tanzanians 
had little option, in any case, but to eliminate the subsidy. 
4 Future Directions 
The analysis of interrelationships between stabilization and adjustment pro- 
grams and poverty proves to be highly complex. Generalizations seem likely 
to be of limited value. Computable general equilibrium models, despite 
their inability to handle non-marginal changes, dynamic processes, and 
transitions between equilibria, have shed valuable light upon some of the 
possible longer-run effects of broad differences in adjustment policies. 
More work of this kind seems warranted; expense and data requirements, 
however, limit the range of these models' likely applicability, and there are 
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some questions that, in any case, require more micro-level and shorter-run 
investigation. What seems most clearly required is more detailed analysis of 
specific countries' experiences with different kinds of macro-economic im- 
balance and different short- or medium-term policy responses. Particularly 
useful may be comparative empirical analyses of the composition of cut- 
backs in real government expenditures; the incidence of new governmental 
revenues; the impact of generalized inflation or particular kinds of relative 
price change upon the poor; and the distributional and poverty implications 
of alternative output-mixes, particularly allowing for differing factor inten- 
sity and other characteristics of non-tradables as against tradables, and dif- 
fering characteristics of various kinds of exports. The sheer compilation of 
the facts with respect to the impact upon poverty of recent external shocks 
and policy responses remains to be done in most developing countries and is 
an obvious matter for research attention. 
The Tanzanian case illustrates the limited range of policy alternatives 
that, particularly in the poorest countries, may confront even the most 
determined governmental protector of the most vulnerable groups. It also 
illustrates the difficulty of inducing from readily available data the distribu- 
tional and poverty consequences of macro-economic events in a poor coun- 
try. Distribution-related differences between the Government of Tanzania 
and the IMF seem to have been largely matters of approach and of style 
rather than of policy substance. Though one cannot generalize from this 
country's experience, it does seem that an IMF more oriented towards 
analysis of distributional questions may, in some instances, be received 
more warmly by leftist or populist governments, without any major altera- 
tion in the overall complexion of the policy package that must be agreed 
upon between them and the Fund. In such circumstances there seems little 
merit in the IMF's maintenance of a purported distributional `neutrality' 
that forbids any country-level analysis of what are regarded by borrowers as 
crucial questions. More generally, professional analysis relating to the 
poverty and distributional consequences of alternative short-term policy 
packages (as well as long-term ones that have so far received more atten- 
tion) is bound to be useful because these matters are of both national and 
international interest in all countries. There seems no reason why the IMF 
could not collaborate productively with the World Bank, the ILO, UNICEF, 
and others in. such research and policy analysis. 
On one last matter it is possible to be fairly unequivocal, and the Tanza- 
nian case study helps to make it more concrete. The correlation between the 
incidence of absolute poverty and per capita income is not perfect but it is 
close. When equivalent external blows impact upon very low-income coun- 
tries, there must be a presumption that, other things being equal (includ- 
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ing the distribution of income), the proportion of households and people 
pushed over the line into `absolute poverty' will be greater than in middle- 
income or better-off countries. When one adds the fact that the very low- 
income countries typically are less adaptable and flexible in their economic 
structure than are more developed countries, and are therefore likely, in 
response to external shocks, to have to resort to deflation to a greater degree 
and for longer lengths of time, this presumption increases. To make matters 
still worse, some of the low-income, primary exporting countries have suf- 
fered the heaviest external shocks of all in recent years; and there is every 
prospect of continued severe instability in real primary commodity prices. 
Nor can the lowest-income countries expect stabilization finance from com- 
mercial banks. 
For all these reasons, international concern with global poverty ought to 
have led to buffering arrangements to ease the stabilization and adjustment 
difficulties of the poorest countries when they are hit by exogenous shocks. 
Unfortunately, the evolution of the international monetary and financial 
system has run in precisely the reverse direction in recent years, as not only 
aid but also both liquidity and stabilization finance for the poorest coun- 
tries have actually fallen (Helleiner, 1985). There can never be total 
assurance that the provision of such external finance would reduce the inci- 
dence of poverty; but there is certainly a strong presumption that it could. 
There is evidence to suggest that in sub-Saharan Africa the provision of 
such stabilization finance would have increased growth rates as well (Hel- 
leiner, 1986a). Excluding China and India, the amounts required to make a 
significant difference to the stabilization of the low-income countries are 
very modest, relative to the overall activities of the IMF and World Bank. 
Doubling present IMF commitments to the low-income and lower- 
middle-income countries as a group would involve less than existing IMF 
commitments to Argentina alone. Reforms in this area seem the most ob- 
vious means of limiting the impact of macro-economic imbalance upon 
poverty. 
Note 
An earlier version of this paper was prepared for a conference on government 
policy and the poor in developing countries, co-sponsored by the Institute for 
Policy Analysis and the Development Studies Programme, University of Toronto, 
25-26 April 1985. I am grateful to the following for comments on this earlier 
draft: Sidney Dell, Joan Nelson, Vito Tanzi, Rolph van der Hoeven, Frances 
Stewart, Steven Triantis, and participants in the conference. None bear any 
responsibility for the contents of the current version. 
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Taxation, Pricing, and the Poor 
RICHARD M. BIRD AND BARBARA D. MILLER 
... Taxes cannot make the poor richer, which is, after all, the main concern of 
distributional policy. Even the complete removal of all taxes on the poorest members 
of society would not make them much better off, simply because of the low absolute 
amounts of income and tax involved. Furthermore, many of the poorest people, par- 
ticularly those in rural areas, take part only marginally in the economic life of the 
country and are thus little affected by taxes. While the regressivity of the tax system, 
where it exists, ought to be reduced as much as possible in order not to make things 
worse, it is clear that, if our main concern is with poverty as such, with the waste and 
misuse of human resources and the stunted opportunities in life afforded those with 
income below some minimum level, any fiscal corrective must be exercised primarily 
through the expenditure side of the budget. (Bird, 1974b, p. 4) 
This statement, made over a decade ago, was substantiated by a later survey 
of tax-incidence studies and the poor in developing countries (McLure, 
1977a). The main role for tax policy in developing countries with respect to 
the poor was not to make them even poorer, a task that required both the 
avoidance of regressivity in tax design and its reduction through tax reform. 
More positive policy actions to reduce poverty were to be left to government 
expenditure policies or to more drastic realignments of power and property 
through non-fiscal means. Since then, academic discussion of taxes and the 
poor has tended to follow similar lines. The elimination of those taxes con- 
sidered to be particularly regressive has been advocated (McLure and 
Thirsk, 1978). The general potential of tax policies relative to expenditure 
policies to redistribute income in developing countries has been played 
down (Harberger, 1977; Goode, 1984). 
Several recent developments, however, suggest that it is time to recon- 
sider the relationship between taxes and the poor in developing countries. 
Developments in incidence analysis have cast doubt on the earlier consensus 
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about the relative regressivity of various taxes (Aaron, 1975; Browning, 
1978; Whalley, 1984). Some applications of those ideas to developing coun- 
tries are now available (McLure, 1979; Linn, 1980a). Advances in modelling 
the effects of taxation have cast new light on the complex relationship be- 
tween taxation and income distribution (Shoven and Whalley, 1984; Stern, 
1984). New data sources have begun to be developed and exploited to 
explore some of these relationships in developing countries (Ahmad and 
Stern, 1983; Ahmad, Coady, and Stern, 1984; Ahmad, Leung, and Stern, 
1984). The potential scope for tax policy to affect factor prices and hence 
income distribution in developing countries has recently been stressed (Bird, 
1982). Moreover, scepticism has grown as to the effectiveness of public 
expenditure policy in reaching the very poor (Tanzi, 1974; Toye, 1981; 
Meerman, 1979). In any case, `whatever experts think, policy makers will 
continue to attempt to use the tax system to achieve goals that they deem 
important' (Tanzi, 1983, p. 22). The `good old days' of untrammelled belief 
in the efficacy of the tax-transfer system to achieve distributional goals are 
unlikely to return.' Nevertheless, improved income distribution continues 
to be an important goal of tax policy in the rhetoric of policy-makers in 
developing countries. For all these reasons, then, a new look at taxes and 
the poor in developing countries seems opportune. 
The emphasis of this chapter is on the state of the relevant professional 
literature. The aim is to discern common threads, unresolved conflicts, and 
researchable lines for future investigation. The first section reviews briefly 
the present state of fiscal-incidence studies in developing countries: What 
do we know, or think we know, about how tax and pricing systems affect 
the poor in developing countries? For the most part, these studies suggest 
that the major direct impact of the government revenue system in most 
developing countries is on the urban poor, especially through property taxes 
and user charges and through indirect taxes. The next two sections of the 
chapter, therefore, review in more detail recent research on the distribu- 
tional effects of these fiscal instruments, including preliminary results from 
our current analysis of the impact of indirect taxes on the poor in Jamaica. 
The final section contains a brief conclusion. 
1 Studies of Fiscal Incidence 
A decade ago, a comprehensive review of fiscal incidence studies concluded 
that in only two of the forty-four studies examined (covering twenty-two 
developing countries) was the tax system regressive in the sense that the 
poor, broadly defined, appeared to pay a larger proportion of their incomes 
in taxes than did the rich (De Wulf, 1975). In a number of other cases, 
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however, there was evidence of some regressivity toward the bottom of the 
income scale. The same review found that most of the fifteen incidence 
studies (twelve on India alone!) that distinguished between urban and rural 
sectors found that taxes represented a relatively smaller share of (usually 
lower) incomes in the agricultural than in the non-agricultural sector. 
Almost no attention was paid in any of these incidence studies to the disper- 
sion around the average of the effective tax rate within each income class. 
The focus of tax-incidence studies has invariably been on the vertical equity 
of taxes (do the rich pay a larger share of their income in taxes than the 
poor?), to the virtual neglect of the equally interesting horizontal equity 
question (do two equally poor people pay the same taxes?). 
McLure (1977a) subsequently examined the results of seven of the same 
incidence studies - three in India and one each in Colombia, Brazil, 
Pakistan, Lebanon, and Jamaica - with particular attention to the poor. 
Although none of these studies provided sufficient data to analyse the tax 
burden on the poor in detail, on average it appeared that taxes took around 
10 per cent of the incomes of the urban poor and a bit less of the incomes of 
the rural poor. Jamaica was found to be an exception in both respects, 
however, with taxes on the poor being close to 20 per cent of income 
throughout the island. 
Incidence studies of any one country are, as a rule, conducted by dif- 
ferent people, often using different assumptions, at different times. It 
would, therefore, not be surprising if such studies produced different 
results. On the whole, however, the broad pattern of results found for any 
country is surprisingly consistent over time. Table 3.1 shows the results of 
three studies of the incidence of Jamaican taxes conducted over the last 
twenty-five years. There are great difficulties in comparing these studies in 
detail, but it does not seem too misleading to characterize the results as sug- 
gesting, in general, a basically proportional incidence pattern over a fairly 
broad range of income, with taxes on the poor tending on the whole to be 
lower than those on the middle class.a 
Both in the 1971-2 Jamaica study, where the lowest income class included 
32.4 per cent of all households and the two lowest classes together included 
57.5 per cent (McLure, 1977b, p. 16), and in the 1983 study, indirect taxes 
accounted for the bulk of the taxes paid by the poorest half of the popula- 
tion. The more disaggregated 1983 study found the incidence of indirect 
taxes to be roughly proportional (Wasylenko, 1985) among the poorer half 
of the Jamaican populace. Because taxes on food are low in Jamaica, and 
the income elasticity of non-food consumption is probably close to unity, a 
proportional general-consumption tax would produce more or less these 
results. In fact, however, as McLure (1977b, p. 56) noted, this outcome is 
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TABLE 3.1 
The incidence of Jamaican taxes, 1958, 1971-2, and 1983 
(tax as per cent of income) 
Income group 1958a 1971-2b 1983 
1 7.7 22.3 21.4 
2 7.2 17.0 21.2 
3 8.7 18.4 21.7 
4 8.5 17.0 24.6 
5 10.1 16.4 25.1 
6 8.4 18.4 27.1 
7 10.5 18.3 29.6 
8 15.3 20.8 33.4 
9 21.2 21.0 33.3 
10 22.4 23.9 
11 23.6 
a Lovejoy (1963). Weekly income group in pounds, ranging from less than 2 in group 1 to 
over 30 in group 9. 
b McLure (1977b). Dollars per year, ranging from less than J$499 in group 1 to J$5000 and 
over in group 11. 
c Wasylenko (1985). Annual income by deciles, ranging from less than J$1846 in the first 
decile to over J$28,999 in the tenth decile. 
the result of the complicated interplay of the effects of the quite different 
tax ratios that are found for different indirect taxes - some rising with in- 
come, some falling, and some remaining essentially flat. Broadly similar 
results, what De Wulf (1975) has called `wandering proportionality,' have 
been found in many other incidence studies in developing countries. 
A comprehensive recent review of urban finance in developing countries 
by Bahl and Linn (1985) turned up nineteen studies of the incidence of prop- 
erty taxes in thirteen different countries. A few of these studies - on residen- 
tial property tax in Seoul, on all property taxes in Jamaica, and on the 
urban property tax in Bogota - have found that the burden of the property 
tax was distributed regressively. All the other studies, however, found the 
property tax to be generally progressive, or even very progressive. 
As Bahl and Linn (1985) discuss in detail, this diverse group of incidence 
studies employs so many different and sometimes inconsistent assumptions 
that it is difficult to know what to make of these results. On the whole, 
however, the conventional view that the property tax is regressive seems less 
likely to be correct in developing than in developed countries, largely 
because the income elasticity of housing is likely to be unity or greater in 
developing countries. 
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Bahl and Linn (1985) have also reviewed carefully the scanty evidence on 
the incidence of the user charges levied to finance various urban services in 
some developing countries. In the case of water, perhaps the most impor- 
tant such service, both the precise nature of the rate structure employed and 
the physical nature of the city in question were found to affect the distribu- 
tive impact of user charge systems. In Nairobi, for example, low-income 
areas can be supplied at lower cost, so efficient water charges would have a 
generally progressive incidence. The opposite, however, is true in Cali and 
probably in many other cities, because it is the poor who tend to live in the 
areas where land values are low owing to difficult access and unfavourable 
physical factors. On the whole, property taxes probably constitute a more 
progressive way to finance the expansion of basic urban services than even 
progressively structured service prices, essentially because housing con- 
sumption is more income-elastic than water consumption. 
Most studies of the distributive effects of various tax and pricing systems 
in different developing countries suggest that the tax systems existing in 
developing countries are not very regressive. It is true that few of these 
studies focus explicitly or in much detail on the poor. It cannot be said, 
however, that the taxes - mostly indirect taxes - now levied on the poor in 
most countries are regressive, contrary to an impression that is still 
widespread (e.g., Chenery et al., 1974, p. 84). Almost no study pays atten- 
tion to the important question of the horizontal equity of the tax system 
within the heterogeneous group called `the poor,' however. The results for 
any country often depend on a very detailed understanding of the precise 
structure and working of the fiscal instruments in question.3 And, finally, 
almost all these studies rest on questionable logical and statistical bases in 
the first place (Bird and De Wulf, 1973). 
The incidence of the taxes studied here may constitute only one small 
aspect of the distributional effects of government policy as a whole, and 
may in a sense be swamped by the effects of inflation, trade restrictions, 
and the like. Nevertheless, the evidence is clearly that taxes do take a 
relatively substantial fraction of even very low incomes in most developing 
countries. Moreover, governments are clearly concerned with the distribu- 
tional effects of taxes. There appears to be considerable interest in the scope 
for improving the well-being of the poorer half of the populace through 
appropriate redesign of taxes. 
Focusing on redistributing income through the fiscal system after it has 
initially been distributed by the economic system may, indeed, give a mis- 
leadingly small impression of the potential of the tax system to redistribute 
income. The tax system, like many other aspects of government policy that 
affect relative prices, may also affect the initial distribution of income 
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through its effects on, for example, the structure of industry and the 
demand for unskilled labour as well, in a more long-run framework, 
through its effects on saving, capital formation, and real wage levels. For 
example, the potential scope for tax policy to influence employment, the 
major source of income for most people, is enormous: `Apart from the ef- 
fects of taxation on capital formation itself, the proportions in which 
capital is combined with labour may be influenced (1) by operating on the 
"big" relative prices through altering the intersectoral terms of trade, the 
effective exchange rate, or the wage-rental ratio itself; (2) by altering the 
distribution of income, and hence the composition of demand; (3) by alter- 
ing relative product prices; (4) by influencing the rate and nature of 
technological innovation; and (5) by bringing about a more unified (and 
price-sensitive) factor market' (Bird, 1982, p. 214). Payroll taxes and tax in- 
centives for investment almost by definition do not impinge directly on the 
incomes of the poorest 40 per cent (or 60 per cent) of the population in most 
developing countries. Nevertheless, by tending to reduce employment in the 
modern sector, such fiscal measures probably mean that the poor will stay 
poorer longer than they would otherwise. 
Similarly, as Kuznets (1966) has argued, the principal long-run re- 
distributor of income in developing countries is almost certainly the move 
out of agriculture. Tax factors affecting this move may, therefore, have a 
much greater long-run impact on the poor than the current regressivity of 
tobacco taxes or whatever. Similarly, within the agricultural sector, Bird 
(1974a) has argued for more use of properly structured land taxes. Even 
though such taxes might seem at first to penalize poor peasants, they may 
well in the long run improve the well-being of both the rural and the urban 
poor through encouraging more efficient utilization of land and rural 
labour (particularly if coupled with appropriate land reform). 
In short, tax policies that in effect encourage resources to be allocated to 
their `highest and best uses' will, as a rule, tend to make the poor better off 
- perhaps not as obviously or immediately as would the elimination of the 
tax on tobacco, for example, but probably in the end more significantly. To 
explore such questions further, however, is beyond the scope of this chap- 
ter.4 The balance of the chapter therefore concentrates on the question of 
the distributional effect of alternative indirect taxes and urban finance 
systems on the poor in developing countries. 
2 Financing Urban Services 
A striking phenomenon of recent decades is the increasing urbanization of 
the developing world. Average incomes are much higher in urban than in 
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rural areas, but so is open unemployment; relatively fewer urban than rural 
households are poor, but the incidence of slums and squatter settlements as 
a proportion of urban population is often very high. The level of public 
utility services is much higher in urban areas, but even in the most 
developed parts of Latin America large numbers of urban dwellers have no 
access to even rudimentary services. Furthermore, there is evidence that the 
quality and reliability of such services has deteriorated (Linn, 1983). While 
there is much variation from country to country, and even from city to city 
within the same country, the level and nature of urban services provided 
often depend on the manner in which they are financed, particularly at the 
local level. 
The subject of local government finance in developing countries has not 
received the attention it deserves. Two reasons for this neglect may be sug- 
gested. The first is that many people seem to think that only central govern- 
ments matter financially in most developing countries. In many countries, 
however, local government finance is quite important. State and local 
governments accounted for close to one-third of the taxes collected in the 
non-oil developing countries in 1981 (International Monetary Fund, 1984).5 
An important local financial role does not necessarily imply any real local 
independence or autonomy (Bird, 1980b). Nevertheless, those interested in 
fiscal impacts on the poor should take a close look at the nature of urban 
government finances, especially in the larger cities (Smith, 1974). The urban 
poor do pay significant taxes, and many of the taxes they pay as well as ser- 
vice charges are levied by local governments (Linn, 1983). How local 
governments finance the services they provide thus has a potentially signifi- 
cant impact on the poor, particularly in urban areas. 
A second reason for neglecting the distributional effect of local finances 
is the belief that distributional aims should not be explicitly pursued by local 
governments. Distribution policy (like stabilization policy) has traditionally 
been considered by public-finance analysts to be the proper concern of cen- 
tral governments alone. Local distributional policies would in any case be 
ineffective and inefficient in view of the openness of local economies 
(Oates, 1972). 
In developing countries, however, these arguments are not very persua- 
sive (Bird, 1980b, p. 20). In the first place, as shown above, local revenue 
systems are important in many countries. Their impact on the well-being of 
the poor is, therefore, a legitimate matter of concern, especially in countries 
in which the assumption implicit in much public finance theory that there is 
(or can be) a smoothly operating central government tax-transfer system 
that will attain any distributional policy aims is simple fantasy. Second, the 
very fact that the local governments in most developing countries have little 
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autonomy - and may therefore be considered to be agents of the national 
government - means that local fiscal taxes and charges constitute as much a 
part of redistributive policy as do national taxes. The openness issue is less 
serious than is usually thought because what is going on is not locally dif- 
ferentiated redistribution but the local implementation of national policies. 
A Property Taxes 
Linn (1983) suggests three rules for those who want to alleviate urban 
poverty through local fiscal policy: (1) reduce regressive taxes; (2) increase 
progressive taxes; and (3) use benefit charges appropriately to finance urban 
services. The first rule relates primarily to the indirect commodity taxes 
levied by some local governments - the octroi in India and beer taxes in 
Zaire, for example (Linn, 1980b) - and is further discussed in the next sec- 
tion in the context of indirect tax policy as a whole. The other two `rules' 
are taken up below. 
Apart from the strong case that can be made for more local use of gener- 
ally progressive taxes on automobile use and ownership (Smith, 1975; Linn 
1979), the main progressive revenue source available to local governments 
in most countries is the property tax. There is increasing evidence that the 
property tax is, or can be, a fairly progressive way to finance urban services. 
As Linn (1983, p. 77) notes, however, the precise distributive effect of prop- 
erty taxes depends very much on the details of their structure and adminis- 
tration. The relative legal and administrative treatment of a rental vs owner- 
occupied properties, of land vs improvements, of low-value vs high-value 
properties, and so on, may have a profound effect upon the progressivity or 
otherwise of a property tax. 
Higher taxes on land than on buildings, for example, would likely in- 
crease both the progressivity and the efficiency of the property tax (Holland 
and Follain, 1985). Because the value of landholdings generally rises with 
income class, a tax levied solely on land - the burden of which falls on land- 
owners - is obviously more progressive than a tax on all real property, 
which in an open economy will inevitably bear more heavily on labour and 
on the consumption of locally produced goods than on capital. In addition, 
a tax on land is more neutral - less likely to deter development - than an 
equal-revenue tax on land and improvements (Follain and Miyake, 1984). 
While there is no good distributive case for progressive rates of property 
taxation (Bird, 1974a, p. 211), there may often be substantial distributional 
(and administrative) benefits from combining an exemption with a flat rate. 
In Jamaica, the property tax is at present levied on the basis of the unim- 
proved value of land at rates varying from 1 per cent to 4.5 per cent. Parcels 
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valued at less than $J2000, however, pay only a flat tax of $J5. Approx- 
imately the same distributional effect could be attained with much less 
administrative and efficiency cost by levying a flat rate of 1.5 per cent and 
exempting the first $J6000 in value (Holland and Follain, 1985). 
More broadly, a recent detailed study of the Jamaican property tax by 
Holland and Follain (1985) demonstrates that conclusions about the relative 
burden of different versions of property taxes on the poor can be put for- 
ward only with limited confidence.6 Factors that make it difficult to talk 
about `the' incidence of the property tax in any particular city or country, 
let alone in general, include the theoretical and empirical uncertainy about 
the incidence of the tax in the first place, the importance of detailed dif- 
ferences in structure in determining distributional impacts, the wide intra- 
class variations in such impacts depending on the distribution of land 
ownership and other factors, and the possibly differential effects of such 
administrative aspects as assessment, collection, and the appeals process. 
Nevertheless, despite such complexities, it seems safe to conclude in most 
circumstances that `an increase in the average level of property taxation 
tends to be progressive in the sense that it burdens high income groups more 
heavily in relation to their incomes than low income groups. The progres- 
sive impact is more pronounced in the short-term than in the long-term, and 
more for nationwide property tax increases than for increases restricted to a 
particular jurisdiction' (Bahl and Linn, 1985). 
In particular circumstances such features as the exemption of improve- 
ments (Holland and Follain, 1985) or the imposition of different tax rates in 
different locations (Holland, 1979) may provide sufficient gains in terms of 
both equity and efficiency to seem worthwhile. As always, however, it is a 
rather dangerous game to advocate undue complexity in tax design in coun- 
tries in which the limits of administrative feasibility are very real (Bird, 
1977). 
B User Charges and Public Services 
Complexity introduced for distributional reasons may also produce per- 
verse results. Nominally progressive public-utility rates proved to be an 
inefficient technique of income distribution in Malaysia because many poor 
families consume more water than do rich families (Katzman, 1978). That 
portion of the poor population receiving services was in effect penalized by 
a supposedly 'pro-poor' rate structure. Similarly, in Colombia, where the 
subsidization of urban public services through progressive rate structures is 
relatively important, the benefits of this subsidy are generally regressively 
distributed within the poor population (Bahl and Linn, 1985). At the same 
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time, the large group of the poor who receive no services have also often 
been burdened, through either taxes or inflation, in order to make up the 
deficits of public-utility enterprises. 
Once again, it is very important to be clear about the details before gener- 
alizing. In some instances, for example, 'life-line' tariffs (a low tariff for an 
initial small block of consumption) may well provide both an efficient and 
an equitable way of pricing water, provided that the low rate is not below 
the amount appropriate to reflect the presumed external benefits from such 
consumption and that it is not financed by charging larger consumers at 
prices higher than marginal cost (Bahl and Linn, 1985). Since the income 
elasticity of demand for water is relatively low even in poor countries, 
however, and since to some extent at least household size and income may 
be negatively correlated, in other instances this policy may produce perverse 
distributional results, especially to the extent that multiple-household con- 
nections are more prevalent among low-income households. 
Other water-pricing schemes besides rising block prices (progressive 
tariffs) are found in many countries. In Colombia, water charges are fre- 
quently related to property values in a progressive fashion. Again, however, 
the distributional effect of such charges depends on a wide variety of fac- 
tors. In Cali, it was found that although the average price of an initial block 
of water rose steadily with assessed property values, the final impact of 
these charges was in fact regressive in terms of income (Bahl and Linn, 
1985). A broader study of the incidence of the public-service charges levied 
in Colombian cities for residential water supply and sewerage, electricity, 
garbage collection, and local telephone service found, using some strong 
assumptions, that the incidence of these subsidies was generally progressive. 
But relatively few of these benefits flowed to the lowest 20-30 per cent of 
the population, largely because of their lack of access to services (Linn, 
1980a). 
It may be seriously misleading to concentrate on redistribution only 
within the select group of consumers receiving such services because the 
most important consideration may be whether the poor have access to ser- 
vices at all, not how much they have to pay for them (Selowsky, 1979; Meer- 
man, 1979). The poor can benefit from subsidized services only when they 
have access to them. 
In Colombia, the proportion of the urban population with access to 
public water supply in 1977 ranged from a high of 93 per cent in the Depart- 
ment of Quindio to a low of 37 per cent in the national territories (Bird, 
1984, pp. 137-8). Even in the largest cities, about 25 per cent of the popula- 
tion had no access to services in 1974, the poorest being those most likely to 
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do without (Linn, 1980a, p. 101). One reason for this outcome is that the 
poor are less able to afford the high connection and installation costs 
charged by the largely self-financing public enterprises responsible for pro- 
viding urban services in Colombia. Because the extent of access is often 
related to the financial and other incentives under which service is provided, 
it makes little sense to discuss the distributive effects of user-charge financ- 
ing of urban services without considering explicitly the precise institutional 
links between financing and service provision. 
Another reason for lack of access may be simple political bias in favour 
of the better-off, the traditional and expected recipients of such services. 
Yet another reason may be, in contrast, that the relative insulation of the 
public enterprises from day-to-day political pressures may result in reduced 
access to services by the poor. The more technocratically determined invest- 
ment decisions of bureaucrats, for example, may result in favoured (and 
usually relatively high-income) consumers receiving better services (Bird, 
1980b, p. 32). The poor may thus lose out in many ways: through having to 
bear through taxes or inflation some of the cost of providing subsidized ser- 
vices to the rich, through being faced with high `benefit' charges for a self- 
financing system, and through the bureaucratic and political machinations 
determining who gets what service in either case. 
Urban transit provides another instance of the potential importance of 
public-service financing and pricing and the necessity of considering both 
the details and the broader context in order to determine the distributional 
impact of public-services financing. Most public mass-transit operations in 
developing countries are heavily subsidized and beset by management and 
operating problems (Bahl and Linn, 1985). 
Experience suggests that the subsidization of urban mass transit is likely 
to be so inadequate in financially pressed developing countries that public 
transit systems are usually seriously underfinanced and provide correspond- 
ingly poor service.' The resulting problems are normally exacerbated by the 
political difficulty of raising fares - even though it seems likely that much of 
the subsidy thus extended at least nominally to the travelling poor in fact ac- 
crues to landowners or employers. It is not always clear that public-transit 
users are those who need subsidization most in any case. A 1978 study of 
Kingston, Jamaica, found that the poorest people used a higher-cost private 
system more than they did the public system, partly because the private ser- 
vice to their areas was better (Heraty, 1980).8 This study also found that 
many poor people in Kingston spent a high fraction of their income on 
travel. More than 73 per cent of those with household incomes under $30 a 
week were estimated to spend over 10 per cent of their income on travel.9 
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Another aspect of the inefficient pricing of public services such as transit 
and water is that they encourage low-density development and urban sprawl 
(Downing, 1973). The waste of resources through such subsidization may 
initially seem distributionally worthwhile, even in poor countries with 
scarce public savings. Over time, however, as inflation eats away at public 
resources and at the effective degree of subsidization, and as more and more 
poor people get locked into costly and inefficient commuting and living pat- 
terns, the resulting mixture may well prove to be politically explosive. 
The `oil crisis' in recent years set off such explosions in some oil- 
importing countries. The poor may not drive cars, but they do ride buses 
and minibuses, and fuel costs account for a large and increasing proportion 
of transit fares. With a public bus system, fares can be held down - at the 
expense, of course, of an increase in operating deficits and the sorts of 
problems already mentioned. Jamaican experience suggests that matters 
may be even worse in the absence of a public transit system. 
The public bus system in Kingston ceased operation early in 1984, largely 
as a result of pressure from international lending agencies to reduce the 
burden on government finance arising from public-enterprise deficits. As a 
result, all public road transportation in Jamaica is now in the hands of 
private minibus operators - a result that believers in competition and effi- 
ciency should presumably applaud.10 In fact, however, this move to a 
privately run transit system may well in time result in larger rather than 
smaller government deficits. As Smith (1984, p. 53) has argued: `For every 
dollar saved through the elimination of the publicly owned and operated 
bus company, more than a dollar may be lost in fuel tax revenues because of 
social and political pressure to keep the taxes low given the anticipated ef- 
fect on public transport fares.' 
In view of the attractiveness of higher fuel taxes as a generally equitable 
and efficient means of raising revenue, such a constraint on fuel taxes may 
be very costly. The demonstrations in Kingston and other parts of the island 
in December 1983 and January 1985 following fuel-tax increases underline 
both the importance of keeping fuel taxes from impacting too heavily on the 
poor and the difficulty of doing so when there is no public bus system to 
provide an administratively feasible vehicle for delivering the subsidy. The 
`privatization' of public transit in Jamaica may indeed have had the prom- 
ised benefits of providing transport more efficiently. But it has done so only 
at the expense of making it increasingly difficult to raise fuel prices to 
reflect the real opportunity cost of oil to Jamaica, let alone to add to scarce 
public-sector resources through more reliance on this most administratively 
feasible of progressive taxes. 
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3 Indirect Taxes and the Poor 
On average, taxes on goods and services account for about half the total 
government revenue in developing countries (International Monetary Fund, 
1984). The dominance of indirect consumption taxes over the more modern 
taxes on income and profits was long considered (Musgrave, 1969) to be 
little more than an unfortunate lapse arising from administrative and struc- 
tural factors that would be rectified as these countries moved closer to the 
position of the industrial countries, where such taxes on average now pro- 
vide less than one-fifth of total revenue. More recently, increasing attention 
has been paid even in the industrial countries to the alleged virtues of taxing 
consumption rather than income (see, for example, Meade et al., 1978). The 
theoretical and practical merits of retaining the present predominant role of 
consumption taxes in the developing countries have also begun to be 
reassessed (Tanzi, 1983). It is important, therefore, to consider carefully the 
implications for the poor not only of the present heavy reliance of develop- 
ing countries' tax systems on indirect taxes but also of such likely changes as 
the rapidly spreading adoption of some form of value-added tax (Lent et 
al., 1973). 
Indirect consumption taxes, particularly those on the traditional `excis- 
ables,' account for most of the existing direct impact of taxes on the poor. 
In addition, such taxes as those on fuel may also have a substantial indirect 
impact on the poor through increasing transport costs. 
A recent review of the incidence of different excise taxes in developing 
countries found the tobacco tax to be the most regressive tax in the Philip- 
pines, Guatemala, Colombia, Argentina, and Greece, among other coun- 
tries (Cnossen, 1977). In Lebanon, however, the tobacco tax was actually 
progressive, largely because of the higher tax content of the imported 
cigarettes consumed by the rich (De Wulf, 1974). A similar result has also 
been noted in the Philippines (Asher and Booth, 1983, p. 142). 
The incidence of taxes on the other important `traditional' excise 
products - alcoholic beverages and hydrocarbon oils - is similarly im- 
portant to the poor in many countries. As in the case of tobacco, the in- 
cidence of these levies appears to vary sharply from country to country, 
depending on the specifics of local consumption patterns and tax structures. 
Generalizations about incidence based on predetermined value judgments 
concerning the `inherent' progressivity or regressivity of particular levies 
can be misleading. As Cnossen (1977, p. 47) notes, the income-distribution 
approach used in most incidence studies suppresses the potentially much 
more important differences between families in the same income class. 
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Tanzi (1974) has suggested that the dispersion around the average increases 
as income rises, so that estimates of average tax rates by income classes have 
little significance. Equally important, however, it may be argued that a 
given degree of dispersion has more significant equity implications at lower 
than at higher income levels. One early study of Guatemala, for example, 
suggested that heavy smokers and drinkers probably paid 3 per cent of their 
income in taxes while moderate consumers paid only 1 per cent (Adler et al., 
1952). Differences of this magnitude at low income levels obviously raise 
important equity questions, particularly because the low price elasticity of 
demand for these products implies that it is mainly the consumption of 
other goods (`basic needs'?) that is necessarily reduced as a result (McLure 
and Thirsk, 1978). 
Recent analysis also indicates that the efficiency effects of commodity 
taxes need to be taken much more explicitly into account in designing and 
reforming indirect tax systems (Stern, 1984). In particular, this analysis 
casts doubt on the traditional view that a uniform commodity tax such as a 
general sales tax is in principle better than a more differentiated set of taxes 
on goods and services (Due, 1970). Actually, there is substantial divergence 
in the literature as to whether commodity tax rates should be uniform or 
differentiated. 
Rate differentiation of varying types has been urged on efficiency 
grounds, on distributional grounds, and even on stabilization grounds 
(Asher and Booth, 1983, p. 132). Many countries have listened to this 
advice, at least to the extent of having a system of progressive sales and 
excise tax rates intended to make the incidence of their indirect taxes pro- 
gressive. However, a strong case may be made against using rate differen- 
tials in a general sales tax in order to achieve distributive ends, essentially 
because any equity gains from differentiation may be more than outweighed 
by administrative costs (Cnossen, 1982, 1984). In most developing coun- 
tries, however, there are substantial differences in consumption patterns 
between income groups that can be differentially taxed through sales. It is 
not enough in such countries to say `whatever meagre progressivity that 
may be achieved by a differentiated sales tax rate structure can be attained 
far better through a small change in the income tax' (Cnossen, 1982, p. 
213). With respect to the poor, who are largely outside the income tax, this 
statement is not true, while with respect to the rich it assumes that the in- 
come tax is in fact an effective instrument of redistribution. This assump- 
tion is erroneous for most developing countries particularly with regard to 
non-wage income. 
The appropriate distributional role of indirect taxes in any developing 
country cannot easily be decided on a priori grounds. What matters is the 
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relative quantitative importance of different tax and income characteristics. 
Textbook advice, such as that in Chenery et al. (1974, p. 84), to discriminate 
between income groups through higher taxes on goods with high income 
elasticities and low price elasticities is as uselessly simplistic as the judgment 
on the same page that `in most cases the [existing] structure of indirect taxa- 
tion is markedly regressive.' 
Similarly, the sweeping condemnation of sumptuary taxation of alcohol 
and tobacco in McLure and Thirsk (1978) offers as little guidance to what 
should be done in any particular developing country as does the recent 
evidence suggesting on grounds of efficiency that such taxes should be re- 
tained and perhaps even strengthened, at least in industrial countries 
(Shoup, 1983). Although, presumably, `being poor should not entitle one to 
an unlimited license to create negative externalities' (Shoup, 1983, p. 262), 
little, if any, attention appears to have been paid to these questions in 
developing countries. 
The sumptuary rationale appears to be important in most Asian indirect 
tax systems, but Asher and Booth (1983, p. 135) express substantial scep- 
ticism about the realism of this rationale given the low price elasticity of 
demand for such goods. They quote with approval the dictum of Due (1970, 
p. 63) that `the primary argument for excises on alcoholic beverages and 
tobacco products is their revenue productivity.' As Shoup (1983) has noted, 
however, what an observed low price elasticity really shows is that the tax 
rate is still some distance below the maximum-revenue rate. Moreover, the 
observed reluctance in many countries to maintain the real level of sump- 
tuary taxes in the face of inflation casts further doubt on the view that these 
levies are just a simple way to gouge the poor. Those who advocate much 
higher taxes on alcohol on social grounds in developing countries (Marshall, 
1982) are not necessarily talking hypocritical nonsense, as McLure and 
Thirsk (1978) appear to suggest, especially when higher alcohol taxes would 
often not be regressive." Once again, detailed, quantitative study, not 
sweeping generalization, is what is needed to advance knowledge and for- 
mulate good tax policy in this area. 
What is to be taxed? At what rates? An interesting example of the sort of 
research needed to answer these key questions of indirect tax policy in any 
country is a recent series of studies of India and Pakistan produced by a 
group of economists at the University of Warwick. The approach in these 
studies derives from the general optimal commodity-tax literature, in which 
the aim is to raise a given revenue in such a way as to minimize the welfare 
loss, subject to socially determined distributional weights (Stern, 1984). 
This literature usually yields such vague guidelines to tax policy - `tax 
products for which demand is more inelastic more heavily' - that their 
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application to any real case is either obscure or else dependent on so many 
specific, quantifiable assumptions as to seem a most unpromising manual 
for reform in the context of a developing country. The Warwick studies, 
however, manage to reach some interesting, if tentative, policy conclusions. 
The first step in this analysis was to calculate the effective tax rates, in 
itself not an easy task, particularly because the impact of taxes on interme- 
diate goods must be traced through an input/output system in order to cal- 
culate the final tax components of different products. The taxation of 
inputs often produces quite a different pattern of indirect tax incidence than 
the nominal rate structure would suggest. Food grains, for example, are not 
taxed by India's central excises, but nevertheless these products were found 
to bear taxes ranging from 1.5 per cent to 3.6 per cent (Ahmad and Stern, 
1983a). On the whole, India's indirect tax system, when the effects of all 
subsidies and input taxes were taken into account, was found to be progres- 
sive but rather less so than had been indicated in the major previous study 
(Chelliah and Lall, 1978), which followed more traditional methods. 
The second stage of the Warwick group's work involves the examination 
and evaluation of possible alternative indirect tax structures. The major 
conclusion emerging from this exercise is that `the marginal social cost of 
taxing different goods is quite sensitive to distributional value judgements. 
Cereal subsidies, for example, would be unattractive if one has little con- 
cern for inequality but more attractive otherwise' (Stern, 1984, p. 32). In the 
case of India, Ahmad and Stern (1983a) found that over a fairly wide range 
of value judgments about the importance of redistribution, reductions in 
fuel taxes and increases in taxes on milk products seemed indicated. A simi- 
lar exercise in Pakistan suggested strongly that any concern for inequality at 
all made wheat and sugar poor candidates for increased taxation compared 
to, say, meat and eggs (Ahmad, Leung, and Stern, 1984).12 Although this 
analysis can be extended only with great difficulty to non-marginal tax 
changes, such as the introduction of a value-added tax (VAT), 13 the study of 
India found that a shift to a VAT would reduce the expenditures of the 
poorest rural households by almost 7 per cent and of the poorest urban 
groups by about 5 per cent. `The only value judgement for which it [a shift 
to a VAT] would be considered optimum would be that involving no concern 
whatsoever for income redistribution in favor of the poor' (Ahmad and 
Stern, 1983a, p. 105). 
While there are obviously problems and limitations with studies such as 
these, this work has already made a contribution to our understanding of 
indirect tax reform in developing countries. The potential distributive im- 
portance of input taxes - stressed, for example, in Due (1970) but not dis- 
cussed carefully, if at all, in most incidence analyses - has been underlined. 
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Small though difficult steps have been taken toward evaluating commodity- 
tax reforms in a much more explicit and systematic way than ever before. 
The inescapable extent to which judgment of particular tax changes depends 
on concern for the poor has been emphasized and systematically explored. 
And, by no means least, a step has been taken toward making optimal taxa- 
tion, one of the most esoteric branches of modern public-finance theory, 
potentially useful to those who make policy decisions in this area. 
A A Jamaican Case Study 
Although neither the data nor the resources available in Jamaica have been 
adequate for an analysis as complex as that undertaken by the Warwick 
group, some preliminary results from ongoing work on indirect tax reform 
in Jamaica are reported here. An interesting feature of this work is the panel 
data on which it draws. As described in Miller and Stone (1985), a special 
survey was carried out on the expenditure patterns of 145 urban and rural 
low-income households over an eight-month period. The daily expenditure 
sheets were checked weekly by trained interviewers and supplemented by 
monthly questionnaires on household characteristics and economic status. 
While not all the data collected have yet been analysed, we have used a con- 
densed version of the resulting extensive data set to carry out a preliminary 
analysis of some proposed changes in the indirect tax system. Table 3.2 
shows the basic characteristics of the sample households. For purposes of 
preliminary analysis, this sample was divided three ways: urban and rural, 
female-male and female-headed households, and three expenditure classes. 
As shown in table 3.3, the variations in expenditure patterns between these 
groups are marked, suggesting that `horizontal equity' may be an even more 
important consideration than `vertical equity' in appraising alternative 
consumption-tax patterns. 
At the present time, many consumption goods in Jamaica are subject to 
three separate consumption taxes with highly differentiated rate structures 
(Due, 1985; Cnossen, 1984). As part of a general tax reform, it has been 
proposed to consolidate these three levies into a uniform general- 
consumption tax (GCT). The impact effect on this sample of low-income 
households of introducing different variants of the proposed GCT was 
calculated, using the following simple procedure. The various expenditure 
items were first classified on the basis of the law and some judgment into 
those currently subject to the three taxes to be consolidated into the GCT and 
those not subject to these taxes. On average, 36 per cent of the expenditure 
of low-income households was found to be taxed by these levies. The varia- 
tion in the proportion from household to household was very large, ranging 
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TABLE 3.2 
Summary characteristics of the sample households, April 1984 
Urban Rural Total 
Total population 453 493 946 
Number of households 67 78 145 
Average number of household members 7 6 7 
Female-headed households (%) 49 38 43 
Owners (%) 26 63 48 
Tenants (%) 59 37 47 
Squatters (%) 10 1 5 
Weekly expenditures <$89 (Group 1) (%) 16 64 42 
Weekly expenditures $89-189 (Group 2)(%) 55 32 43 
Weekly expenditures over $189 (Group 3) (%) 28 4 15 
SOURCE: Jamaica Tax Structure Examination Project (JTSFP), Low-Income Household 
Expenditure Survey Data, Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School, Syracuse 
University 
from a low of 15 per cent to a high of 62 per cent. Table 3.4 shows this 
variation in terms of the three-way classification set out earlier.14 As this 
table makes clear, poorer households have more of their expenditure poten- 
tially subject to these taxes than do relatively better-off households, even 
within this low-income population. 
The taxes paid by the different groups were then calculated on the basis 
of a set of assumptions that seem reasonable in the Jamaican context.15 The 
results of these calculations by subgroup for the existing tax system are also 
shown in table 3.4. The regressivity of the existing system is apparent even 
in relation to expenditure, let alone income. The variation in taxes paid is as 
great as that in total expenditure, ranging across the entire sample from a 
low of $0.78 (or 2.4 per cent of total expenditure) for one household to a 
high of $9.34 (or 3.1 per cent of expenditure) for another. The importance 
of this variation may be underlined by noting that the highest-taxed house- 
hold in the lowest income group paid an estimated $3.68 a month in con- 
sumption taxes, or 5.5 per cent of its total expenditure, compared to 2.1 per 
cent for the lowest-taxed household in this group, while the lowest-taxed 
family in the highest income group paid only $2.30 (or 1.1 per cent) com- 
pared to 3.6 per cent for the highest-taxed household in this group. In other 
words, the variation in effective tax rates within expenditure groups exceeds 
the variation between groups. 
The differential impact of applying a uniform GCT rate of 20 per cent to 
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TABLE 3.4 











As per cent 
of total 
expenditures 
All households 113.71 33.6 3.23 2.8 
Urban households 146.64 29.9 3.72 2.5 
Rural households 85.44 38.9 2.81 3.3 
Female/male households 119.90 32.2 3.31 2.8 
Female-headed households 109.09 34.7 3.17 2.9 
Total expenditure: 
Less than J$89 60.49 38.4 2.02 3.3 
J$89-J$189 129.86 34.4 3.72 2.9 
More than J$189 215.78 28.5 5.17 2.4 
SOURCE: JTSEP Low-Income Household Expenditure Survey Data, Metropolitan Studies 
Program, Maxwell School, Syracuse University 
existing taxes using the same assumptions. A summary of the resulting 
percentage changes in taxes as a proportion of total expenditures is set out 
as Option 1 in table 3.5. As shown there, it appears that this tax change 
would (1) increase taxes on low-income households as a group and also (2) 
slightly increase the regressivity of Jamaica's already regressive consump- 
tion tax system.16 These results emerge both because at present many con- 
sumption items of low-income groups are taxed at rates lower than 20 per 
cent and because such lower-taxed items as certain processed foods consti- 
tute, on average, a slightly larger proportion of the consumption of the 
poorer households than of the relatively less poor households. 
To assess the importance of taxing processed food in these results, calcu- 
lations were done assuming that all food (and medicines) were exempt. As 
shown in table 3.5 (Option 2), these exemptions reverse the preceding results 
and lower all taxes on low-income families dramatically and in a progressive 
fashion. In line with a recommendation in Due (1985), we also examined the 
effect of taxing some items at a higher `luxury' tax rate of 35 per cent (Op- 
tion 3, table 3.5). As might be expected given the minor importance of these 
items in the consumption of this low-income group, the effect of this change 
on total tax burdens was minute. Indeed, the effect of introducing rate pro- 
gression was actually to make the tax a bit more regressive than a uniform 
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TABLE 3.5 
Incidence of alternative versions of the general consumption-tax packages on 
low-income households (taxes as per cent of total expenditure) 
Weekly 
expenditure 





GCT Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
Less than $89 3.3 3.6 1.0 3.6 2.9 
$89-$189 2.9 3.1 1.4 3.1 3.1 
Over $189 2.4 2.6 1.2 2.7 2.8 
Total 2.8 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.8 
NOTES: 'Existing taxes' represent the effects of the consumption duties, excise duties, and 
retail sales taxes that are to be replaced by the GCT on the expenditure of the low-income 
household sample. 
Option 1 is a GCT levied at a rate of 20 per cent with only unprocessed food exempt. 
Option 2 is a GCT levied at a rate of 20 per cent with all food exempt. 
Option 3 is a Ocr levied at a basic rate of 20 per cent, with a supplementary rate of 35 
per cent on 'luxury' consumption; only unprocessed food is exempted. 
Option 4 is a OCT levied at a rate of 25 per cent with unprocessed food and a limited 
range of the basic food items exempted. 
tax because the very poorest people in the sample actually spend a bit more 
on `luxury' cosmetics than the others! 
This last observation suggests the danger of imposing predetermined 
judgments about what is and is not a `luxury' so far as low-income people 
are concerned. 17 Attempting to make sales taxes more progressive by impos- 
ing `luxury' rates on arbitrarily selected items is at best a very crude tool for 
redistribution. And at worst, as in the present instance, it is a tool that may 
have perverse results, quite apart from the obvious horizontal equity prob- 
lems with this approach. 
While a similar caution about within-group redistribution is warranted, 
the exercise described above suggests strongly that at least some additional 
exemptions from the GCT beyond unprocessed foods (and services) may be 
warranted on distributional grounds. Closer examination of the data under- 
lying table 3.5 indicates that exempting just five products - flour, cooking 
oil, condensed milk, sugar, and butter/margarine - would eliminate almost 
all of the regressivity from taxing processed food under the GCT. These five 
products account for 83 per cent of the total tax reduction shown in table 
3.5 under Option 2 for all households, and for 84 per cent of the reduction 
for the lowest-income group, 80 per cent for the second group, and only 70 
per cent for the highest of the three groups distinguished there. Option 4 in 
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table 3.5 shows that the result of exempting these five additional products, 
while adjusting the GCT rate to 25 per cent to hold revenue constant, would 
be to make the incidence of the GCT roughly proportional to expenditure, 
compared to the strong regressivity exhibited by the existing taxes that 
would be replaced by the GCT. 
Although for the group as a whole each of the five items mentioned above 
is roughly equal in importance, it is interesting to note that by far the most 
regressive tax on food items is that on sugar. This finding once again sug- 
gests the danger of imposing a priori views of what is, or is not, a `basic' 
necessity for the poor! In contrast to Due (1985, p. 36), who explicitly 
singles out sugar for taxation at 20 per cent, these results suggest that even 
the existing 5 per cent levy should be removed.18 
The conclusion of this preliminary analysis is that there is a very good 
case on distributional grounds for exempting at least a select list of basic 
food items from the GCT in order to avoid increasing unduly the regressivity 
of the already regressive consumption-tax system in Jamaica. In particular, 
in addition to exempting all unprocessed foods (fresh meat, fresh fish, milk, 
eggs, fruit, and vegetables), it seems desirable to exempt flour, condensed 
milk, butter and margarine, cooking oil, and sugar from the tax. Contrary 
to the recommendations in Due (1985), however, there seems no reason, at 
least in terms of income effects on low-income households, to exempt other 
processed foods products (such as baby food) or medications. Nor does 
there seem much, if any, case for the `luxury' tax rates he proposed on a 
large group of products (e.g., cosmetics, jewellery). Further detailed at- 
tempts to `fine tune' the rate and exemption structure of the GCT seem more 
likely to destroy the integrity of the new tax than to make it serve better any 
distributional goals. 
Much more will be done with this data base to explore the effects of alter- 
native tax patterns on households of different sizes and compositions. 19 
Dwyer (1983), for example, has suggested that female-headed households 
tend to allocate income differently than female-male households, `more 
productively' she asserts (p. 20), with more going to food, health, and 
clothing and less (presumably) to alcohol and tobacco. The data in table 3.3 
suggest, however, that female-headed households in Jamaica actually spend 
a lower percentage on food, particularly in urban households. However, 
female-headed households appear to spend more on education, again parti- 
cularly in urban households. 
Similarly the data need to be converted to a 'consumer-equivalent' basis 
for comparative purposes. Espuet (1984) has made a preliminary effort 
along these lines in his study of a rural Jamaican community, but much 
more can be done, as discussed in Blokland (1976) and Lazear and Michael 
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(1980). The longitudinal nature of the data will also be utilized to analyse 
demand responses to changing prices during the rapid inflation occurring 
over the study period. The analysis obviously needs to be extended to the 
other very important indirect taxes in Jamaica (Bird and Miller, 1985). 
Nevertheless, as Fass (1980, p. 133) said of an earlier study of poverty in 
Haiti, in work such as this `it seems inappropriate to seek out absolute ac- 
curacy. What really is necessary is that data stay within the bounds of 
reason and provide interpretation and results that are meaningful.' By this 
test, we think that even these preliminary results provide strong evidence of 
the potential impact on the poor of particular changes in the design of in- 
direct taxes. In the face of the apparent strong direct impact on the poor of 
taxes on basic foodstuffs, for example, it would take a very low inequality 
aversion coefficient indeed not to recommend their exemption.20 Similarly, 
the perverse distributive effect of some avowedly `progressive' rates (e.g., 
on cosmetics) should also, we believe, carry some weight in designing con- 
sumption tax structures in countries like Jamaica, particularly given the 
high administrative costs associated with such rate differentiation. As has 
been noted time and again in this paper, detailed expenditure data and close 
attention to the details of tax structure are needed to reach conclusions such 
as these. 
B Microlevel Data Sets and Fiscal Incidence 
As the Jamaican example suggests, the most useful data sets for the analysis 
of indirect taxes will include several features: longitudinal data on expendi- 
tures so that changes over time can be analysed; expenditure categories that 
are sufficiently fine-tuned so that the details of the tax ratio can be 
examined; actual price data rather than imputed prices; and demographic 
information on the population surveyed. Such features are basic to the 
endeavour, yet are rarely found in any study in the literature on indirect tax 
incidence. 
For an even better understanding of fiscal impacts, still other information 
is needed. For example, beyond the bare facts of household composition 
such as number of household members and their age and sex, it is important 
to try to find out both who is the `household head' (not always an easy ques- 
tion) and the number of income earners in the household. Such factors may 
affect substantially the pattern of expenditures and consequently the effects 
of tax changes (Dwyer, 1983).21 Household characteristics greatly influence 
the nature of consumption patterns (Strauss, 1982; Kelley, 1981). An 
obvious example is one cited by Brown and Deaton (1972) in which a house- 
hold with beer-consuming adults but no children will have a higher per 
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capita consumption rate than a household with beer-consuming adults and 
children. We must be able to separate adults from children in order to see 
clearly the incidence of a tax on beer in this case. 
The conventional analysis of tax incidence in effect assumes that the 
family is a sort of `black box.' If one tax on a family is reduced and another 
increased by the same amount, it is assumed that there will be no net effect 
on the family. But what if the tax reduced is on beer consumed by the hus- 
band and the tax increased is on condensed milk consumed by the children? 
Would the effects be different if the increases and reductions were reversed? 
Households organize their finances in many ways, and there is no certainty 
that the effect on expenditure patterns will be the same in all cases (Pahl, 
1980, 1983). 
Even more ideally, and to our knowledge non-existent in the fiscal- 
incidence literature, would be a data set that would combine the features on 
the `whole consumption/production vector' (Behrman and Deolalikar, 
1985) and so allow us to learn how consumption would be altered, within 
the household and among households, by changing prices, how such 
changes would affect nutrient intake, and how changes in nutrient intake 
would affect productivity.22 Studies that could incorporate such data would 
greatly advance our knowledge of current tax incidence, changes in inci- 
dence over time, and how such changes alter consumption, nutritional 
status, and productivity. All these processes must be eventually taken into 
account if we are to place taxation in the wider context of how the poor will 
fare in the course of development. 
4 Issues for Future Research 
The first, and perhaps the most important, conclusion of this chapter is 
simply that the issue of fiscal incidence and the poor matters. The tax 
system in most developing countries impinges on the lives of many poor 
people in potentially important ways. The poor, especially the urban poor, 
do pay substantial taxes. The extent, nature, and perhaps duration of their 
poverty are affected in many ways by the characteristics and operation of 
the tax system. Both governments and researchers concerned with poverty 
in developing countries should, therefore, be aware of these effects. The 
interaction of taxation and poverty is thus an important subject for 
research. 
A second conclusion is that unfortunately this interaction is a very diffi- 
cult subject to study. Not only are the underlying theoretical issues inher- 
ently complex and the needed facts hard to find, but it is essential to 
understand the detailed reality of the fiscal instruments under examination 
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and to ground that understanding firmly in the relevant broad policy con- 
text. Such generalizations as `income taxes are better than sales taxes' or 
`beer taxes are always regressive' are useless guides to designing or reform- 
ing tax policy in any particular country. 
New data and techniques may make it possible in the future to refine 
answers to meaningful old questions (will the substitution of a general sales 
tax for a set of excise taxes be progressive or regressive?) and to answer im- 
portant new questions (will an increase in tobacco taxes impact differently 
on children in female-headed households?). There is still a long way to go in 
the analysis of the distributional effects of taxes.23 But it is gradually 
becoming possible to carry out serious studies in a field that has far too long 
been dominated by misleadingly overly simplistic quantifications of 
untested, and too often ad hoc, hypotheses. 
The set of those who can simultaneously deal with complex theoretical 
issues, with primary data-grubbing, with institutional realities, and with 
broad economic policy concerns is probably almost an empty one. In the 
future, there must probably be more `team research' along the lines of the 
Warwick and Jamaican studies cited earlier. But however such research is 
carried out, a final conclusion suggested by this chapter is that much more 
attention should be paid to collecting and analysing data bearing on these 
matters, with particular emphasis on trying to obtain a better understanding 
of the extent and nature of the variations among the poor. It may be useful 
for many purposes to seize upon the simple lack of command over econo- 
mic resources of the poor as their dominant and most important character- 
istic. What has been too often neglected, however, are the very great differ- 
ences within those classed as `the poor': between urban and rural; between 
employed and unemployed; between those in male-headed and female- 
headed families; between those with and without children; between smokers 
and drinkers and the abstemious; and so on. 
Yet if we know anything about the effects of taxation on the poor in 
developing countries, we know that these effects often vary more with such 
characteristics than they do with any measure of total income or expen- 
diture. Beyond gathering more detailed data in order to be able to depict 
more accurately the impact of taxation on the poor, we also need a much 
clearer idea of the normative and positive relevance of the observed devia- 
tions among different groups of poor people. Do the non-smoking poor 
care that their addicted colleagues pay heavy taxes? Should they? Do their 
colleagues care? Should anyone care?24 
We do not, as yet, know much about either the short-run or the long-run 
impact of taxes on the poor in developing countries. But we are perhaps ap- 
proaching a point where the economist's increasing understanding of the 
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implicit models underlying incidence analysis and the increasing availability 
of relevant data are, despite a continued lag on the data side, better matched 
than ever before. We are able, at last, to begin to respond to the oft- 
expressed concerns of policy-makers with respect to the distributional im- 
pact of revenue measures with something other than qualitative bromides or 
quantitative exercises in sleight of hand. With luck, and even more with 
perseverance, a similar survey a decade hence may be able to report not just 
promising beginnings but firm results. 
Notes 
1 A decade ago, for example, the Organization of American States, like many 
economists of the day, blithely characterized the tax system as the `supreme 
equalizer' (Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos, 1973, p. 348). 
2 The considerable differences in tax levels apparent in table 3.1, particularly in 
the upper-income groups, are attributable to differences in time period, tax 
coverage, income concept, and incidence assumptions. These differences are 
not discussed further here. It should be emphasized, however, that all the 
studies of tax incidence in developing countries reviewed here assume that 
sales and excise taxes are fully shifted forward. For a contrary argument in the 
context of the United States, see Browning (1978). The validity of this assump- 
tion in developing countries with substantial trade restrictions is also open to 
question (Bird and De Wulf, 1973), but this point is not further discussed 
here. 
3 See, e.g., Bahl and Linn (1985), on the effects on property tax incidence of 
different administrative systems. 
4 Some useful appraisals along general equilibrium lines have been carried out in 
developing countries with respect to particular fiscal policy issues (Minford, 
1970; Berry, 1972; Thirsk, 1980). Data limitations have so far generally 
rendered impossible the application of even such simplified versions of reality 
as a computable general equilibrium model (Shoven and Whalley, 1984) to tax 
policy in such countries, however. 
5 In contrast, the same source shows that in thirty-eight of the fifty-five non- 
oil developing countries for which data are available, central governments 
account for 95 percent or more of all tax revenue, and in only nine of the 
fifty-five is this proportion less than 90 per cent. The explanation for this 
apparent difference is that some of the larger developing countries are most 
decentralized. In Brazil, for example, subnational governments collected 24 
per cent of all taxes in 1982, while in India, the comparable figure was 30 per 
cent. 
6 It is interesting to note that the Jamaican property tax was held up by Linn 
(1983, p. 78) as an example to other developing countries. 
7 As is well known, such subsidization is in any case definitely a second- 
best alternative to congestion pricing (Churchill, 1972). 
8 At the time, a large subsidized urban public bus company provided 
most transit services, with the balance provided by a variety of private mini- 
buses, often operating illegally. 
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9 `For many of these low income households, transport costs were higher 
than the rent, but the fares to and from work were regarded as a necessary 
part of enjoying a job income (rather like at-source deductions). Some of 
them regularly ran out of cash by Thursday and would walk to work or try to 
obtain a lift part way from a friend who had some means of transport, either 
privately owned or as part of his work. Few could aspire to any form of 
private transport of their own, even a bicycle' (Heraty, 1980, p. 14). Similar 
results are common in other countries (Linn, 1983, p. 105). 
10 `There exists ample evidence that cities which are served by privately 
operated buses tend to have better transit service at substantially lower costs to 
transit users and to the governments alike than do cities served by public bus 
undertakings' (Bahl and Linn, 1985, pp. 1-34). 
11 See, for example, the case of Papua New Guinea discussed in Bird (1983). 
12 As emphasized repeatedly in the Warwick studies, such specific results are - 
as is common with optimal tax work - quite sensitive to the functional forms 
used in estimation. Moreover, their analysis to date has largely ignored the 
effects of taxes on incomes (the sources side). 
13 In addition to serious conceptual problems, the analysis does not take into 
account the implications or costs of the significant administrative changes 
inherent in such a reform. 
14 Some figures in table 3.4 vary slightly from those in the text because the 
former are weighted means and the latter unweighted means. (See also note to 
table 3.3.) 
15 For a full description of the methodology, see Bird and Miller (1985). 
16 Note that these figures do not include the almost invariably regressive 
sumptuary items. For a full discussion of the incidence of all indirect taxes on 
low-income households in Jamaica, see Bird and Miller (1985). 
17 Much the same result, for example, emerged in Bird's earlier (unpublished) 
study of a similar point in the Philippines, where it was found that hair oil - 
an obvious `luxury' - was in fact a basic consumption item for even the lowest 
income groups. The Philippine example also points up the rather odd results 
that may emerge if tax-rate classifications are determined on the basis of 
household surveys, which classify as `essential' the most widely used goods - a 
practice commended by both Due (1970) and Asher and Booth (1983). 
18 Recall the similar results for Pakistan mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
19 For further analysis of the existing indirect tax system and GCT in Jamaica, 
see Bird (1985). 
20 It should also be recognized that since most such foodstuffs are not consumed 
by the poor, exemption is not a particularly efficient way to help the poor. In 
the absence of an efficient transfer system, however, it is much better than 
nothing. 
21 See Folbre (1984) for a critique of the use of a joint utility function for the 
household. 
22 Behrman and Deolalikar (1985) do an excellent job of bringing the consump- 
tion/production function together in an analysis of data from rural southern 
India. Taxation, however, is not a concern of their study. 
23 Many common layman's questions on incidence (`is the tax system as a whole 
progressive?') can probably never be answered satisfactorily (Bird, 1980a). But 
increasing familiarity with general equilibrium and other modelling techniques 
76 Richard M. Bird and Barbara D. Miller 
has made clearer how dependent the results of incidence studies are not only 
on data but also on our implicit models; e.g., assuming the forward shifting 
of excise taxes in the face of trade restrictions, as has been done in all studies 
cited here, requires some strong, and rather strange, assumptions. 
24 Some arguments suggest no one cares - or should (Buchanan, 1969). 
References 
Aaron, H.J. 1975. Who Pays the Property Tax? A New View. Washington: The 
Brookings Institution 
Adler, J., E.R. Schlesinger, and E.C. Olson. 1952. Public Finance and Economic 
Development in Guatemala. Stanford: Stanford University Press 
Ahmad, E., and N. Stern. 1983. `Effective Taxes and Tax Reform in India.' 
Discussion Paper 25, Development Economic Research Centre, University of 
Warwick 
Ahmad, E., D. Coady, and N. Stern. 1984. `Tax Reform, Shadow Prices and 
Effective Taxes: Illustrations for Pakistan for 1975/76.' Discussion Paper 48, 
Development Economics Research Centre, University of Warwick 
Ahmad, E., H-M Leung, and N. Stern. 1984. `Demand Response and the 
Reform of Indirect Taxes in Pakistan.' Discussion Paper 50, Development 
Economics Research Centre, University of Warwick 
Asher, M.G., and A. Booth. 1983. Indirect Taxation in Asean. Singapore: 
Singapore University Press 
Bahl, R., and J. Linn. 1985. `Urban Public Finance and Administration in 
Developing Countries.' World Bank draft. Washington (mimeo) 
Behrman, J.R., and A.D. Deolalikar. 1985. `How do Food and Product Prices 
Affect Nutrient Intakes, Health and Labor Force Behavior for Different Family 
Members in Rural India?' Paper presented at the meeting of the Population 
Association of America, March, Boston 
Berry, R.A. 1972. `Presumptive Income Tax on Agricultural Land: The Case of 
Colombia.' National Tax Journal 25: 169-82 
Berry, R.A., and R. Soligo (eds). 1980. Economic Policy and Income Distribution 
in Colombia. Boulder, co: Westview Press 
Bird, R.M. 1974a. Taxing Agricultural Land in Developing Countries. Cam- 
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
- 1974b. `Public Finance and Inequality.' Finance and Development 11: 2-4 
- 1977. `Tax Reform and Tax Design in Developing Countries.' Revista di diretto 
finanziario a scienza delle finanze 36, no. 2: 297-306 
- 1980a. `Income Redistribution through the Fiscal System: the Limits of 
Knowledge.' American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 70: 77-81 
- 1980b. Central-Local Fiscal Relations and the Provision of Urban Public Ser- 
vices. Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Australian 
National University 
- 1982. `Taxation and Employment in Developing Countries.' Finanzarchiv 40, 
no. 2: 211-39 
- 1983. The Allocation of Taxing Powers in Papua New Guinea. Port Moresby: 
Institute of National Affairs 
77 Taxation, Pricing, and the Poor 
- 1984. Intergovernmental Finance in Colombia. Cambridge, MA: International 
Tax Program, Harvard Law School 
- 1985. `The Impact of the Proposed General Consumption on Low-Income 
Households.' Syracuse University (mimeo) 
Bird, R.M., and L. De Wulf. 1973. `Taxation and Income Distribution in Latin 
America; A Critical Review of Empirical Studies.' International Monetary 
Fund Staff Papers 10: 639-82 
Bird, R.M., and B. Miller. 1985. `The Incidence of Indirect Taxes on Low- 
Income Households in Jamaica.' Syracuse University (mimeo) 
Blokland, J. 1976. Continuous Consumer Equivalence Scales. The Hague: Mar- 
tinus Nijhoff 
Brown, A., and A. Deaton. 1972. `Surveys in Applied Economics: Models of 
Consumer Behavior.' Economic Journal 82: 1145-1236 
Browning, E.K. 1978. `The Burden of Taxation.' Journal of Political Economy 
86: 649-71 
Buchanan, J.M. 1969. Cost and Choice. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company 
Chelliah, R.J., and R.N. Lall. 1978. Incidence of Indirect Taxation in India 
1973-74. New Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy 
Chenery, H., et al. 1974. Redistribution with Growth. London: Published for the 
World Bank and the Institute of Development Studies by Oxford University 
Press 
Churchill, A. 1972. `Road User Charges in Central America.' World Bank Staff 
Occasional Paper number 15. Washington 
Cnossen, S. 1977. Excise Systems: A Global Study of the Selective Taxation of 
Goods and Services. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 
- 1982. `What Rate Structure for a Value-Added Tax.' National Tax Journal 35: 
205-14 
- 1984. `Jamaica's Indirect Tax System: The Administration and Reform of 
Excise Taxes.' Staff Paper no. 8, Jamaica Tax Structure Examination Project, 
Metropolitan Studies Program. Maxwell School, Syracuse University 
De Wulf, L. 1974. `Taxation and Income Distribution in Lebanon.' Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 28: 151-9 
- 1975. `Fiscal Incidence Studies in Developing Countries: Survey and Critique.' 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 22: 61-131 
Downing, P.R. 1973. `User Charges and the Development of Urban Land.' 
National Tax Journal 26: 631-7 
Due, J.F. 1970. Indirect Taxation in Developing Countries. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press 
- 1985. `Revision of the Indirect Tax Structure in Jamaica: A Proposal for a 
General Consumption Tax.' Staff Paper no. 6 (revised), Jamaica Tax Structure 
Examination Project, Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School, Syracuse 
University 
Dwyer, D.H. 1983. `Women and Income in the Third World: Implications for 
Policy.' Working Paper no. 18, Population Council. New York 
Espuet, P. 1984. `Poverty in a Rural Jamaica Community.' Unpublished thesis, 
University of the West Indies, Jamaica 
Fass, S. 1980. The Economics of Survival: A Study of Poverty and Planning in 
Haiti. Washington: Agency for International Development 
78 Richard M. Bird and Barbara D. Miller 
Folbre, N. 1984. `Household Production in the Philippines: A Non-Neoclassical 
Approach.' Economic Development and Cultural Change 32: 303-30 
Follain, J., and E. Miyake. 1984. `Land versus Property Taxation: A General 
Equilibrium Analysis.' Staff Paper no. 13, Jamaica Tax Structure Examination 
Project, Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School, Syracuse University 
Frank, C.R., Jr, and R.C. Webb (eds). 1977. Income Distribution and Growth in 
the Less-Developed Countries. Washington: The Brookings Institution 
Goode, R. 1984. Government Finance in Developing Countries. Washington: The 
Brookings Institution 
Harberger, A.C. 1977. `Fiscal Policy and Income Distribution.' In Frank and 
Webb, 1977, pp. 459-80 
Heraty, M.J. 1980. Public Transport in Kingston, Jamaica and Its Relation to 
Low Income Households. Crowthorn, Berkshire: Overseas Unit, Transport and 
Road Research Laboratory 
Holland, D.M. 1979. `Adjusting the Property Tax for Growth, Equity and 
Administrative Simplicity: A Proposal for La Paz, Bolivia.' In Roy W. Bahl 
(ed.), The Taxation of Urban Property in Less Developed Countries, 
pp. 119-34. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 
Holland, D., and J. Follain. 1985. `The Property Tax in Jamaica.' Staff Paper 
no. 16, Jamaica Tax Structure Examination Project, Metropolitan Studies Pro- 
gram, Maxwell School, Syracuse University 
International Monetary Fund. 1984. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 
vol. 8. Washington 
Katzman, M.T. 1978. `Progressive Public Utility Rates as an Income Redistribu- 
tion Device in Developing Countries: The Case of Municipal Water.' In J.F.J. 
Toye (ed.), Taxation and Economic Development, pp. 174-92. London: Frank Cass 
Kelley, A. 1981. `Demographic Impacts on Demand Patterns in the Low-Income 
Setting.' Economic Development and Cultural Change 30: 1-16 
Kuznets, S. 1966. Modern Economic Growth. New Haven: Yale University Press 
Lazear, E., and R.T. Michael. 1980. `Family Size and the Distribution of Real 
Per Capita Income.' American Economic Review 70: 91-107 
Lent, G.E., M. Casanegra, and M. Guerard. 1973. `The Value-Added Tax in 
Developing Countries.' International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 20: 318-78 
Linn, J.F. 1979. `Automotive Taxation in the Cities of Developing Countries.' 
Nagerlok 11: 1-23 
- 1980a. `The Distributive Effects of Local Government Finances in Colombia: A 
Review of the Evidence.' In Berry and Soligo, 1980, pp. 69-111 
- 1980b. `Urban Finances in Developing Countries.' In Roy Bahl (ed.), Urban 
Government Finance: Emerging Trends, 245-83. Urban Affairs Annual 
Reviews, vol. 20. Beverly Hills: Sage 
- 1983. Cities in the Developing World. New York: Published for the World 
Bank by Oxford University Press 
Lovejoy, R.M. 1963. `The Burden of Jamaican Taxation, 1985,' Social and 
Economic Studies 12: 442-58 
Marshall, M. (ed.). 1982. Through a Glass Darkly: Beer and Modernization in 
Papua New Guinea. Monograph 18, Institute of Applied Social and Economic 
Research. Boroko, Papua New Guinea 
McLure, C.E., Jr. 1977a. `Taxation and the Urban Poor in Developing Coun- 
tries.' World Development 5: 169-88 
79 Taxation, Pricing, and the Poor 
- 1977b. `The Incidence of Jamaican Taxes, 1971-1972.' Working Paper no. 16, 
Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 
Mona, Jamaica 
- 1979. `The Relevance of the New View of the Incidence of the Property Tax in 
Less Developed Countries.' In Roy W. Bahl (ed.), The Taxation of Urban 
Property in Less Developed Countries, pp. 51-76. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press 
McLure, C.E., Jr, and W.R. Thirsk. 1978. `The Inequity of Taxing Inequity: A 
Plan for Reduced Sumptuary Taxes in Developing Countries.' Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 26: 487-503 
Meade, J.E., et al. 1978. The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation. London: 
George Allen and Unwin 
Meerman, J. 1979. Public Expenditure in Malaysia: Who Benefits and Why. New 
York: Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press 
Miller, B.D., and C. Stone. 1985. `The Low-Income Household Survey: Descrip- 
tion and Analysis.' Syracuse University (mimeo) 
Minford, A.P.L. 1970. `A Model of Tax Incidence for Malawi.' In Centre of 
African Studies, African Public Sector Economics, pp. 67-93. Edinburgh 
Musgrave, R.A. 1969. Fiscal Systems. New Haven: Yale University Press 
Oates, W.E. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich 
Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos. 1973. La Politica Tributaria como 
Instrumento de Desarrollo. Washington 
Pahl, J. 1980. `Patterns of Money Management within Marriage.' Journal of 
Social Policy 9: 313-35 
- 1983. `The Allocation of Money and the Structuring of Inequality within Mar- 
riage.' Sociological Review 31: 237-62 
Selowsky, M. 1979. Who Benefits from Government Expenditure? A Case Study 
of Colombia. New York: Published for the World Bank by Oxford University 
Press 
Shoup, C.S. 1983. `Current Trends in Excise Taxation.' In Sijbren Cnossen (ed.), 
Comparative Tax Studies, pp. 257-75. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing 
Company 
Shoven, J., and J. Whalley. 1984. `Applied General Equilibrium Models of Taxa- 
tion and International Trade: An Introduction and Survey.' Journal of 
Economic Literature 22: 1007-51 
Smith, R.S. 1974. `Financing Cities in Developing Countries.' International 
Monetary Fund Staff Papers 21: 329-88 
- 1975. `Highway Pricing and Motor Vehicle Taxation in Developing Countries: 
Theory and Practice.' Finanzarchiv 33: 451-74 
- 1984. `Motor Vehicle Taxation in Jamaica.' Staff Paper no. 10, Jamaica Tax 
Structure Examination Project, Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell 
School, Syracuse University 
Stern, N. 1984. `Optimum Taxation and Tax Policy.' DM/84/9, Fiscal Affairs 
Department, International Monetary Fund, Washington 
Strauss, J. 1982. `Determinants of Food Consumption in Rural Sierra Leone: 
Application of the Quadratic Expenditure System to the Consumption-Leisure 
Component of a Household-Firm Model.' Journal of Development Economics 
11: 327-53 
80 Richard M. Bird and Barbara D. Miller 
Tanzi, V. 1974. `Redistributing Income through the Budget in Latin America.' 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review 17: 65-87 
- 1983. `Tax Systems and Policy Objectives in Developing Countries: General 
Principles and Diagnostic Tests.' DM/83/78, Fiscal Affairs Department, Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, Washington 
Thirsk, W.R. 1980. `A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Effects of Subsidized 
Farm Mechanization on Output and Income Distribution in Colombia.' In 
Berry and Soligo, 1980, pp. 177-201 
Toye, J. 1981. Public Expenditure and Indian Development Policy 1960-1970. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Wasylenko, M. 1985. `The Distribution of Tax Burdens in Jamaica.' Syracuse 
University (mimeo) 
Whalley, J. 1984. `Regression or Progression: The Taxing Question of Incidence 
Analysis.' Canadian Journal of Economics 17: 654-82 
4 
Public Subsidies in the Social 
Sector: Equity and Efficiency 
EMMANUEL JIMENEZ 
The public sector in developing countries has traditionally played an impor- 
tant role in the financing of social services. In education, the most accurate 
available indicator is the percentage of students who are enrolled in public 
school. I In 1975 the ranges were 82-87 per cent at the primary levels in Latin 
America, Asia, and West Africa and 67-71 per cent at the secondary levels 
(table 4.1). The proportions at the university levels are also substantial 
(World Bank, 1980). These enrolment figures have important implications 
for government expenditures, since tuition and fees recover very little of the 
costs in public institutions.2 Moreover, large bursaries to students to cover 
living and other expenses, and transfers to subsidized private schools, add 
large amounts to the fiscal burden. The share of education in the govern- 
ment budget hovers around 16 per cent for all developing countries. 
However, the figure goes to 23 per cent for francophone countries in sub- 
Saharan Africa (table 4.2). 
In health, the figures vary more widely across countries for definitional 
reasons. However, gross estimates of public as a per cent of total health 
expenditures indicate averages of about 63 per cent in Africa, 48 per cent in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and 30 per cent in Asia (table 4.1). The 
percentage share of health expenditures in the government budget is about 3 
per cent for low-income countries and 5-6 per cent for middle-income coun- 
tries (table 4.2). 
The extent of public intervention in the social sectors has been justified 
on equity grounds. One argument is that public expenditures on social ser- 
The World Bank does not accept responsibility for the views expressed herein, which are 
those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank or its affiliated 
organizations. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Share of the public sector in health and education 
Per cent of students in 
public schools 1975a Private as per cent of 
total health ex enditure p 
Primary Secondary (1975-80)b 
Africa 38.3 
East 57 55 
West 82 70 
Asia 87 71 70.1 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 87 67 49.4 
Europe, Middle East, 
and North Africa 94 92 42.7 
a Tan (1985a) and World Bank estimates 
b De Ferranti (1985) 
vices can be used as an effective method of income redistribution, particu- 
larly if they are financed out of progressively collected revenue sources. 
Another is that health and education should be considered as `basic human 
needs,' to which the public sector should guarantee access to some mini- 
mum threshold amount. Widely accepted campaigns for universal primary 
education and `health for all by the year 2000' (WHO, 1981) are examples of 
the basic needs view. 
The other justification for heavy public subsidization has been on ef- 
ficiency grounds, based on traditional public-finance arguments. A com- 
pletely private system would lead to sub-optimal levels of consumption of 
the public service for a number of reasons. Because of externalities, 
individual consumers would undervalue the consumption of a particular 
service. Because of scale economies, providers would charge a price that 
would be too high relative to that which is socially optimal. Because of 
failure in related markets, such as that for credit, individuals could not 
generate requisite resources to consume the desired amounts. 
In recent years, many developing countries have confronted tightening 
budget constraints. Country conditions have changed substantially because 
policies regarding the financing of education and health were developed. 
Thus, it is time to investigate the record of public investments in meeting 
their goals regarding equity and efficiency. This review shows that there is 
substantial room for improvement in both areas. As a result of the re- 
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TABLE 4.2 
Public expenditure on education and health, major world regions, 1980 
Expenditure on education Expenditure on health 
as per cent of state budget as per cent of state budget 
Africa 
East 11.1 5.3 
West 14.9 4.7 
Asia 
East Asia and Pacific 13.4 5.1 
South Asia 14.6 3.7 
Latin America 15.6 8.2 
East and North Africa 15.8 4.2 
Developing countries 14.5 5.4 
SOURCE: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, various issues; De Ferranti (1985a) 
examination of the traditional assumptions that justified public interven- 
tion, this chapter concludes that, perhaps, a return to some form of private 
participation is warranted. 
1 Equity in the Distribution of Public Social Expenditures 
A Patterns of Distribution 
Despite the policy of free provision, the distribution of public resources 
devoted to education is not progressive with respect to current household in- 
come. The rich get more of the subsidy because of their enrolment ratios, 
particularly at those educational levels where subsidies are highest. The 
total monetary effect for various world regions has recently been estimated 
in a World Bank study by Mingat and Tan (1986b). Table 4.3 shows the 
proportion of total public resources appropriated by different socio- 
economic groups. Because of the paucity of income data in developing 
countries, the distribution figures are categorized on the basis of occupa- 
tional rather than income categories.3 The figures take into account the 
cumulative effects of subsidies obtained at previous levels of education. A 
comparison of the share of resources received by three socio-economic 
groups with their share of the total population of school-age children pro- 
vides a measure of the benefit that each socio-economic group derives from 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































85 Public Subsidies in the Social Sector 
that it is much higher for the white-collar group than for the other groups, 
indicating that this group enjoys a more-than-proportionate share of all 
education subsidies. In most developing country regions, the children of 
white-collar workers gain nearly six times as much benefit from public 
education subsidies as the children of farmers. In francophone Africa, the 
contrast is even more marked: children from white-collar families gain over 
ten times as much from subsidies as farmers' children. Thus, the `provision 
of free or heavily subsidized education does not ensure equity in the 
distribution of public resources' (Mingat and Tan, 1985b). 
Information on the distribution of public-health subsidies by income 
class is more difficult to compile. Table 4.4 summarizes the distribution of 
overall public-health subsidies for a number of countries. The evidence is 
that this distribution is not as regressive as that for educational subsidies. 
However, neither is it progressive (with the possible exception of pre- 
revolutionary Iran). The poorest 40 per cent in Colombia, Malaysia, and Sir 
Lanka receive, respectively, 41, 47, and 46 per cent of the public subsidy for 
health. This distribution is mostly a result of the progressive incidence of 
public expenditures on rural health care. The distribution is more regressive 
in Indonesia and the Philippines, where the poorest 40 per cent receive only 
19 and 27 per cent, respectively, of the subsidies from public-health centres 
and hospitals. 
These numbers are made even more dramatic when one considers the 
relative needs of income groups. Although space does not permit a 
thorough review, the bias against lower-income groups in the distribution of 
public education and health expenditures is more pronounced when one 
considers the large number of school-age children and the incidence of 
disease for the poorer household. 
In summary, the distributions of government subsidies in health and edu- 
cation are, at best, neutral with respect to household income. Indeed, for 
most types of education, the distribution is highly regressive. Thus, present 
policies regarding the public provision of educational and health services 
have not succeeded in substantially improving the national distribution of 
resources. 
This result is preserved even when the financial contribution of richer 
households to public revenue is taken into account. It is sometimes argued 
that because most public subsidies to education and health are drawn from 
general revenues, which are financed by a progressive tax system, the 
regressive distribution of these subsidies may be mitigated. The evidence 
indicates otherwise. While revenue from income taxation may be based on a 
progressive schedule, a large proportion of central government revenue, 
which funds most health and educational expenditures in highly centralized 
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TABLE 4.4 
Percentage share of public-health subsidies by income group 
Income group 
Country Year of 
(source) data 
Type of health 
subsidy 
Poorest 
20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-1000/16 
Chile 1969 Public health 31 (poorest 30016) 35 (40-6001o) 35 (70-10007o) 
(Foxley et al. 1979) 
Colombia 1974 NHs hospitalb 30 23 20 18 12 
(Selowsky 1979) sss hospitalb 8 15 29 24 23 
Health centre 25 29 23 15 8 
Overall public 20 21 20 20 20 
Indonesia 1980 Overall public 19 (poorest 40076) 3 (40-7001o) 45 (70-10001o) 
(Meesook 1984) 
Iran 1977 Overall public 30 21 19 18 13 
(Richards 1982) 
Malaysia 1974 Inpat. hospital 19 27 10 24 20 
(Meerman 1979) Outpat. hospital 22 20 23 14 6 
Rural clinic 28 27 19 19 8 
Overall public 21 26 15 22 17 
Philippines 1975 Overall public 14 13 15 18 40 
(Richards 1982) 
Sri Lanka 1978 Overall public 25 21 20 19 14 
(Richards 1982) 
a All rows sum to 100%. 
b NHS = National Health Service; sss = Social Security System. 
c These figures are from an 1Lo review (Richards, 1982). The data are from restricted 11.0 
documents. The years quoted are the dates of the original studies. 
developing countries, is raised through indirect taxation. Thus, when all 
sources of tax revenue are taken into account, the tax systems in these coun- 
tries are not strongly progressive and may even be regressive (see table 4.5). 
B Reasons for the Distribution 
Under present financial arrangements, richer households have greater ac- 
cess to public subsidies in education and health services than do poorer 
households. First, the presence of private costs implies that income con- 
straints bound consumption choices, even if the public authorities do not 
charge for the services. Second, for any given type of service, but especially 
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TABLE 4.5 
The incidence of taxation by income group, selected countries 














Lowest income Middle income Highest income 
17.2 19.8 21.4 
5.2 14.3 14.8 
18.5 16.2 26.7 
17.1 13.1 29.9 
11.5 8.8 12.7 
16.4 15.7 21.6 
8.4 20.2 20.3 
17.7 16.5 42.1 
40.2 22.7 14.9 
15.0 9.6 25.3 
4.8 17.4 26.6 
23.0 16.9 33.5 
NOTE: Figures include direct and indirect taxes. 
SOURCE: De Wulf (1975); Foxley et al. (1979); Mann (1982); Heller (1981); and Gillis and 
McLure (1978) 
for education, the private costs of using publicly subsidized health and 
educational services are positively related to household income. It is also 
possible to argue that private benefits are negatively related to income. 
Third, governments tend to subsidize relatively more (in relation to private 
cost) those types of social services that have the lowest private returns for 
indigent families. This effect reinforces the first in biasing the participation 
rate towards richer families. Finally, among those who are induced to seek 
the subsidy services, there is excess demand. The method of rationing scarce 
services is biased towards richer demanders. 
(i) Presence of Private Costs 
Fees are not the only costs of consumption. Free provision is not free con- 
sumption. Other costs, such as transport, the purchase of auxiliary comple- 
mentary services, and the opportunity cost of the consumer's time, are real 
constraints to poor households and constitute a major component of the 
cost of consumption. 
Table 4.6 presents some indicators of the magnitude of non-fee costs for 
education for selected countries. Important components of these indirect 
costs are for transport; auxiliary materials such as books, school supplies, 
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and uniforms; board and lodging, where they are available (although some 
of these costs are living costs that households may have had to incur any- 
way, had the student not gone to school). 
Although more difficult to estimate directly, the largest non-fee cost, par- 
ticularly for secondary and higher levels of education, is that of the oppor- 
tunity cost of the student's time. This factor is particularly important for 
education. Many poor households require substantial contributions from 
children to augment total family resources, especially if work activity is 
defined as including market work, home production, and housework. For 
example, the Malaysian evidence indicates that the proportion of children in 
a family participating in work activity rises from 0.31, for Malay girls aged 
5-6, to 0.99 for those aged 15-19; and 0.17 to 0.92, respectively, for Malay 
boys of the same age groups (De Tray, 1984).4 
Similar costs can be documented for any given type of health-care service. 
For example, physician services in the form of government-run clinics may 
be free. However, transport costs would still have to be incurred. Also, 
drugs may not be subsidized to the same extent (De Ferranti, 1983; Mus- 
grove, 1983). 
The presence of these costs would lead poorer families to demand less of 
health and education services than richer households in developing coun- 
tries. (If they were truly free, and benefits were distributed to all, this 
demand should be relatively insensitive to income). Musgrove, for example, 
estimates income elasticities greater than unity in the demand for health ser- 
vices. And the poorest households may not participate at all. This is particu- 
larly true for services not deemed essential for immediate survival, such as 
education. 
(ii) Differential Costs and Benefits 
It is likely that the costs of consuming any given type of educational or 
health service are greater and the perceived benefits may be less for lower- 
income households. Costs tend to be higher in serving the poorest segments 
of the population because these households live in rural areas, where they 
are more dispersed. Most of these transport costs are borne by the user, par- 
ticularly for primary education and primary health care (Jimenez, 1987). 
They are far from trivial for the poorest segments of the population, and, in 
some instances, board and lodging costs may have to be incurred as well. 
Household income is greater in urban areas and the result is that demand 
would be greater for richer income groups. 
Another source of greater cost is the lack of access to financial markets. 
For example, the lack of educational credit markets does not enable the 
poorest household to borrow needed funds. Households are then con- 
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TABLE 4.6 
The private costs of publicly provided educational services 
(all figures in current U.S. dollars) 
Average household expenses 
per student 
Per Average 
Survey capita Type of bursary Indirect Opportunity 
Country year income service provided Fees costsa costs 
Malaysia 1974 680 Primary 1 2 51 - 
Secondary 5 30 123 - 
Post-secondary 7 141 235 - 
Tanzania 1981 280 Secondary 0 0 137 1,115b 
Malawi 1983 210 Sid.8 0 5 34 - 
Secondary - 86 126 - 
Mali 1981 190 Rural primary 0 2 5 0 
a Includes books, transport, room, board, supplies, uniforms, etc. 
b As perceived by the student. A dash means not available. 
SOURCE: Meerman (1979) for Malaysia; Tan et al. (1984) for Malawi; Tan (1985b) for 
Tanzania; Birdsall (1983b) for Mali. Per capita income from World Bank 
fronted with a choice between savings and present consumption. This 
choice has been posited as one explanation why the average propensity to 
save rises with income - because at low income levels, survival is threatened 
below some minimum consumption threshold (Gersovitz, 1983). 
Not only are costs expected to be greater for lower-income households. 
The perceived benefits of receiving the social service may be less as well. 
Households in higher socio-economic strata may simply be more aware of 
the benefits of health and nutrition, as well as of the greater opportunities 
that are opened by education. For educational services, there are a number 
of other reasons. First, higher-income households tend to provide a better 
environment for studying, including parental help, and thus increasing the 
returns to education. Second, these households require a vent for invest- 
ment of their assets in economies where capital markets are constrained and 
may simply substitute human for physical capital in their investment port- 
folio. Third, in non-competitive job markets, where whom one knows is as 
important as what one knows, the elite once again have an advantage. 
(iii) Patterns of Government Expenditure 
The choice of which service to subsidize has a profound impact on the 
distribution of public resources. The evidence is that the public sector in 
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many countries subsidizes those types of health and education services to 
which access is severely limited and for which the benefit/cost ratio is higher 
for higher-income groups. 
The difference in the benefit/cost ratio between richer and poorer income 
groups is likely to be greater for higher education than for primary educa- 
tion. The most important reason for this result is the opportunity cost. Yet, 
a great proportion of government subsidies is direct at higher levels. Table 
4.7 shows the proportion of the world regional populations with no educa- 
tion or only primary schooling as compared to the proportion with higher 
education. It further compares the share of government educational 
resources that these two groups receive. The figures take account of the sub- 
sidies received by those in higher education throughout their school career, 
including subsidies at the primary and secondary levels. In developing coun- 
tries as a whole, on average, 71 per cent of the population in each genera- 
tion receive none or only primary schooling and obtain only 22 per cent of 
the resources devoted to education. In contrast, the proportion who attain 
higher education is only 6 per cent, but this minority obtains 39 per cent of 
total resources. The most skewed distribution is in Africa: in francophone 
Africa, 2 per cent of each cohort in the population attain higher education 
and receive 40 per cent of the public resources devoted to education; in 
anglophone Africa, 1 per cent of the cohort receives more than one-quarter 
of all public education resources available to that cohort. The primary 
reason is the large public reimbursements for out-of-pocket personal costs, 
such as transport and books (Eicher, 1984; Hinchliffe, 1984; Mingat and 
Psacharopoulos, 1985). In anglophone Africa, `student subsidies represent 
1407o [of total subsidies] at secondary and higher education levels, while in 
francophone Africa the figures are much higher, 23 and 43% respectively. 
In countries like the Congo, the Central African Republic and Ivory Coast, 
scholarships ... even exceed teaching expenditures at the higher level' 
(Mingat and Psacharopoulos, 1985). To put these numbers into perspective, 
per student scholarships as a percentage of per capita GNP are: 120 per cent 
in the Ivory Coast, 160 per cent in Senegal, 700 per cent in Mali, and 800 per 
cent in Niger and Burkina Faso. 
Another government policy that induces inequitable distribution is that 
spending for given types of urban schools far outstrips spending for rural 
schools. Table 4.8 is indicative of this trend, which is most pronounced for 
post-primary education in some countries. In Colombia, secondary educa- 
tion in rural areas, where 32 per cent of the school-age population resides, 
receives 19 per cent of total government resources. In Indonesia, upper 
secondary education in rural areas, where 76 per cent of the school-age 
population resides, received 50 per cent of the government subsidies. 
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TABLE 4.7 
Distribution of total educational resources and population by terminal level of schooling, 
major world regions, 1980 
Primary or less Higher education 
Region % population % resources % population To resources 
Africa 
francophone 86 16 2 40 
anglophone 83 39 1 26 
Latin America 56 16 12 42 
Asia 
East Asia and Pacific 57 19 9 40 
South Asia 81 23 4 39 
Middle East and 
North Africa 64 19 9 45 
Developing countries 71 22 6 39 
Developed countries 20 8 21 37 
SOURCE: Mingat and Tan (1985a) 
Similar considerations apply to the health sector. Table 4.9 shows that the 
rural populations in Colombia obtain 19 per cent of government subsidies 
but account for 38 per cent of the total population. One of the most skewed 
rural/urban differentials in health spending is in China. Rural households, 
which make up 79 per cent of all households, receive 29 per cent of all 
government subsidies. In Brazil, coverage of the public social-security 
system (INAMPS) is more complete in urban areas. Musgrove (1983) finds 
that in metropolitan areas `most health care is provided directly, with little 
or no out-of-pocket cost to the consumer, whereas in smaller cities and rural 
areas INAMPS often reimburses consumers for private expenditures, as well 
as paying other public sector institutions for the services provided' (p. 254). 
(iv) Rationing Criteria 
There is excess demand for most subsidized social services. The distribution 
of public resources devoted to these services thus depends not only on which 
types of households want them, but also on how the public authority 
decides to allocate the scarce school places or hospital beds. It can be argued 
that, at least for education services, the allocation mechanisms tend to be 
regressive. 
The most popular system of rationing scarce educational places is to use 
performance in school or in entrance examinations. Those who score the 
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TABLE 4.8 
Distribution of government educational subsidy by type of education and location 
Share of educational 
subsidy (%) 
Share of school- 
age cohort (%) 
Country Year Type of schooling Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Indonesia 1982 Primary 83 17 84 16 
Upper secondary 71 29 80 20 
Lower secondary 50 50 76 23 
University 21 79 78 22 
All levels 76 24 83 17 
Malaysiaa 1974 Primary 52 48 - - 
Secondary 50 50 - - 
Post-secondary 37 63 - - 
All - - 56 44 
Colombia 1974 Primary 35 65 35 65 
Secondary 19 81 32 68 
Kenyab 1976 Secondary 87 13 95 5 
a Shares are estimated from enrolment in public institutions. Shares of school-age cohort 
are assumed to be equivalent to population shares. Dash means not available. 
b Urban shares as from enrolment data in Nairobi assisted schools 
SOURCE: Meesook (1984) for Indonesia; Meerman (1979) for Malaysia; Selowsky (1979) for 
Colombia; Bertrand and Griffin (1984) for Kenya. For each row, adding rural and urban 
would total 100 per cent 
highest are allowed to enter. Whatever the efficiency implications of this 
system (they are discussed below) the impact on equity is not neutral, even if 
it is assumed that innate ability is randomly distributed throughout the 
population. 
There are several reasons why children from richer households can be 
expected to perform better than those from poorer households on the basis 
of the above selection criteria. First, richer households have more of their 
own funds to invest in private tutoring or in the purchase of books. This 
asset may give their children a comparative advantage in entrance examina- 
tions. Second, richer households may be better aware of the benefits of 
schooling. Consequently, they cultivate a milieu that is conducive to study- 
ing and where scholarly activity is not disparaged. The result is often better 
performance.' Third, the need to acquire good grades or to pass competitive 
tests often leads to repetition in primary or secondary schooling, and poorer 
households may be unable to finance extended primary or secondary 
schooling. Thus, even a system of free secondary or higher education that 
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TABLE 4.9 
Distribution of government health subsidy by type of service and by location 




Country Year Type of schooling Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Indonesiab 1983 All public (Java)e 50 16 55 11 
All public (Outer)e 27 6 28 6 
All public (Indon.) 77 23 83 17 
Malaysiab 1974 All publicd 57 43 60 40 
Senegal 1981/82 All publich 57 43 81 19 
Colombia 1974 NHs hospitalse 39 61 - - 
ss hospitalse 2 98 - - 
Health clinics 23 77 - - 
All public 19 81 38 62 
China 1981 Hospitalsf 25 75 - - 
Other MOPH acts. 84 16 - - 
Med. insuranceg 0 100 - - 
All public 29 71 79 21 
a Subsidies are government expenditures net of any fees received. 
b Services include government hospitals, public-health centres, and community-health 
volunteers. 
c These are percentages of all (Indonesia) subsidies. 
d Includes rural outpatient clinics, district hospitals, and general hospitals. 
e National Health Services (NHs) and Social Security (ss) hospitals. 
f These are expenditures by the Ministry of Public Health and include hospitals of tradi- 
tional medicine, commune health centres, anti-epidemic activities. 
g Health insurance to provide free health care is an expenditure by the Ministry of Finance. 
h Urban = Cap Vert region (Dakar). 
SOURCE: Meesook (1984) for Indonesia; Meerman (1979) for Malaysia; Selowsky (1979) for 
Colombia; Prescott and Jamison (1983) for China; De Ferranti (1983) for all others. Dash 
means not available. 
depends entirely on competitive examinations to select students may in fact 
discriminate against those who have high ability but insufficient current in- 
come to finance the indirect costs of schooling. 
This effect is exacerbated because the bulk of the subsidies in education is 
concentrated on higher education, where the selectivity criteria are the most 
stringent. The poorer income groups are underrepresented not only because 
they must be selected from the pool of secondary-school graduates, but also 
because they are already underrepresented in that qualifying pool. 
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The selection processes in the health sector vary considerably by type of 
service. When publicly provided curative care is in excess demand, the most 
popular allocation mechanism seems to be the queue. The distributional im- 
pact of this type of rationing is unclear. If opportunity costs are lower for 
poorer households, then it may be progressive. Although it was argued 
above that for the poorest the opportunity cost of seeking public services 
such as education or preventive health care may be survival in terms of 
nutrition (time off work), it may also be the opportunity cost of not obtain- 
ing curative care. 
2 Efficiency of Public Subsidization 
The extent and nature of public subsidization of educational and health ser- 
vices have been characterized by inefficiencies that inhibit further expansion 
and improvements of these sectors in relation to other sectors. Moreover, 
the distribution of public subsidies among types of institutions within the 
education and health sectors has resulted in the misallocation of the scarce 
resources. 
A Underinvestment in Education and Health 
The ability of many governments to mobilize resources to meet the public- 
service needs of growing populations has been restricted by the recent 
world-wide recession. Average per capita growth rates in 1970-80 have 
fallen in the thirty-three countries with the lowest per capita income 
(excluding China and India) by over 50 per cent (from 2 per cent per annum 
to 0.9 per cent) of rate of the previous decade (World Bank, 1982). 
The impact on government budgets has been immediate (for a more 
detailed discussion, see Jimenez, 1987). As a result, the gap between govern- 
ments' goals regarding the provision of public services, particularly health 
and education, and the resources required to finance them has been widen- 
ing. Between 1973 and 1980, the share of education and health services in 
government expenditures fell I1 and 13 per cent, respectively, for non-oil 
developing countries as a group. The decline is particularly pronounced for 
the African countries where, for example, the share of health in total 
government expenditures fell, on average, 20 per cent.6 One estimate of the 
cost of financing a so-called basic human development package of educa- 
tion and health related services implies budget shortfalls, for the average 
developing country, as high as 17 per cent of gross national product (GNP) 
(Meerman, 1979). 
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There is also evidence that some governments, in adjusting to the tighter 
budgetary restraints, have opted to lower per capita recurrent subsidies 
rather than sacrifice coverage. While politically more palatable, this action 
has led to the so-called recurrent cost problem: i.e., investment projects are 
not being fully funded with the resources required to run and maintain them 
as designed (see Heller, 1979, for a detailed definition). The relatively high 
proportion of recurrent costs in social expenditures makes them more vul- 
nerable to such budgetary restrictions. For example, a recent cross-section 
time-series study of twenty-eight developing countries concludes that the 
public-sector response to tightening fiscal pressures on education over the 
last decade has been to squeeze recurrent non-wage expenditure per student 
(Heller and Cheasty, 1983). Such policies have led to shortages in books and 
teaching materials but not in classrooms in Mali (Birdsall, 1985). One exam- 
ple where the ratio of public-health recurrent expenditures to capital expen- 
ditures has been steadily falling is Botswana (Jimenez, 1987). 
B Resource Misallocations within Education and Health 
Another source of inefficiency can be traced to intra-sectoral sources. The 
distribution of public subsidies among types of educational, and perhaps 
health, services as well as the access to those services among individuals 
tends to be distorted. These misallocations have persisted primarily because 
of the failure of government policies - which might have been justifiable in 
the period when newly emergent nations were trying to consolidate their 
gains - to adjust to changing circumstances. 
(i) Misallocations among Types of Social Services 
At least for education, there is evidence that public subsidization needs to 
be refocused. Not all types of educational investment are equally profitable. 
Table 4.10 indicates that the social rates of return to primary education are 
much higher than those to post-primary education for the developing coun- 
tries. Within the developing country group, the differences are largest for 
the African countries. These rates of return compare the benefits to educa- 
tion, as measured by the additional income from completing more school- 
ing, with the costs of education, as measured by opportunity costs in terms 
of forgone earnings and the cost of providing the education, regardless of 
who pays for them. Since the non-monetary benefits of education, such as 
the gain to society over and above those that accrue to individuals from 
good citizenship and having a literate and numerate population, are likely 
to be larger for lower levels of education, at least for the poorest countries, 
taking them into account in these calculations could accentuate the result. 
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TABLE 4.10 
The rates of return to investment in education by level, country, type, and region (percentages) 
Social rate of return Private rate of return 
Country type/ 
region Primary Secondary Higher Primary Secondary Higher 
Developing 
Africa 28 17 13 45 26 32 
Asia 27 15 13 31 15 18 
Latin America 26 18 16 32 23 23 
Intermediate 13 10 8 17 13 13 
Advanced - 11 9 - 12 12 
NOTE: Dash means not available because of lack of a control group, namely those with no 
schooling. 
SOURCE: Psacharopoulos (1985), table 1 
Yet the present pattern of public education investment does not appear to 
be aimed at equalizing the social rates of return described above. Post- 
primary education, and particularly university education, is relatively more 
heavily subsidized than primary education, in comparison to the costs that 
have to be incurred by private individuals. A comparison of private rates of 
return in table 4.10 with the social rates of return is a measure of the degree 
of relative subsidization of each level of education. For all three country 
groups, the ratio of private to social rates of return is greater for higher edu- 
cation than for secondary education. For the African countries, the ratio is 
higher even when compared with primary education. These results are not 
surprising when one considers the subsidization schemes documented 
earlier. 
The potential gains in redirecting investments from activities with lower 
rates of return (e.g., higher education) to those with higher rates of return 
(e.g., primary education) can be substantial. These calculations are rough, 
but indicative. If the magnitude of the shift in investments were such as to 
equalize rates of return across levels of education, the gains in allocative ef- 
ficiency would amount to 2.6'per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP), 
or almost the entire education budget in five African countries for which 
data are available (Dougherty and Psacharopoulos, 1977). The figures for 
the four Latin American countries are even more dramatic. 
(ii) Misallocation within Types of Social Services 
Heavy public subsidization also has implications in the way that resources 
are allocated within institutions. One aspect is that the reliance on public 
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provision of educational and health services has led to inefficiencies because 
public-sector managers have less incentive to minimize cost than their 
private-sector counterparts.? Very few comparisons have been made of the 
efficiency of public- versus private-sector provision of educational and 
health services. The difficulty is in ensuring that in cost comparisons output 
is held constant in terms of both quantity and quality. 
A related aspect of efficiency within institutions is whether publicly sub- 
sidized health and educational services allocate access according to those 
consumers who have the `highest return.' In health services, this means that 
those who have the most to gain from being well or those who are sickest are 
given priority. In effect, the issue is whether the methods of quantity- 
rationing of publicly subsidized services are efficient, since these services are 
supposedly not rationed by willingness to pay. 
A full analysis of the efficiency of alternative access methods is complex 
because much depends on the existence of related markets, such as those for 
educational credit and health insurance. Such a discussion would be beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, it is worthwhile to emphasize that ration- 
ing schemes that seem, at first blush, to be relatively efficient methods of 
allocation may not be so. 
For example, the most popular method of allocating scarce public-school 
places is by performance in entrance examinations or in school. Although 
this method may appear to sort students solely on the basis of ability, in 
practice it leads to sorting on the basis of willingness to pay. Richer 
households have more resources to invest in tutoring or in materials to assist 
their children to enter. There is even evidence from African countries like 
Mauritius (see Woodhall, 1983) that students are kept in school longer 
(through repetition) for the sole purpose of enhancing progression to higher 
levels. The result is a greater representation of richer households in the 
rationed school level than is warranted.8 There will be excess investment in 
types of schooling inputs that are socially costly and only marginally 
beneficial in terms of raising productivity - an argument for improved 
educational credit schemes. 
In the health sector, the most popular quantity-rationing device appears 
to be the queue. Although hard evidence is not available, various field 
reports are replete with examples of overcrowding in health centers 
(Jimenez, 1987). Queuing may be efficient for in-patient care, where physi- 
cians have an opportunity to assess needs and grant entry accordingly. For 
other types of health care, such as out-patient services, reasonably efficient 
allocation mechanisms are not as forthcoming. Although a portion of 
health-care demand is randomly determined, a great deal of it is endoge- 
nous to individual behaviour. Queues do not provide inducements for in- 
dividuals to engage in preventive care. 
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3 Directions for Policy Change: Selective User Charges 
It is useful to summarize the evidence reviewed so far. The distribution of 
government subsidies for health and education is not progressive. In fact, 
for education it is strongly regressive. The reasons are: 
a Free provision does not mean free consumption. So, we would expect in- 
come to still determine consumption, even if no charges are levied by the 
public sector. 
b Costs are higher for poorer income groups because they lack access to 
credit markets and insurance markets, and because they live in remote 
areas. 
c Subsidies are highest for the types of public services that are consumed by 
richer income groups (higher education, private rooms in hospital care). 
d Quantity-rationing depends on willingness to pay. 
Public-sector financial involvement has contributed to inefficiency. The 
reasons are: 
a It has led to underinvestment in social sectors as a whole. Recent con- 
straints on public investment, combined with restrictions on private- 
sector involvement, have led to this result. 
b There is misallocation of resources among types of education and, 
perhaps, health services. In education, there is overemphasis on higher as 
compared to primary education. In health, there is not enough done for 
preventive care and too much for high-cost in-patient curative care. 
c There is misallocation of resources within social services. First, the wrong 
students or patients may be chosen. Second, there are not enough 
managers to minimize cost. 
How should the public sector respond? The idea is to generate resources 
without relying on traditional resources (i.e., tax revenue)? and also to 
improve equity and internal efficiency. One option is to relax some of the 
constraints that prevent the private sector from responding, at least from 
the financial side. This option implies a selection lowering of subsidies 
through a combination of user fees and lower allowances. It must be selec- 
tive, at least by type of service. Subsidies should be decreased for those ser- 
vices that exhibit fewer externalities and to which access is biased towards 
richer income groups. Because there is frequently excess demand for these 
services, more resources will be generated for the sector - to be invested 
where they are most socially productive (see Jimenez, 1987, for a technical 
discussion). 
On the basis of the above criteria, there is a strong case in education for 
raising user charges in publicly provided higher education and using the 
freed budgetary allocations to expand lower levels, particularly primary. 
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Externalities in education are likely to be exhausted beyond literacy and 
numeracy.9 The excess demand for university places, as reflected in accep- 
tance ratios, is one indicator that the willingness to pay is likely to be non- 
zero. Finally, it has already been demonstrated that the richer income 
groups are grossly overrepresented in publicly subsidized higher education. 
A series of steps could be the following: (1) eliminate living allowances that 
are often higher than the opportunity cost of schooling; (2) introduce fees 
for boarding and other services; (3) introduce fees for tuition to recover a 
larger percentage of the cost. Accompanying these steps should be the 
development of student loan schemes and access to credit. To the extent 
that some subsidies remain, they should be more geared to income rather 
than distributed uniformly. 
Where should the revenues generated go? To primary education, if possi- 
ble, because social rates of return are highest there. A recently completed 
case study of nine African countries concluded that even a modest realloca- 
tion of resources through the above policy can have a significant impact. 
The effects of withdrawing all public subsidies for (a) students' living 
expenses, by abolishing scholarships, and (b) tuition costs, by introducing 
fees, are shown in table 4.11. In Niger and Burkina Faso, the gain in terms 
of additional primary enrolments would be modest because of the small cur- 
rent enrolments in higher education; but in Malawi and Senegal, the pri- 
mary enrolment rate could almost double, if all subsidies to higher educa- 
tion were reallocated to primary schooling. 
It has been suggested that the wider array of health services can be cate- 
gorized into three groups for the purposes of determining the applicability 
of user charge policies (table 4.12). For curative services, except for those 
that are referred (all in-patient and some out-patient care), `fees ... un- 
doubtedly should be increased above the current very low (or zero) levels in 
many cases' (De Ferranti, 1985). The funds can then be used to expand ser- 
vices in overcrowded facilities. For patient-related preventive services, the 
case is not as strong because of externalities and lack of information on the 
part of patients. However, some anecdotal evidence does exist to indicate 
that willingness to pay is non-zero so that, with an appropriate information 
campaign, some charging may be warranted. For non-patient-related 
preventive services, the extent of externalities, exclusivity, and the merit- 
goods argument preclude the imposition of user charges. 
One sequence of events if there are no insurance markets or if they are 
small and confined to urban salaried households (as they are now) would be 
the following, in order of ease of administration: (1) institute hospital 
charges for private patients; (2) provide for greater cost recovery, including 
user charges plus premiums, for hospital charges of the insured; (3) bypass 
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TABLE 4.11 
Actual and potential enrolment ratio at the primary level in selected African countries 
Actual 
primary 
Potential primary enrolment ratio 
if higher education students bear 








Central African Republic 68 76 71 80 
Ivory Coasta 76 94 91 100 
Mali 27 33 29 35 
Niger 23 25 24 26 
Senegal 48 58 61 71 
Togoa 100 100 100 100 
Burkina Faso 20 24 22 26 
Malawi 59 64 86 91 
Tanzaniaa 100 100 100 100 
a For these countries, the shift in resources will release more than sufficient resources to 
provide universal primary education at the existing unit costs; hence the resources could 
be used for other purposes, such as improving school quality. 
SOURCE: Mingat and Tan (1985b) 
fees in countries where a referral system exists; (4) institute other in-patient 
charges (meals, charges for visitors); (5) introduce out-patient fees (Birdsall, 
1985). If possible, there should also be an introduction of insurance markets 
to cover a wider array of people. However, at the same time it would be im- 
portant to try to ensure that services or insurance coverage continued to be 
available to the poorest, and that user fees did not restrict this group's ac- 
cess to care. Many countries have successfully implemented such schemes 
(Zschock, 1983). 
Finally, another possible government response to meeting the social- 
service needs of its population under constraints would be to lift outright 
prohibitions (if any) on private providers and, in certain instances, relax the 
constraints under which they operate .10 The private sector already responds 
in meeting the excess demand for public education in many countries (Tan, 
1985a). One example for education is Kenya's harambee system (Armitage 
and Sabot, 1987; Bertrand and Griffin, 1984). The private sector in health 
has traditionally been large (De Ferranti, 1985). Lifting the excessive regula- 
tions under which the private sector operates may allow social-sector expan- 
sion without reliance on additional government subsidies. This type of 
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TABLE 4.12 
Health services: categories for user charge policies 
i Curative care 
Includes personal services (care of patients) by health facilities and independent 
providers, including traditional practitioners; and purchases by users of medicines. Can 
be subdivided into (i) 'first-contact' services (all outpatient); (ii) referral services (in- 
patient and some out-patient). 
ii Preventive care: patient-related 
Includes services to well patients, particularly infants, mothers, and pregnant women; 
also oral rehydration therapy (see note in table 4.4) and hypertension control. Delivered 
through maternal and child health clinics at health facilities and community health 
programs. Typical services are immunization, growth monitoring, and instruction on 
improved breast-feeding and weaning practices. 
in Preventive care: non-patient-related 
Includes disease control (both vector control and mass campaigns), sanitation, education 
and promotion of health and hygiene, control of pests and zoonotic diseases, and 
monitoring of disease patients. 
SOURCE: De Ferranti (1985) 
reform requires some care so that the private sector does not end up pre- 
empting public-sector resources (e.g., public subsidy of training doctors). 
There are also lessons to be learned from mixed public and private provision 
of health in the United Kingdom and the United States, for example, where 
the end result is two classes of service with services for the poor being 
markedly inferior. 
However, removing the constraints on the private sector should be used, 
to the extent possible, to direct government subsidies toward providing ade- 
quate health and educational services to the relatively poor. Strained public 
resources need not be used to subsidize the rich, who should nonetheless be 
allowed to satisfy more of their demands with their own private resources. 
Notes 
Part of the research in this paper was conducted while the author was a con- 
sultant to the Resource Mobilization and Public Management Division, Coun- 
try Policy Department, the World Bank, Washington. The paper also draws 
on recent work in collaboration with George Psacharopoulos and Jee-Peng 
Tan. Any remaining errors in this particular paper, however, are the author's, 
as are the views expressed herein. The latter should not be attributed to the 
World Bank or its affiliates. A version of this paper was published in the 
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World Bank Research Observer as `The Public Subsidization of Education and 
Health in Developing Countries: A Review of Equity and Efficiency,' vol. 1, 
no. 1 (January 1986). 
1 Indicators on the basis of public versus private educational expenditures are 
available but might be misleading because of the way they are aggregated - for 
example, from national accounts data, one can calculate the share of public in 
total national expenditure on recreation, entertainment, education, and 
cultural services, but not on education alone. Tan (1985a) shows expenditure 
shares to range from 89 to 45 per cent in Africa, 84-12 per cent in Asia. 
However, these are likely to be underestimates because of the definition of the 
category. 
2 The degrees of cost recovery in public education vary by regional grouping 
and by level of education. Data for twenty-five developing countries were 
recently compiled and reveal that, around 1980, the per cent of unit public 
costs covered by fees amounts to: 5.7 (primary), 11.4 (secondary), and 1.9 
(higher) in Africa; 1.7 (primary, 15.6 (secondary), and 8.5 (higher) in Asia; 0.9 
(primary), 1.7 (secondary), and 6.6 (higher) in Latin America. These numbers 
are compiled from Wolff (1984), Ainsworth (1984), Jimenez (1987), Schiefel- 
bein (1985). 
3 Fields (1980) surveys some evidence on the distribution of enrolment ratios for 
developing countries. Some recent contributions, which confirm the earlier 
findings, include those of Mingat and Tan (1986a) for Malaysia, Meesook 
(1984) for Indonesia, Birdsall (1983a) for rural Mali. 
4 De Tray (1984) uses these data to conclude that, on the basis of a multivariate 
regression, income is unrelated to children's work activities. However, both 
household income and parents' education are included in the equation and it 
is likely that the income effect is captured by parental status variables. Indeed, 
parents' education is significantly negatively correlated with children's work 
activities. 
5 The impact of socio-economic characteristics on school achievement is well 
documented. See, for example, Heyneman and Loxley (1983). 
6 These figures, quoted in Jimenez (1987), are taken from IMF, Government 
Finance Statistics. 
7 Some analysts would argue that even conscientious public-sector reform would 
only lead to temporary improvements. The reason is that the members of 
society, as co-owners of a public enterprise, have less incentive to monitor its 
output (given that this is even possible) than do the owners of a private enter- 
prise because the former do not have full property rights. That is, the general 
taxpayer cannot sell his/her share of the enterprise so that he/she has less in- 
centive at the margin to ensure its success. 
8 The efficiency loss is substantial. Pinera and Selowsky (1981) estimate that if 
the allocation of school places were based more on ability and if all the most 
able students were given the opportunity to benefit from secondary and higher 
education, the efficiency gains would amount to 5 per cent of GDP in Latin 
America, Africa, and the less-developed countries of Asia. 
9 In fact, overly inflated public-sector wage scales in some African countries 
may make these externalities negative for higher education because a greater 
proportion of graduates go into the public sector. 
10 See Cameron and Hurst (1983) and Cowen and McLean (1984) for a review of 
the restrictions on public providers. 
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Sites and Services - and Subsidies: 
The Economics of Low-Cost Housing 
STEPHEN K. MAYO AND DAVID J. GROSS 
This is a paper about a major innovation in delivering shelter and related 
services to the poor in developing countries: sites-and-services projects. 
These projects, which now have been sponsored by international aid agen- 
cies for a bit more than a decade,' are government-sponsored projects that 
deliver a package of shelter-related services, from a minimal level of 
`surveyed plots' to an intermediate level of `serviced sites' to an upper level 
of `core housing' complete with utilities and access to community-based ser- 
vices, depending on the ability and willingness of beneficiary populations to 
afford a particular level of services. Typically, such projects represent a 
sharp break with pre-existing government shelter policies in that they at- 
tempt, in principle, to focus directly on lower-income groups and to deliver 
shelter and services with small or no subsidies. 
In addition they constitute a package of policy alternatives on a small 
scale that, if extended more broadly, would address most land-use and 
shelter-policy areas in which governments have actively intervened. For 
example, sites-and-services project designers must confront issues of build- 
ing codes, zoning and land-use regulations, tenure security, subsidy levels 
and mechanisms, housing and infrastructure standards and pricing policies, 
expropriation and compensation, cost-recovery mechanisms, financing 
instruments and terms, project siting and layout, land-acquisition mechan- 
isms, the mix of public and private roles in project implementation, and a 
host of other administrative and institutional issues. Thus, to study the 
impacts of sites-and-services projects and to link those impacts to specific 
project design features and policies is in a real sense to study housing policy 
The World Bank does not accept responsibility for the views expressed herein, which are 
those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank or its affiliated 
organizations. 
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for the poor in a far more generic way than might at first appear to be 
required. 
By now, large numbers of sites and services and slum-upgrading projects 
have been implemented. The World Bank alone, for example, had initiated 
some sixty-eight projects through 1984, each benefiting more than 25,000 
households on average. After a decade of experience with such projects, it is 
instructive to look closely at how they have worked and to determine the 
lessons that can be learned from their successes and failures. 
In order to understand better the workings of sites-and-services projects, 
it is useful to have an analytical framework. This paper uses such a frame- 
work, described in Mayo (1985), which looks at areas of impact such as 
housing consumption and investment, consumption of non-housing goods 
and services, incentives to sublet or to sell out to higher-income groups, and 
incentives to default on mortgages. The analytical framework provides a 
basis for estimating the economic benefits that accrue to project partici- 
pants, the subsidies that are required to achieve certain project outcomes 
(such as housing that meets minimum project design standards), and the 
welfare losses to society associated with subsidy elements. In order to 
estimate these benefits, it is necessary to have information on housing- 
demand parameters in developing countries. Thus, the next section of this 
chapter reviews recent evidence on housing demand in developing countries 
based on an ongoing research project at the World Bank. Implications of 
that research for impacts of sites-and-services projects are then described. 
There follows a review of several major project outcomes of sixty-eight 
World Bank-sponsored sites-and-services projects in which it is suggested 
that failure to incorporate correct information on housing-demand behav- 
iour in project designs has resulted in subsequent problems that seriously 
threaten the ability to achieve some of the most fundamental goals of sites- 
and-services projects. The most serious of these problems are creating con- 
ditions that lead either to large subsidies and hence poor prospects of 
replicability or to smaller subsidies but with benefits going to relatively 
higher-income groups. The chapter concludes with some comments and 
recommendations about improving both the design of sites-and-services 
projects and the choice of housing-policy instruments in developing coun- 
tries. 
1 Sites and Services: Background and Recent Evaluations 
The growth of populations in developing countries and their increasing con- 
centration in urban areas have put enormous pressure on governments to 
mobilize resources to meet the basic needs of their people. Shelter demands 
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have been particularly acute. For example, between 1960 and 1980, the 
population of cities in developing countries is estimated to have increased 
by 135 per cent, from 234 million to 549 million; between 1980 and 2000, a 
further increase, to 1.2 billion people, is expected, thereby creating major 
demands on countries to provide both housing and related services (World 
Bank, 1975a). 
The initial response of many developing-country governments to the 
press or urban population growth was to adopt the shelter `solutions' of 
developed countries: heavily subsidized blocks of public-housing flats with 
high standards of construction and infrastructure, zoning and building- 
code regulations discouraging production of housing of lower standards, 
and, in many cases, destruction of slum areas and squatter settlements in 
the name of either `law and order' or `urban renewal.' These policies did 
not work. 
Public housing did not reach most of the population; Grimes (1976), for 
example, reported that from one-third to two-thirds of urban populations 
could not afford the least expensive public housing unit in six developing- 
country cities he studied. Subsidy levels were high enough virtually to guar- 
antee that public housing could not be made available to most of the popu- 
lation. Zoning and building regulations were widely flouted as `informal 
housing' and squatter settlements proliferated. In Cairo, for example, 
where zoning laws forbid conversion of agricultural land to residential use 
and where building codes require approved architectural or engineering 
plans for legal housing construction, it was estimated that approximately 84 
per cent of housing built since 1970 is `informal' - built in violation of either 
zoning or building codes or both (Mayo et al., 1982). When squatter settle- 
ments were removed, hydra-like they returned, sometimes nearby but often 
in the same place. 
By the 1970s, it was clear to many in positions to affect third-world hous- 
ing policy that the failed (or failing) programs of the 1950s and 1960s had to 
be replaced by more constructive solutions. What was called for, and found 
expression in the works of Turner (1972), Mangin (1970), and others, was 
an approach more in harmony with the natural processes of shelter acquisi- 
tion and with the development of the poor themselves. In place of previous 
policies, it was proposed that public programs capitalize on the untapped 
energies and resources of the poor through 'progressive-development' 
schemes that provided housing or simply serviced sites that were affordable 
by low-to-moderate-income households and that could be progressively 
upgraded over time. Complementing such sites-and-services schemes, there 
were to be 'slum-upgrading' or 'squatter-upgrading' schemes that focused 
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on improving existing residential areas of the poor rather than on develop- 
ing undeveloped land. 
The key to making such projects work was to bring down the cost of 
shelter and infrastructure from the high and unaffordable levels prescribed 
by most governments. As noted in a World Bank policy paper (1975a, p. 5): 
`This can be achieved, in the first instance and most rapidly, by reducing 
standards; permitting and encouraging the use of low-cost (frequently 
indigenous)) building materials and a lower quality of finish; providing 
communal rather than private plumbing and sanitary facilities; encouraging 
or providing higher density construction, with less land per dwelling unit; 
and providing less living space per dwelling unit.' Reducing standards was 
not enough, however. It was also seen to be important to deal with prob- 
lems and constraints in urban land and housing markets, which were as- 
sumed to restrict the level of housing investment among low-income 
households - for example, shortages of urban infrastructure, uncertain and 
insecure land tenure, unavailability of formal housing finance, shortages of 
low-cost building materials, and difficulty in assembling land for develop- 
ment. Removal of such supply-side barriers to investment was seen as essen- 
tial in establishing the context within which household resources could be 
mobilized to upgrade shelter and infrastructure beyond initial affordable 
but minimal levels. 
It was also assumed that the progressive-housing development engen- 
dered by household resource mobilization and investment would be paral- 
leled by a similar phenomenon at an institutional scale. That is, it was 
expected that public institutions responsible for implementing site-and- 
service schemes and upgrading projects would price sites and shelter at a 
level that would not only fully recover costs but generate a modest surplus 
that could be recycled in order to replicate projects at a larger scale. 
Although subsidies, particularly for the lowest-income participants, were 
not altogether ruled out of the sites-and-services paradigm, it was assumed 
that they would be modest, often generated internally by allocating profits 
earned on sales of higher-income and commercial sites to write down prices 
of sites for lower-income households. Thus, the important goal of `replic- 
ability' of projects was seen to depend critically on both `appropriate stan- 
dards and sound pricing policies' (World Bank, 1983, p. 9). The latter im- 
plied prices that recovered costs and entailed small or no subsidies; the 
former implied that standards were not only affordable but represented a 
bundle of housing and infrastructure characteristics for which poor house- 
holds were willing to pay. These principles were succinctly set out by the 
director of the World Bank Urban Projects, Department, who stated that 
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`affordability is the key to cost recovery, and cost recovery is the key to 
replicability. It's as simple as that' (Ayres, 1983, p. 162). 
These principles were to be reflected in the 1970s and 1980s in a growing 
number of sites-and-services and upgrading projects sponsored by devel- 
oping-country governments and funded in part by outside agencies such as 
the World Bank, u.S. Agency for International Development (uSA1D), 
regional development banks (e.g., Asian Development Bank, Inter- 
American Development Bank), and other bilateral aid agencies. The World 
Bank alone made loans for thirty-six sites-and-services or upgrading proj- 
ects between 1972 and 1981, involving total Bank lending of more than $1 
billion and estimated to have benefited nearly 2 million people (World 
Bank, 1983, p. 46). Under its Housing Guarantee Program, uSA1D spon- 
sored preparation of a number of similar schemes, many of them in Latin 
America (World Bank, 1975a). 
Evaluations of the workings of such projects, their impacts, and their 
potential problems are beginning to emerge in some numbers. For example, 
reviewing possible beneficial policy impacts of sites-and-services projects, 
Ayres (1983, pp. 176-7) concluded that `The most obvious manifestation of 
these [policy] changes is held to be that publicly constructed housing, the 
model of the 1950s and 1960s, has given way to private investment through 
self-help, thereby reducing the role of the public sector,' citing as examples 
policy changes consistent with the sites-and-services approach in a number 
of countries. In addition to policy-level impacts, Ayres (p. 177) concluded 
that `The Bank impact on project design, planning, and investment pro- 
gramming is more measurable. Changes in design standards have brought 
shelter costs way down.' In Zambia, for example, complete houses in sites- 
and-services projects were estimated to cost less than one-fifth as much as 
the least expensive government-subsidized housing; in El Salvador, the 
better-quality sites-and-services-project houses cost less than half as much 
as the cheapest conventional house (Keare and Parris, 1982, p. xiv). 
In a recent evaluation study of four early World Bank projects jointly 
sponsored by the Bank and 1DRC (International Development Research 
Centre), the authors stated that `the experiment embodied in the first 
generation of Bank-supported urban shelter projects [has] been remarkably 
successful' (Keare and Parris, 1982, p. v), citing (1) increased production of 
housing and infrastructure, (2) stimulation of beneficiaries to produce 
housing of higher quality than had been expected, (3) continued investments 
by beneficiaries in both housing and community facilities, (4) allocation of 
plots as low as the twentieth income percentile, (5) residential turnover no 
greater among project residents than among control group households, (6) 
`affordability' among target groups, and (7) generation of income and 
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employment among project beneficiaries and producers of sites and services 
(Keare and Parris, pp. v-vi). 
These relatively positive assessments indicate real accomplishments, 
achieved only at the expense of ̀ hard and sometimes bitter arguments ... to 
persuade borrowing nations to reduce their standards and costs, [and] to 
increase the amounts that were charged to project participants,' with the ef- 
fect that available public resources were spread far more broadly among the 
population than they had been before the advent of sites-and-services and 
upgrading projects (Tym, 1984, p. 217). For these accomplishments, a gen- 
eration of social innovators and implementors deserve considerable credit. 
Despite the running accomplishments of sites-and-services and upgrading 
projects, a number of reservations and criticisms have been expressed con- 
cerning the way the sites-and-services paradigm is working. In many ways 
these critiques go to the heart of the paradigm, claiming variously that 
(1) shelter provided is not, in fact, affordable by the poor, (2) benefits ac- 
crue disproportionately to better-off households, (3) cost-recovery experi- 
ence is poor, (4) subsidies persist at unsustainable levels, and, because of the 
above, (5) projects as they are now designed and implemented are not 
replicable on a large scale. Consider the arguments regarding each point. 
Concerning affordability, Ayres (1983, p. 193) states that `there is some 
evidence that the [World] Bank's project designs may have been overly opti- 
mistic about the ability of intended beneficiaires to afford improvements 
rendered by the projects,' citing the slow speed of housing consolidation 
beyond initial stages and biases in the distribution of sites-and-services plots 
toward higher-income groups in some projects. Payer (1982, pp. 336-7) 
goes further, claiming that `the World Bank figures turn out to be highly 
unrealistic as a guide to "affordability" of the projects by the poorer slum 
residents,' and elsewhere elaborates by speculating that `the "improve- 
ments", however desirable some of them may be, will eventuate in the col- 
lection of payments and taxes that are considerably higher than what the 
population is now paying, and that will be for many, if not most, more than 
they can afford' (p. 325). Jere (1984, p. 67), in reviewing the experience of a 
sites-and-services project in Lusaka, Zambia, notes that `cost recovery in 
low-cost housing remains a major source of concern,' explaining that `offi- 
cials involved in the early planning stage had assumed that the residents 
would be willing to pay up to 20 to 25 percent of their monthly income 
towards housing costs. Now it appears that the question of affordability 
and willingness-to-pay were not studied with sufficient care.' The result of 
this oversight is `the inability of some residents to pay even if they wanted 
to' (p. 67). 
Over-optimism in design standards and the resultant inability of the poor 
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to afford to be in the project has an inevitable corollary: that benefits will 
tend to accrue to higher-income households that can afford the higher stan- 
dards. `Leakage' of benefits to middle-income households in some sites- 
and-services projects is well known (Cohen, 1983, p. 95), and is in fact cited 
in the World Bank/[DRC evaluation: `The principal finding ... with respect 
to accessibility [of different income groups to project benefits] is that, in 
both sites and services and upgrading projects, the participating popula- 
tions span a wide range of incomes and tend to be more reresentative of 
median income groups than of the poorest urban households' (Keare and 
Parris, 1982, p. 12). The mechanism by which higher-income households 
become project beneficiaries varies. In some cases, they misstate incomes in 
order to meet initial project income-eligibility limits; in others, they may 
legally or surreptitiously purchase or lease project units from initial low- 
income occupants. For example, Keare and Parris (1982, p. 15) note that in 
the Philippines `a number of cases of illegal selling of rights to tagged (cen- 
sused) dwellings in the poorest area have been observed, and some other in- 
terim reports have suggested that a significant proportion of families may 
not be able to meet regular payments for reblocked housing.' Chana (1984, 
p. 52), in reviewing the experience of one of the most celebrated sites-and- 
services projects - the project at Dandora in Nairobi, Kenya - notes that 
about half of all occupied plots were rented out fully to non-allottees and 
some units had been illegally sold, presumably to members of higher- 
income groups. It should be noted that in many sites-and-services projects 
formal restrictions exist for a stipulated period on sales or rentals by initial 
allottees, with the effect that distributional consequences of initial design 
and pricing decisions may become apparent only over a number of years. 
This tendency for distributional consequences to be disguised initially is 
aggravated by the existence of subsidies. As Keare and Parris (1982, pp. 
56-7) note, `it is also likely that where subsidization of (a portion of) project 
costs coexists with barriers to transfer the subsidy in the event of resale, the 
participant may be, or at least feel, "locked in" for a time.' Subsidies can 
also disguise the existence of potential cost-recovery problems by creating 
situations whereby such 'locked-in' households undertake extraordinary 
financial sacrifices to reach a point at which they can either comfortably 
make payments on mortgage loans or, perhaps as likely, sell out to higher- 
income households. 
Despite the incentive for low-income project beneficiaries to hold on in 
the face of economically precarious positions, cost-recovery problems have 
nevertheless arisen in World Bank and other sites-and-services projects. For 
example, Keare and Parris (1982, p. xii) note that cost recovery was a prob- 
lem in three of the four projects they reviewed, although `causes and sever- 
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ity of the problems varied significantly.' Reviews of cost-recovery experi- 
ence at the World Bank have focused on the degree to which poor cost 
recovery depends on poor financial administration, lack of enforcement 
mechanisms or political will, unwillingness of populations to pay before ser- 
vices are connected and functioning adequately, and an endemic disdain for 
payment of charges for services (Keare and Parris, 1982, p. xii). Somewhat 
surprisingly, the possible inability or unwillingness of project beneficiaries 
to pay for project benefits has been discounted by Keare and Parris. Recall- 
ing the questions raised by Ayres, Payer, and others concerning the ques- 
tionable appropriateness of affordability assumptions that underpin some 
project design standards, it may be appropriate to ask whether or not the 
explanations cited by Keare and Parris are `derived variables' - the product 
of household unwillingness to pay for standards well beyond their needs 
and of governments' tacit recognition either of the validity of project bene- 
ficiaires' reluctance or of the risk to the government of admitting a mistake. 
That is, how much of an incentive exists for governments to increase sub- 
sidies quietly or to fail to pursue vigorously cost-recovery goals when it is 
clear to them that otherwise they would risk evicting or impoverishing a 
highly visible group in a highly visible project? 
Regardless of the answer to such questions, it is clear that cost recovery is 
a significant problem in a number of World Bank (and undoubtedly other 
agencies') sites-and-services projects. And as Ayres (1983) notes, citing a 
Bank assessment, `obviously more needs to be done to improve collections 
of monthly charges from sites and services occupants and/or develop alter- 
native financing sources. Otherwise affordability cannot be equated with 
replicability' (p. 197, emphasis added). Unfortunately, even this prescrip- 
tion for improvement does not ring quite true, for, noting the italicized 
phrase, developing alternative financing sources almost inevitably means in- 
creasing subsidies, and it can almost never be true that affordability plus 
subsidies equals replicability. 
Yet it appears that in many projects affordability has been purchased 
with subsidies that are considerably higher than the minimal levels envi- 
sioned by the original architects of the sites-and-services paradigm. For 
example, in one project in Ismailia, Egypt, undertaken by the Egyptian 
government (with some support from the British Overseas Development 
Council), selling prices for serviced land were set at Egyptian £2.25 per 
square metre when the market price was between Egyptian £10 and £15 per 
square metre (Davidson, 1984, p. 142); purchase was financed by the 
government at an interest rate of 5 per cent per annum at a time when the 
prevailing market rate was about 12 per cent. Such land-price write-downs 
and interest-rate subsidies are common in sites-and-services projects and 
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can easily, as in the example just cited, constitute from half to as much as 90 
per cent of the true resource cost of the shelter or land provided in a project. 
And despite the fact that many subsidy elements are implicit, off-budget 
transfers, they imperil the long-term replicability of projects just as surely 
as do direct government payments to project beneficiaries. 
Reducing such subsidies has often proved to be extremely difficult for 
designers of sites-and-services projects, in that there is often a powerful 
inertia, of two major dimensions, at work in shelter policy. One dimension 
is that of standards, the other that of subsidies; each derives from earlier 
practice in shelter policy in developing countries - the often inappropriate 
policies of the 1950s and 1960s discussed above. The two are intimately 
related; as noted by Payne (1984, p. 8): `The frequent exclusion of all land, 
financing, and administrative costs from project accounting may be con- 
sidered to represent positive discrimination in favor of the poor and there- 
fore a socially progressive approach. In practice, however, it is often an 
excuse to maintain unrealistically high standards irrespective of their appro- 
priateness.' Another problem with subsidies is that little thought appears tw 
be given in project planning to their form, magnitude, distribution among 
different sorts of households, or their impacts either on behaviour of bene- 
ficiaries (e.g., impacts on housing consumption, investment, or tenure 
choice) or on the viability of subsidy-generating institutions. In most 
developed countries with significant social-housing policies, such questions 
are at the heart of policy and technical debates concerning the choice of 
housing programs and policies; in most developing countries they are ig- 
nored - often at the peril of long-run replicability of low-income housing 
programs. 
Yet it is on the basis of their replicability on a large scale that sites-and- 
services and upgrading projects will ultimately be judged. Achieving other 
project goals - physical implementation, affordability, cost recovery of 
'scheduled costs' - at the expense of replicability simply cannot be viewed as 
the ultimate objective. Thus, as Cohen (1983) noted in reviewing the first 
decade's performance of World Bank shelter projects, 'by the end of the 
seventies, it was evident that the notion of replicability could no longer 
mean doing more of the same thing, but rather it had to involve seeking 
ways to increase the scale in the provision of housing whether through 
public or private sector efforts' (p. 91). 
To meet this challenge means, among other things, having a clearer 
analytical understanding of how sites-and-services projects affect the 
behaviour of potential beneficiaries, as well as empirical information on 
expenditure on housing, in order to produce projects that are both afford- 
able and replicable. 
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The next two sections, therefore, take up the issue of, first, the effective 
demand for housing in developing countries and, second, the actual plan- 
ning practice of World Bank sites-and-services projects regarding afford- 
ability assumptions and the design and pricing decisions that follow from 
them. 
2 Demand for Housing in Developing Countries 
The previous section suggests the importance of getting good estimates of 
the effective demand for housing if sites-and-services projects are to be 
designed appropriately, that is, in ways that provide significant benefits to 
intended beneficiaries without adverse side-effects. Here we review recent 
research on household demand for housing in developing countries and 
present some of the major implications of that research for the design and 
likely outcomes of the sites-and-services projects. 
A Housing Demand 
Until recently few comparative studies of housing demand in developing 
countries existed. Most of the studies of household demand for housing ser- 
vices in developing countries were based on specialized data bases, not 
usually collected for the express purpose of estimating housing-demand 
relationships.2 Different analyses used different variable definitions, dif- 
ferent functional forms, and different stratification variables. This incon- 
sistency made comparison of results regarding demand parameters across 
studies exceedingly tenuous. 
In 1981, a major comparative study of housing demand in developing 
countries was initiated at the World Bank. In that analysis high-quality data 
were collected for sixteen cities in eight countries (Colombia, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Korea, and the Philippines) and were 
used to estimate housing-demand relationships using relatively comparable 
variable definitions and identical functional forms and stratifying variables. 
For comparative purposes, identical models were estimated for two U.s. 
cities - Pittsburgh and Phoenix. A description of much of that research is 
contained in Malpezzi and Mayo (1985). The following represents a highly 
abbreviated description of the study and of its major empirical findings. 
Malpezzi and Mayo first estimate a simple log-linear model of housing 
expenditures in each of the sixteen cities: 
(1) In R = a + ey(ln y) + bH + cH2 + u, 
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where R is rent; y is income; H is household size; er is the estimated income 
elasticity of demand; a, b, and c are regression coefficients; and u is an 
estimated disturbance. The model is stratified for renters and owners. For 
renters, rent is defined as net rent, exclusive of utility payments. For 
owners, rent is defined variously as owner imputations of net rent, hedonic 
estimates of net rent based on applying renter-based hedonic price equa- 
tions to owners' housing characteristics, or imputed rents based on applying 
a fixed amortization ratio (from 1 per cent to 1.5 per cent per month 
depending on the country) to owners' estimates of housing value. Although 
other functional forms were tried, and many other demographic variables 
were included in alternative estimated equations, results from the simple 
log-linear model were found to provide adequate fits and robust findings 
regarding major demand parameters. 
Table 5.1 presents the estimated parameters of housing expenditures 
functions for renters and owners.; In general the results are remarkably 
consistent with results from developed countries (see Mayo, 1981). The 
regression fits are typical for this type of equation: typical R-squared 
statistics are in the 0.1-0.3 range (minimum 0.06, maximum 0.57). Fits are 
similar for owners and renters. 
The median of all renter income elasticities is 0.49; developing-country 
elasticities range from 0.31 (Busan, Korea) to 0.88 (Davao, the Philippines). 
Most cluster between 0.4 and 0.6, with estimated U.S. elasticities, however, 
lower than developing-country estimates. The median of all point estimates 
of owner income elasticities is 0.46, with extremes of 0.17 in Cairo and 1.11 
in Santa Ana, El Salvador. Most point estimates lie between 0.4 and 0.6. In 
nine of fourteen cases where comparison is possible, estimated developing- 
country owner income elasticities are greater than those for renters; this 
finding parallels findings in the literature for developed countries (Mayo, 
1981). Comparing expenditure equations across countries reveals practically 
no systematic variation of income elasticities with country or city income 
level or population size, but considerable variation in dollar-adjusted in- 
tercepts, which are positively related to average city income. Rent-to- 
income ratios, therefore, decline systematically with income within cities, 
but increase with income across cities.4 
These relationships are shown graphically in figure 5.1 for renters in four 
representative cities. Relationships for owners are similar, although average 
rent-to-income ratios are invariably higher at every income level for owners 
within given housing markets.5 
The relationships portrayed in figure 5.1 are very similar to the consump- 
tion patterns within and across countries documented by Kuznets (see 
Kuznets, 1961, and other works cited therein). Qualitatively, housing con- 
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Figure 5.1 Rent-to-income ratios by income for renters 
sumption is remarkably similar to total consumption; that is, within- 
country differences are markedly smaller at various income levels than are 
between-country differences at different average income levels. Malpezzi 
and Mayo explore alternative theoretical explanations for these results and 
then test a series of cross-country housing expenditure models, which are 
designed to explore presumably long-run cross-country housing-demand 
relationships. The simplest cross-country model they test parallels the log- 
linear within-country model, but with the addition of a price term, the 
relative price of housing, which is constructed using data from Kravis, 
Heston, and Summers (1982). Defining pH as the relative price of housing, 
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Renters 
(2) In R = - 5.39 + 1.60 In y + 0.15 In p, 
(0.18) (0.29) 
Rz = 0.90, d.f. = 13 
Owners 
(3) In R = 3.57 + 1.38 In y + 0.65 In p,,, 
(0.35) (0.50) 
Rz = 0.76, d.f. = 11 
where the dependent variable, rent (R), and income (y) are city means and 
are converted to 1981 U.S. dollars.' 
The implications of these models, which are confirmed with alternative 
specifications, are straightforward: in the very long run, housing consump- 
tion is income elastic. Price elasticities are smaller in absolute value than in- 
come elasticities, although confidence intervals are quite wide for the 
former. Long-run income elasticities are estimated to be higher for renters 
than owners. This means that as cities' economies develop over the very 
long run, owner and renter consumption patterns increase at a similar pace, 
ceteris paribus. However, because relative housing prices arise with income 
(at least in our sample) and because renter price elasticities are estimated to 
be higher than owner elasticities, the net effect of both incomes and prices 
rising with economic development is that owners' consumption increases 
faster than renters' consumption over most of the range of the data. 
These findings have important implications for the design of housing pro- 
grams and, in particular, of sites-and-services projects. An obvious general 
rule is that the fraction of income allocated by households for housing is 
highly variable, depending on income, the level of economic development, 
the relative price of housing, and tenure (own or rent). Thus, it is inappro- 
priate to use any single rule-of-thumb `affordability ratio' as the basis for 
establishing design standards in sites-and-services projects. If a single value 
is used, particularly if it is higher than normal spending patterns would in- 
dicate, then subsidies might be required to induce target groups to par- 
ticipate and higher-income groups might find their way into projects, either 
initially or by purchasing from initial allottees. 
In order to get a sense of how serious these problems might be, it is useful 
to examine (1) the minimum subsidy (or benefit) necessary to induce typical 
target groups to participate and (2) the likely income levels of participants in 
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the absence of subsidies based on the empirical findings on housing demand 
presented above and assuming alternative affordability rules of thumb. 
B Minimum Subsidies Necessary to Induce Participation 
Theoretical work by Mayo (1985) has developed a general procedure for 
estimating minimum subsidies (benefits) necessary to induce participation 
by households whose normal housing equilibria are below those implied by 
project standards. Here we operationalize that procedure by assuming a 
particular utility function, the parameters of which can be approximated 
using our empirical results, and examine the impact on required subsidies as 
they vary with alternative affordability planning assumptions. 
Specifically, assume that household preferences can be approximated by 
a Stone-Geary utility function:' 
(4) U = (H -6h)bh (X -6X)bX 
where H is the housing consumption, X is the consumption of other goods, 
and 6h, 6X, bb, and bX = (1 -bh) are parameters. Applying the procedures 
described in Mayo (1985), the following expressions can be derived for the 
minimum housing necessary to induce participation, Hmin, and the 
minimum subsidy (benefit) necessary to induce participation, Smin. 
- (5) Hmin - 
y 
-R, -6X 




Y -RS -6X 
and 
(6) Smin = Ph HS -R5, 
where Ro is the initial pre-project rent, R, is the within-project rent, and 
Ph Hmin is the market value of shelter and services provided in the project. If 
the project is designed according to the typical site-and-service paradigm, 
within-project rent reflects the `design affordability ratio,' a, and hence 
R, = ay. Thus equations (5) and (6) become: 
(7) Hmin = 






(8) Smin = Ph Hmin -aYi 
where RO is determined by the housing expenditure function. 
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The parameters of a Stone-Geary utility function may be locally approx- 
imated using knowledge of the parameters of a log-linear housing expen- 
diture function; the resulting parameters can then be used to evaluate equa- 
tions (7) and (8) for various values of a.9 Figure 5.2 presents results of such 
a procedure based on the actual housing expenditure equations estimated in 
Malpezzi and Mayo where, for simplicity, it was assumed that a within-city 
income elasticity of 0.5 and a corresponding price elasticity of - 0.4 
typified developing-country cities, and where a typical target income group 
for sites-and-services project is in the thirty-fifth percentile of the income 
distribution. 10 The horizontal axis is monthly household income in 1981 
u.s. dollars and the vertical axis is the minimum subsidy necessary to induce 
participation as a percentage of the market value of the housing provided in 
a project for various values of a, the design affordability ratio. For 
reference, estimated monthly household incomes in 1981 dollars in most 
African countries and countries on the Indian subcontinent were below 
$100; some of the countries with incomes between $100 and $200 were 
Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, El Salvador, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand; countries between $200 and $400 included a number of Latin 
American and North American countries, Nigeria, and Zambia; and coun- 
tries above $400 included Caribbean, Latin American, and East Asian 
countries, such as Jamaica, Bahamas, Brazil, Mexico, Panama, and Korea. 
The figure indicates clearly the effect that project standards (as derived 
from `design affordability levels') have on target-group households' incen- 
tives to participate, and on the need to provide subsidies to induce participa- 
tion when standards are set too high. for example, suppose that it were 
assumed that households in a typical African country, say Kenya, with a 
1981 household income of roughly $100 per month would be willing to pay 
for a unit designed to cost 20 per cent of income. According to figure 5.2, a 
subsidy of roughly 60 per cent of the market value of such a unit would have 
to be provided in order to induce households in the thirty-fifth percentile of 
the income distribution to participate. In Burundi, with a monthly 
household income of only about $70 in 1981, a subsidy of over 90 per cent 
would be required to induce thirty-fifth-percentile households to participate 
if the design standard is based on an affordability assumption of 20 per cent 
of income. Subsidies of these levels are, of course, a reflection of the low 
average propensities to consume housing indicated by the cross-country 
expenditure functions presented above. 
In higher-income developing countries by contrast, a 20 per cent afford- 
ability standard may be entirely appropriate. For example, for countries 
(cities) with average household monthly income above about $175, subsidies 
of less than 20 per cent would appear to be adequate to induce target groups 
to participate. Required subsidies are, however, extremely sensitive to the 
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Figure 5.2 Minimum subsidies necessary to induce participation of thirty-fifth 
percentile households at alternative design affordability ratios 
choice of design standards. Although the difference between 20 per cent and 
25 per cent of income may not sound like much to a project planner, such a 
difference represents a 25 percentage-point difference in monthly shelter 
costs and can easily mean the difference between required subsidies in the 
range of 60-70 per cent rather than the range of 20-35 per cent. Depending 
on whether subsidies of the required magnitude are forthcoming or not, 
target income groups may not even participate or, if they do, they may have 
strong incentives to sell out to higher-income groups. It is useful to examine 
now the influence of planning subsidies on the income levels of participants 
if subsidies are not provided or, alternatively, if initial allottees sell out to 
higher-income households at the full market price. 
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C Income Levels of Participants at Zero-Subsidy or upon Resale by 
Initial Occupants 
The model in Mayo (1985) presents a general procedure for inferring the 
income level of households that would participate in a project and their 
place in the income distribution were they obliged to pay the full unsubsi- 
dized price of the bundle of the shelter and services provided in a project. 
The expenditure functions that describe across-country and within-city 
behaviour can be used to solve for the income level consistent with a stipu- 
lated project design standard and its associated market rent. Thus, for 
example, the following expression (which is derived by manipulating across- 
country and within-city expenditure functions) may be used to derive the 
income level, ,i, of households that would freely enter a project of its full 
subsidized price, where the latter is set equal to the assumed affordability 
ratio, a, multiplied by the income of the typical target group, defined here 
as income at the thirty-fifth income percentile, y35: 
(9) y = exp[In ay35 - (ln(R/y)-(Ey-1) In y )]/c-y 
where e,, is the within-city income elasticity of demand, y" is average city in- 
come, and (R/y) is the rent-to-income ratio evaluated at average city in- 
come (which is estimated using the cross-country expenditure relationship, 
equation (2)).11 The percentile of the income distribution associated with y is 
found by integrating the estimated income density function to an upper 
limit of Y. 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the estimated impact of alternative design standards 
on the income of households that would participate with no subsidies or 
that would be likely to purchase from original allottees. The calculations 
underlying the figures are based on a generalized or average income distri- 
bution in developing countries that was estimated by fitting a fourth-degree 
polynominal to Lorenz curve data presented in Kakwani (1980) for a sample 
of thirty-three developing countries. 12 A within-city income elasticity of 0.5 
was assumed, and it was assumed that the design standard was based on the 
product of income of the thirty-fifth-percentile households and various 
assumed affordability levels, ranging from 10 to 30 per cent of income. 
The figure clearly illustrates the effect of alternative design standards of 
unsubsidized projects on the income of probable participants. Not only 
does increasing the design affordability ratio increase the income level of 
likely participants, but it does so with particularly dramatic effect at various 
thresholds. For example, for households in low-income countries (e.g., 
y = $100 per month), setting the design standards on the basis of an 
assumption that households are willing to spend 20 per cent of income on 
125 Sites and Services - and Subsidies 
Affordability ratio 
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Figure 5.3 Income percentile of participating households with no subsidy at 
alternative design affordability ratios 
housing implies that households in approximately the eightieth percentile of 
the income distribution could afford to participate without subsidies. Drop- 
ping the standard to one based on 15 per cent of income has only a modest 
effect, inducing participation down to the sixty-fifth percentile in the 
absence of subsidies. Dropping the standard still further to one based on 
just 10 per cent of income permits reaching even below the original target 
group, all the way down to the fifteenth percentile. Similar thresholds exist 
at each level of income, suggesting that dramatic improvements can be 
realized in the ability to reach the poor through sites-and-services projects 
by finding the `correct' design standard - the one that reflects true will- 
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Having examined the behavioural evidence on developing-country hous- 
ing demand and having explored some of the implications of that evidence 
for sites-and-services project planning, it is useful now to consider the ac- 
tual planning practice and some of the project outcomes of typical sites- 
and-services schemes. Planning practice can be evaluated in terms of its 
consistency with external evidence on household behaviour, and project 
outcomes can be interpreted in part in light of discrepancies between plan- 
ning assumptions and actual behaviour. 
3 Project Design Practice and Project Outcomes 
The previous section has emphasized the important role played by planning 
parameters in influencing outcomes in sites-and-services projects. In this 
section we review briefly important aspects of planning practice in sixty- 
eight World Bank-financed sites-and-services projects, particularly afford- 
ability assumptions, and examine the consistency of planning parameters 
with external evidence on willingness to pay for housing. In addition, we 
look at the magnitude of subsidies that have been provided in a subset of 
Bank-financed sites-and-services projects - those that have been completely 
implemented with all loan amounts disbursed. Implications of these find- 
ings for the ability to achieve the nominal goals of sites and services are then 
evaluated. 
Among the most important planning criteria in sites-and-services projects 
are the income levels of the principal target groups, the affordability ratio, 
the percentage down payment, and the interest rate to be charged on project 
financing. Table 5.2 presents median values of each for sixty-eight World 
Bank-financed sites-and-services projects initiated between 1972 and 1984, 
along with median values of three variables that indicate market conditions. 
Results are disaggregated by region, by the time period of project initiation, 
and by 1983 per capita GDP (gross domestic product). 
Consider each project design variable in turn. First, the minimum income 
level intended to be reached by sites-and-services projects varies con- 
siderably among regions, ranging from a low of $27 per month in South 
Asian projects to a high of $141 in European, Middle East, and North 
African projects. Much of this variation is a result of differences among 
regions in GDP per capita; the minimum income level of target groups 
ranges from $40 per month in countries with per capita GDP less than $600 
per year to $112 per month in countries with GDP per capital greater than 
$1200 per year. Planned minimum target-group incomes have fallen slightly 
over time, indicating a concern with reaching relatively farther down the in- 
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come distribution. Median target groups (not shown here) tend to be at 
about the thirty-fifth percentile of the income distribution. 
Down payments in sites-and-services projects have generally been mini- 
mal. No region has had a median down payment greater than 10 per cent of 
the sales price. There are only weak positive associations between down- 
payment percentages and time and GDP per capita. Further investigation 
reveal that 79 per cent of World Bank projects required down payments of 
10 per cent or less. Such low down-payment requirements reflect an implicit 
assumption that the ability to accumulate pre-project assets through savings 
is negligible. In contrast, as discussed below, project designs appears to 
assume that within-project savings propensities, in the form of mortgage- 
loan repayments, are quite high. The two assumptions do not appear to be 
consistent. 
Affordability ratios reflect assumptions concerning the fraction of 
income that households are willing to pay for shelter and related services. 
As table 5.2 indicates, there is strikingly little variation by region, time, or 
GDP per capita in the affordability ratios embodied in sites-and-services 
project designs. Medians for all substrata are from 20 to 25 per cent. Fur- 
ther investigation reveals that 74 per cent of all projects initiated by the 
World Bank have assumed affordability ratios of 20-25 per cent, with 17 
per cent below those levels and 9 per cent above. This percentage comes 
close to the very definition of a rule of thumb. 
Median interest rates charged for project-related loans have ranged from 
a low of 7 per cent in the Europe, Middle East, and North Africa region to a 
high of 12 per cent in the South Asia, East Asia, and Pacific regions. Inter- 
est rates have increased systematically over time and are highest among 
countries with the highest GDP per capita. The spread between interest rates 
charged in projects and inflation rates has narrowed appreciably over time, 
indicating a rise in real interest rates on project loans. 
Let us now examine in more detail how the planning assumptions inher- 
ent in sites-and-services projects, particularly affordability ratios, corre- 
spond to empirical evidence on actual willingness to pay for shelter and ser- 
vices. Figure 5.4 superimposes two pieces of information concerning World 
Bank-financed sites-and-services projects. First, a scatter of points is 
presented that indicated for each project its design affordability ratio in 
relation to estimated average household monthly income expressed in 1981 
dollars. 14 Second, figure 5.4 also presents three curves that relate estimated 
rent-to-income ratio to income, based on the cross-country and within-city 
econometric results presented in section 2.15 Curves are shown for city 
average income and for households at the twentieth and thirty-fifth percen- 
tiles of the income distribution. The figures may be interpreted as follows: if 
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Figure 5.4 Assumed willingness to pay in World Bank sites-and-services projects 
in relation to empirically estimated willingness to pay 
the target income group is assumed to have been households at city average 
income, then the lowest curve indicates our estimate of their actual will- 
ingness to pay for housing as a fraction of income; if the target group is 
assumed to have been the thirty-fifth or the twentieth income percentile, 
then the two higher curves represent estimates of their willingness to pay as 
a fraction of income. Recall that because the income elasticity is less than 
one, lower income emplies higher rent-to-income ratios. The figure clearly 
suggests that regardless of the relative income of the target group, afford- 
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ability and, by implication, project design standards are systematically 
overestimated in low-income countries. If it is assumed, for example, that 
twentieth-percentile households represented the lowest-income target group 
in sites-and-services projects, then the majority of projects in countries with 
average household monthly incomes below about $150 appear to have been 
designed with affordability ratios that were higher than typical ratios of 
housing expenditures to income, many by substantial margins. 
Some of the implications of setting project standards too high have been 
discussed in section 1; among these are exclusion of intended target income 
groups and participation by higher-income groups, relatively slow consoli- 
dation or upgrading of housing and plots beyond initial standards, creation 
of incentives for subletting or resale by initial allottees, and making sub- 
sidies necessary in order to reach intended beneficiaries. The critiques of 
sites-and-services projects summarized in section 1 presented anecdotal 
evidence that such outcomes have, in fact, been observed in many sites-and- 
services projects. In contrast, other evidence suggests that many of these 
problems may have been isolated and that project implementation and per- 
formance have, by and large, been successful (see for example Keare and 
Parris, 1982). 
This apparent paradox in the range of outcomes can be partly explained 
by the existence of subsidies. As section 2 points out, the existence of sub- 
sidies can mitigate a number of possible project problems, in effect purchas- 
ing project feasibility at the expense of longer-term replicability. Thus, it is 
useful to examine the magnitude of subsidies that have actually been pro- 
vided in World Bank-financed sites-and-services projects. This examination 
requires having an understanding of the components of project cost and the 
sources of potential subsidy elements; these are illustrated in table 5.3. The 
table indicates that `total development and operating costs' are made up of 
a number of discrete elements, most notably land-acquisition costs, site 
preparation and housing construction, off-site infrastructure and project 
administration, and recurring costs such as utilities and maintenance. A 
proper account of resource costs means costing them at their full opportu- 
nity cost; for example, even though government land may be provided at 
small or no cost, its market value is the proper resource-cost measure. The 
total resource cost of a project, however, should account for the market 
value of the `finished product.' Thus, the market value of the project, 
which is equal to the capitalized value of resource costs, is equal to the total 
development and operation costs multiplied by a factor equal to one plus 
the project's economic rate of return. The annualized resource cost is then 
equal to the total resource cost multiplied by the market rate of interest. 
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TABLE 5.3 
Cost and subsidy elements in sites-and-services projects 
Cost elements 
Site preparation and housing con- 
struction 
+ Land acquisition 
Subsidy elements 
Cross-subsidies from higher- to lower- 
income households within project or 
government-provided cost write-downs 
Government or expropriated private 
land at below cost 
+ Off-site infrastructure and project 
administration 
+ Recurring costs (utilities, main- 
tenance) 
Total development and operation 
costs 
x (1 + economic rate of return) 
= Total resource costs 
x Market rate of interest 
= Annualized resource costs 
Ignored or charged at less than marginal 
cost 
Ignored or charged at less than marginal 
cost 
Prices set to recover scheduled costs, not 
resource costs 
Subsidized interest rates 
Associated with each cost element is a possible subsidy element. These 
elements are indicated in the table and take the form of cross-subsidies from 
higher-to-lower-income project participants; government capital cost write- 
downs; low-cost or free government or expropriated land; exclusion of all 
or part of off-site infrastructure, project administration, or recurring costs; 
pricing to recover only `scheduled' costs rather than full resource costs; and 
subsidized interest rates. These sorts of subsidies are prevalent in many 
World Bank-financed sites-and-services projects and are present as well in 
similar projects not under World Bank auspices - both sites-and-services 
projects sponsored by other aid organizations and government housing 
schemes that pre-dated the sites-and-services paradigm. 
Consider, for example, only one subsidy element, but an extremely 
widespread and significant one: interest-rate subsidies. As Table 5.2 indi- 
cates, median interest rates charged on sites-and-services project loans 
ranged from about 7 to 12 per cent across regions. At the same time, infla- 
tion rates among those regions ranged from 9 to about 16 per cent at the 
time of project appraisal. Assuming that the market rate of interest is, con- 
servatively, from two to three percentage points above inflation, median 
interest-rate subsidies appear to have ranged from roughly 20 to 55 per cent 
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of annual market interest charges in the six World Bank administration 
regions. Were one to calculate real interest rates in World Bank sites-and- 
services projects as nominal interest rates less the rate of inflation in the 
year of project appraisal, 61 per cent of Bank projects are estimated to have 
had negative real rates of interest at the time of project appraisal. Such sub- 
sidies are often part of a general pattern of subsidized interest rates that 
pervade public-sector interventions in developing countries; they are, thus, 
difficult to eliminate or control at the level of planning an individual sites- 
and-services project. 
Other subsidy elements, which are more amenable to project-level con- 
trol, can also be significant, however. Pricing policies for land, off-site in- 
frastructure, administrative costs, utilities, and maintenance are all more 
subject to project-level negotiation than are interest-rate policies. Also, 
decisions about whether or not to price sites and services at a level that 
recovers full resource costs or simply scheduled costs can be made within 
the project planning context. 
In order to estimate the rough order of magnitude of subsidies in Bank 
projects, a simplified version of the cost-accounting framework presented 
in table 5.3 was applied to six of the earliest Bank projects, for which it was 
possible to examine actual pricing policies rather than the hypothetical pro- 
jections contained in initial project appraisals. Subsidies were calculated as 
the difference between a measure of the annualized resource cost and actual 
charges to project beneficiaries. Annualized resource costs were estimated 
based on reported project development costs not including community 
facilities and not including recurring costs. These generally include, but are 
not limited to, stated development costs, land-acquisition costs, pro-rata 
shares of off-site infrastructure, and project administration. These develop- 
ment costs are then increased by a percentage equal to the project's pro- 
jected economic rate of return to get an estimate of the market value of the 
project. This market value is then multiplied by a rate of interest equal to 12 
per cent per year to get an annualized resource cost; as is discussed below, 
this cost represents in general a conservative estimate of the opportunity 
cost of money in each of the six countries. 
Table 5.4 presents the estimated subsidy level as a percentage of annual- 
ized resource costs (assuming an opportunity interest rate of 12 per cent). 
Also shown in the table are the interest rate charged within the project, the 
actual inflation rate in each country in the year of project appraisal, and the 
annual compound rate of inflation for the years 1973-8 (approximately the 
first five years of operation of each project). With the exception of the 
Indonesia project, which features market-level pricing for all components 
(but has a subsidized interest rate), the subsidies range from roughly one- 
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TABLE 5.4 
Estimated subsidies in sites-and-services projects (per cent of annualized resource costs) 
ountry 
Subsidy as a 
per cent of 
resource costsa 
Interest rate 
charged in the 
project (per cent) 
Inflation rate 






Botswana 72 8.0 19.3 12.7 
Indonesia 18 5.0 33.0 14.4 
Ivory Coast 68 13.0 5.5 10.5 
Jamaica 62 8.0 16.0 17.1 
Senegal 55 7.0 2.9 10.7 
Tanzania 67 6.0 18.8 25.0 
a Assuming market rate of interest - 12 per cent 
half to three-quarters of project resource cost. The subsidies have several 
sources: all six projects have subsidized interest rates and beneficiaries are 
in general charged less than the market price for their land, building 
materials, or completed dwellings. Cross-subsidies, which can raise the 
price charged to low-income households without affecting total project 
revenue, were implemented only in Indonesia. 
It should be emphasized that although these subsidy estimates form a 
large part of project costs, they are probably underestimates of the true sub- 
sidy. This is particularly true in regard to interest subsidies. As table 5.4 
indicates, for example, interest rates charged to project beneficiaries are 
generally considerably less than inflation rates and, of course, less than 
market interest rates. The only exception among the six early projects is the 
Ivory Coast, where the project interest rate is in fact close to a market rate. 
What should be made of subsidies of the magnitudes in evidence here? 
The analytical model of section 2 suggests a number of implications. First, 
it is clear that the subsidies provided in early World Bank projects were 
large enough to have overcome many of the potential problems that might 
have resulted from upward-biased affordability assumptions and project 
standards. Comparing the actual subsidies provided with the estimated 
`minimum subsidies necessary to induce participation' by typical (say thirty- 
fifth-percentile) target groups suggests that subsidies were probably instru- 
mental in inducing many low-income households to participate that might 
not otherwise have done so. Even so, subsidies were sufficiently large for 
many project beneficiaries (those induced to distort their shelter consump- 
tion by consuming at overly ambitious project standards) that large relative 
welfare losses must certainly have occurred. That is, for many households 
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whose participation in sites-and-services projects required them to spend 
more out of pocket than before entering the project (even after accounting 
for subsidies), the net benefit of participation must certainly have been 
worth considerably less than the resource cost of the subsidy. Also, for such 
households, incentives to sell out to higher-income households and propen- 
sities to default in the face of income shocks would have been substantial. 
Housing upgrading would have been limited in early years of the project for 
such households, unless subsidies were generous enough (as for example in 
the case of heavily subsidized building loans) to permit continued housing 
investment at low cost. The one possible beneficial side-effect for such 
households and for the housing market in general would have been the 
encouragement of providing additional space for low-income renters 
through subletting. 
At the same time, many households participated in the projects that 
would probably have done so without subsidy, either higher-income house- 
holds or households with stronger-than-average housing preferences. Each 
such group would have had incentives to invest in upgrading their units 
beyond initial standards. For the former group, receipt of large subsidies is 
inequitable; for the latter group, it is inefficient. 
By and large, however, sites-and-services projects appear to have worked 
as intended: target groups have been reached; affordability by target groups 
has generally been evident - indeed some groups have been observed to be 
spending even more than initial affordability targets; reported defaults on 
account of `affordability problems' have not been overwhelming. The com- 
paratively small scale of many projects has also worked in favour of project 
success because households with relatively stronger preferences for the bun- 
dle of shelter and services offered by projects tend to enter projects through 
a process of self-selection. Much of the evidence concerning project impacts 
cited in section 1 appears to paint just such a picture. 
Even while project-by-project assessments indicate the appearance of suc- 
cess, much of it purchased at the expense of significant subsidies, a broader 
view of the sites-and-services experience is consistent with Cohen's (1983) 
view cited above that replicability does not mean doing more of the same 
thing. The most obvious concern is that large subsidies will frustrate the 
ability to replicate projects on a large scale, thereby failing to meet the im- 
mense needs for shelter and services for the poor. Another concern is that 
the subsidies that are provided are not particularly rational. The types of 
subsidies provided, their magnitude, their distribution among potential 
beneficiaries, and their impacts on either beneficiaries or subsidy-granting 
organizations are rarely addressed in a thorough way when projects are 
designed. As a result, the subsidies provided are likely to be inefficient, 
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sometimes inequitable, and harmful to the long-term viability of the 
subsidy-granting institutions. 
4 Suggestions for Future Policy 
This paper has reviewed evidence on the performance of sites-and-services 
projects, observing that although projects have been successful in many 
ways as implemented, there are limits to their effectiveness as a strategy to 
meet the needs of the poor in developing countries. The single most-serious 
problem in extending the breadth of application of the sites-and-services 
paradigm is the existence of subsidies that are simply too high to permit 
large-scale replication of projects. 
Reasons for the existence of such subsidies are complex, in part because 
of the inertia of previous government shelter and services policies that 
established even larger subsidy amounts. To a considerable degree, 
however, subsidies are a reflection of ambitious planning standards, which 
require that large subsidies be maintained to make projects affordable by 
intended beneficiaries. In many cases, these standards are the result of the 
inappropriate application of a rule of thumb that households can spend 
from 20 to 25 per cent of their incomes for shelter and related services. As a 
general rule, this one is wrong. 
The empirical analysis of housing demand in developing countries 
presented in section 2 indicates that the actual fraction of income that 
households are willing to pay for shelter varies with household income, a 
country's level of economic development, the relative price of housing, 
tenure status, and a number of other variables. The fraction actually spent 
on housing generally falls with income within cities but increases with 
average income across cities - relationships that parallel those observed by 
Kuznets (1961) regarding the way that consumption varies with and across 
countries. 
When one compares actual spending patterns with the `affordability 
assumptions' used in World Bank sites-and-services projects as the basis for 
project design standards, it is apparent that there has been a systematic up- 
ward bias in affordability and hence in design standards. This upgrading is 
acute for low-income countries, but largely disappears for better-off 
developing countries. Although the incentives created by such projects are 
complex and affect households differently, two implications of 'too-high' 
standards stand out. Either subsidies have to be provided to induce target 
groups to participate or groups with higher income than the target group 
will find their way into the project (either initially or as initial allottees sell 
out). 
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Section 3 explored empirically the magnitude of the subsidies required to 
reach typical target groups of World Bank projects (roughly the thirty-fifth 
percentile of the income distribution), and also the likely incomes of project 
participants if subsidies are not provided. Each outcome was examined in 
relation to alternative affordability assumptions and hence planning stan- 
dards. There it was shown that subsidies as high as 80 or 90 per cent of proj- 
ect costs might be required to induce typical target groups to participate in 
low-income countries with planning standards that are derived from the rule 
of thumb that households can spend 20-25 per cent of income for housing. 
Alternatively, if no subsidies are provided, households with incomes in the 
eightieth percentile or above might be the most likely project participants. It 
was indicated, however, that required subsidies and income levels of likely 
participants are highly sensitive to the level of standards (and hence pricing) 
of project units. Thus, by choosing standards judiciously, at levels consis- 
tent with empirical evidence on housing demand, it should be possible to 
reach the intended beneficiary groups with small or no subsidies - a clear 
prerequisite for large-scale replicability in most countries. 
A review of actual planning practice in World Bank sites-and-services 
projects (section 3) focused on planning parameters such as affordability 
ratios, down-payment requirements, and interest rates charged to project 
beneficiaries. Actual subsidies in six early projects were also analysed. It 
was found that all the projects had significant subsidy elements, with a 
median subsidy equal to about 65 per cent of total resource cost. Sources of 
subsidies included (1) failure to account for all project costs at their true 
resource cost (e.g., use of written-down government land), (2) pricing units 
at or below cost rather than at market value, and (3) charging below-market 
interest rates. The last is widespread, with 61 per cent of projects analysed 
estimated to have been charging interest rates below the inflation rate dur- 
ing the year of project appraisal. It appears, however, that the real rate of 
interest being charged in World Bank projects has risen over time, perhaps 
in response to an explicit goal to rationalize project design policies. 
Subsidies of the magnitude of those found in early Bank-financed proj- 
ects (which are not atypical of similar projects sponsored by other aid 
organizations) appear to be sufficiently high to have induced target-group 
households to participate, despite requiring them to spend more for shelter 
and services than they would normally be expected to do. Thus, subsidies 
have mitigated potential problems from overly ambitious planning stan- 
dards, namely, high levels of defaults, slow rates of housing consolidation, 
or upgrading, turnover among project beneficiaries with higher-income 
households replacing initial allottees, and lack of participation by the in- 
tended target group. Although some authors have noted the existence of 
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these problems in sites-and-services projects, it seems certain that they have 
been less severe than they might have been because high subsidies in effect 
purchase the participation and co-operation of project beneficiaries. 
There are costs to such subsidies, however, the most severe of which is 
that they defeat the goal of cost recovery within the projects and hence im- 
peril the ability to replicate projects on a large scale. In effect they 
perpetuate some of the problems inherent in public-housing policies of 
many developing countries prior to sites and services. In addition, the sub- 
sidies that are provided are not particularly rational; there is little explicit 
consideration given in much project planning to the magnitude, type, or dis- 
tribution of subsidies; also little consideration is given to their impacts on 
beneficiaries or subsidy-generating institutions. As a result, while subsidies 
do buy a measure of small-scale success in sites-and-services projects, they 
do so at the expense of replicability, equity, and efficiency. 
Despite what may seem a somewhat hair-shirted view of sites-and-services 
projects, it is clear that straightforward means exist, at least in principle, to 
fix many of the problems noted above. For example, the discussion has 
noted the inimical role played by large subsidies in reducing prospects for 
large-scale replication of sites-and-services projects. There are several ways 
to reduce subsidies: one is to reduce project standards and hence project 
costs; another is to change pricing policies to better reflect true resource 
costs; another is to provide a bundle of sites and services that increases 
household willingness to pay, while leaving project costs unchanged. Con- 
sider each in turn. 
The analysis above indicates clearly that project standards are too high in 
most low-income developing countries, the result in part of having assumed 
that households would pay 20-25 per cent of incomes for housing when, in 
fact, formal expenditures are far less. In better-off developing countries, 
however, this assumption is entirely appropriate. The solution to this prob- 
lem is simple: start planning on the basis of actual housing-demand patterns 
rather than on the basis of inappropriate rules of thumb. Actual patterns 
can be established on the basis of either the sorts of research findings 
presented in section 2 or local housing surveys. In the case of the former, a 
forecasting model has been developed by the authors that uses easily avail- 
able macro-economic data (or, if it is available, household-survey data) to 
establish rough willingness to pay estimates in developing countries (details 
are available on request). In the case of the latter, materials have been 
developed by Malpezzi, Bamberger, and Mayo (1984) and by Malpezzi 
(1984) that discuss how to design and analyse urban-housing surveys. 
Simply getting the `affordability assumption' straight can go a long way to 
bringing standards down to an appropriate level in many countries. This 
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necessarily implies affordability standards that vary considerably among 
countries depending on their level of development and that vary among 
population groups depending on household income and other variables. 
Reducing standards to an appropriate level is not sufficient to reduce sub- 
sidies, however. Pricing policies for sites-and-services projects must be 
revised to reflect true resource costs. This means costing project elements 
(land, building materials, infrastructure, administration, and recurring 
costs) at their full resource costs and then charging accordingly. Loans to 
beneficiaries should also be made at market rates of interest in order to 
allow loan-granting organizations to generate a sufficient surplus to ensure 
their institutional viability and growth. 
If there are to be departures from resource-cost-based pricing in order to 
subsidize some households, these should be explicitly recognized, analysed 
and discussed by project planners. Subsidies, rather than being treated in 
the ad hoc or accidental ways that now characterize their use, should be 
explicitly justified and should, to the extent possible, be rationalized to 
serve equity, efficiency, and project-impact criteria. Procedures should be 
established for identifying subsidy elements, for quantifying them, and for 
estimating their incidence and impacts on project beneficiaries and their 
consequences for institutions responsible for them. 
Another way of reducing subsidies is to provide households with a bundle 
of shelter and services that maximizes the perceived benefit for a given level 
of cost of provision. For example, if information is available on the trade- 
offs made by households among different elements of the housing and in- 
frastructure bundle (e.g. relative preferences for size and location of plot, 
size and quality of structure, proximity to community facilities, quality and 
type of infrastructure), it may be possible to design packages of shelter and 
infrastructure characteristics for which households are willing to spend a 
good deal more than they normally do, and which cost no more to provide 
than the households' existing shelter. In some cases, dealing with capital- 
market and land-market imperfections by making available long-term 
finance or secure tenure may induce significant changes in household will- 
ingness to pay for shelter. Research on such trade-offs in developing coun- 
tries has been conducted recently by Quigley (1982), Follain and Jimenez 
(1985a), and with particular reference to the demand for secure tenure, by 
Jimenez (1984) and by Friedman, Jimenez, and Mayo (1985). Related work 
by Gross (1984) looks not only at the trade-offs made by households among 
shelter and infrastructure attributes, but also at the influence of providing 
different bundles of characteristics on groups most likely to participate in a 
project. More empirical research into the nature of such trade-offs and their 
implications for project design could be of great benefit. 
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The analysis presented here has implications at the level of housing-sector 
policy, as well as at the level of project planning and design. The emphasis 
here on reducing and rationalizing subsidies in order to improve the equity, 
efficiency, and replicability of sites-and-services projects is useful advice at 
the sectoral level as well. Government shelter and services policies for other 
than sites and services can benefit from more vigorous attempts to reduce 
standards to truly affordable levels, to modify pricing policies to improve 
cost recovery, and to attempt to package shelter and services in ways that 
maximize their attractiveness to potential beneficiaries. It is particularly im- 
portant to rationalize subsidy policies at the sectoral level, for although sub- 
sidy policies can in part by addressed at the project level, there are often 
severe limits to the extent of low-level reform that can be accomplished. 
Limitations exist particularly in the case of interest-rate policies, for which 
the legacy of subsidized rates for higher-income households makes it polit- 
ically difficult to charge unsubsidized rates in sites-and-services projects; 
similarly, pricing policies for urban services must often be addressed at a 
sectoral level before project-level reform can occur successfully. 
Two directions in shelter policy that follow from the observation that 
standards have been upward-biased in low-income countries are (1) to do 
relatively more upgrading projects than sites and services and (2) to focus 
policies relatively more on improving the supply of rented housing than 
predominantly on owner-occupied housing. Although upgrading and sites 
and services are and will remain useful complements in shelter policy, it 
seems clear that the task of reducing standards to affordable levels is often 
more easily accomplished within the context of slum-upgrading projects 
than in sites-and-services projects. Particularly in low-income countries, a 
product mix more heavily oriented toward upgrading would appear war- 
ranted on grounds of both equity and efficiency. Evidence that just such a 
shift has already begun is presented by Ayres (1983, p. 158), who indicates 
that the World Bank has increased emphasis on slum upgrading `partly 
because some of the earlier sites and services projects proved too costly for 
the urban poor, partly because the number of beneficiaries in sites and ser- 
vices projects tended to be small, [and] partly because it fit better with the 
Bank's emphasis on realism and lower standards.' This tendency to under- 
take such changes based on the lessons of experience deserves further en- 
couragement on the basis of the analysis presented here. 
Reduction in standards can also be attained by emphasizing production 
of private rental housing rather than focusing largely on production of 
housing for owner occupancy. A reasonable strategy would be to encourage 
existing property owners to intensify development of their properties, 
creating additional dwelling units for rental occupancy by their horizontal 
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or vertical expansion. Incentives for such development can be created by 
many of the same instruments used in upgrading schemes; particularly in 
cities with large and growing fractions of renters, it is logical to explore 
housing strategies that are consistent with general market trends. Such 
strategies have the potential in many cities to accommodate larger portions 
of the low-income population in adequately serviced housing than do those 
that emphasize higher standards, lower densities, and owner occupancy. 
In conclusion, it must be noted that the innovative approach of sites and 
services as a way of improving the lives of poor households in developed 
countries remains a valid one. The approach has, in fact, delivered a great 
deal of shelter and related services to households that might not otherwise 
have attained them, has by and large reached more lower-income house- 
holds than were than were typically served by other government-sponsored 
housing projects, and, despite still-significant subsidy levels, has probably 
reduced average subsidy levels per household below levels of previous pro- 
grams. As important, the process of undertaking sites-and-services projects 
has served as a catalyst and focal point for discussions of housing and land 
policies, institutional roles and capacities, and training needs, the outcome 
of which have stimulated reform that goes well beyond the boundaries of 
the projects themselves. 
These real accomplishments, however, cannot yet be seen as having 
achieved the goal of large-scale replicability that is so much the object of the 
sites-and-services paradigm. For upgrading and for sites and services to 
move beyond the level of demonstration projects, reforms must be under- 
taken at the level of both the project design process and sectoral policy. In 
most cases, simultaneous reform is necessary in order for standards to be set 
appropriately, for pricing and subsidy policies to be rationalized, and for 
resource mobilization and cost-recovery goals to be met. This will not be 
easy. But, as experience has shown, a great deal can be accomplished by ap- 
plying technical skills and political will in support of a well-founded sites- 
and-services strategy to serve the shelter needs of the poor in developing 
countries. 
Notes 
Opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be 
interpreted as those of any organization. The authors gratefully acknowledge 
the comments and suggestions of many of their colleagues while research for 
this paper was in progress, especially Alain Bertaud, Anthony Churchill, 
Michael Cohen, Emmanuel Jimenez, Richard Westin, and James Wright. 
Major substantive contributions to analyses of housing demand and analysis 
of sites-and-services projects was made by Stephen Malpezzi; Waleed El- 
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Ansary provided competent and responsive research assistance; and Sylvanus 
Best typed this draft with impeccable efficiency. 
1 The earliest sites-and-services schemes (in South Africa, Chile, and Kenya) 
were undertaken largely without external assistance in the 1940s and 1950s. It 
was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, that international 
agency assistance began in earnest. 
2 For a review of the pre-1984 literature see Malpezzi and Mayo (1985). 
3 Malpezzi and Mayo (1985) discuss findings concerning household size; here we 
focus only on income elasticity and intercept estimates. 
4 It should also be noted that the relative variation in rent-to-income ratios is 
greater at low-income levels than at high-income levels, a result that has impli- 
cations for the degree to which self-selection problems occur within sites-and- 
services projects with high standards. See Malpezzi (1984) for evidence. 
5 On average, owners' housing consumption is roughly 80 per cent greater than 
that of renters at given incomes within particular markets. 
6 Models were also estimated for a pooled sample of u.s. and developing- 
country cities; these are reported in Malpezzi and Mayo (1985). 
7 Note that in a log-linear expenditure equation the coefficient of price is equal 
to one plus the price elasticity; thus the price elasticity is the estimated coeffi- 
cient minus one, or - 0.85 and - 0.35 for owners. 
8 See Phlips (1974) for an extended discussion of the properties of this function. 
9 This approximation requires knowing the price elasticity of demand, EP, the 
income elasticity of demand, Ey, and the rent-to-income ratio at the point 
where the function is to be approximated. These parameters are successively 
substituted into the expenditure equation consistent with the Stone-Geary util- 
ity function (R = Oh (1 -bh)ph + bhy -bhOx), and the expressions for Ej, and 
Ep (Ey = bhylR and Ep = Ey (y -OX)/y) to solve for 6h, 9X, b,,, and bx. 
10 Our research indicated that, on average, income at the thirty-fifth percentile 
was about 43 per cent of city average income. The quantity Ro was estimated 
in two steps, first, estimating average rent at average city income using equa- 
tion (2), for renters, and then moving up the within-city expenditure equation 
(assuming Ey = 0.5) to y = 0.43y and the corresponding value of Ro. Renters' 
rather than owners' expenditure functions are used here. The main reasons are 
(1) that often it is `homeless' or renter households that represent the desig- 
nated sites-and-services-project target group; (2) owners' current consumption 
relative to current income reflects on average greater longevity and thus more 
chance to have upgraded housing services than would renters'; and (3) in some 
markets, owners' current housing consumption reflects both windfall price ap- 
preciation and possible overconsumption due to high transactions costs of 
moving. 
11 Details of the derivation will be provided by the authors on request. 
12 Details will be provided on request. 
13 This assertion is obviously a simplification because the goals of projects are 
numerous and choice of a design standard must reflect a number of com- 
promises among the abilities to satisfy various program objectives. A highly 
simplified way of improving project design might be to view the minimum 
required subsidy to reach the intended target group and the income-group 
percentile likely to be attracted at unsubsidized prices as arguments in a 
limited social-welfare function, with the design standard being chosen to max- 
imize such a function. 
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14 The scatter diagram is constructed on the basis of information in project 
appraisal reports. The affordability ratio is that given for the minimum- 
income taget group. Income is estimated by adjusting GDP per capita figures to 
get household disposable income expressed in 1981 dollars. Details will be fur- 
nished on request. 
15 Equation (2), for renters, is used as the basis of the average city income 
relationship. Other curves are based on the assumption that the within-city 
income elasticity of housing demand is 0.5, and that income levels at the twen- 
tieth and thirty-fifth percentiles are related to average income levels based on 
the generalized developing-country income distribution discussed in section 2. 
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Food Subsidies and the Poor: 
A Case Study of Tanzania 
SUSAN HORTON 
Food-subsidy programs have large and visible costs that affect government 
macro-economic policy and the agricultural sector. Hence such programs 
are often vulnerable in times of economic difficulty because of pressures 
that are internal as well as external to the country. However, food-subsidy 
programs have potentially important benefits for income distribution and 
nutrition. These benefits are not always gained in practice because political 
considerations frequently affect program design. This chapter examines the 
costs and benefits of food-subsidy programs in a number of selected coun- 
tries. The findings and some hypotheses are then compared with a case 
study of the subsidy on maize meal in Tanzania, 1980-4. I suggest that 
abolition of the subsidy in Tanzania did not have the adverse effects on 
poverty and nutrition that might develop in some other countries if sub- 
sidies were removed. The potential operation of food subsidies is rather dif- 
ferent in sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere. Tanzania presents an extreme 
example of the difficulties of using food subsidies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The survey of selected countries in the following section examines two of 
the costs (macro-economic and agricultural) and two potential benefits (im- 
proved income distribution and nutrition) of food subsidies. The survey is 
based on country studies in Horton and Taylor (1986), and draws also on 
Horton (1984). Section 2 gives a brief history and description of the food 
subsidy in Tanzania and section 3 analyses the subsidy based on the survey 
findings in section 1. The final section contains some conclusions. 
1 A Survey of Selected Countries 
One definition of food subsidies is that they exist where the consumer price 
of food in a region is held below some free market price that would other- 
wise prevail. Explicit subsidies exist where there is some budgetary outlay by 
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the government, while implicit subsidies are where the supply price is also 
held down. Using this definition means that food subsidies are endemic 
throughout the developing world, exist in several centrally planned 
economies, and exist at certain times in developed countries. A study of 
thirty-seven developing countries indicated that at least thirty-one of them 
used explicit food subsidies at some point between 1968 and 1980 (Horton, 
1985). Several development models, such as the Fei-Ranis one, argue that 
implicit subsidization of food (at the expense of agricultural producers) is 
necessary for development. The same idea has affected government policies 
during industrialization in the USSR (the `scissors crisis'), India, and Latin 
America (import substitution). However, more recent development litera- 
ture has emphasized the disadvantages of such a policy. 
This section focuses on countries that make explicit subsidies, i.e., where 
government outlays exist. As will be seen, there is a great temptation for 
governments to try to cut costs by using additional implicit taxes on the 
agriculture sector, and hence the implicit/explicit distinction is not always 
clear. This survey examines macro-economic and agricultural costs and 
potential income-distribution and nutritional benefits of food subsidies. 
There are three possible methods for financing a consumer subsidy on 
food. These are government expenditure, a producer tax, and food aid. 
Government expenditure can in turn be financed by increasing taxation, 
reducing other expenditures, borrowing, or printing money. The exact 
macro-economic consequences depend on how a subsidy is financed. The 
effects are, however, quite large, given the scale of subsidy programs in 
some countries. Various macro-models have been used to simulate the ef- 
fects, which tend to vary according to model specification (Cavallo and 
Mundlak, 1982; Quinzon and Binswanger, 1984; de Janvey and Subbarao, 
1984; Gibson, Lustig, and Taylor, 1982; and others). 
Table 6.1 presents some figures on the size of budget outlays. The total 
subsidy has been even larger, given that cheap imported food flows (mainly 
U.S. PL-480 wheat and rice) have been quite large, as has implicit taxation of 
the domestic agricultural sector. The data from table 6.1 are taken from 
very different sources, and are for different years, and hence should be in- 
terpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the expenditures is 
quite striking. 
Food subsidies also have an obvious effect on worsening the balance of 
trade in food. The size of the effect depends on the size of the consumer 
subsidy and the elasticity of demand for food, and the size of (any) pro- 
ducer tax and the elasticity of supply of food domestically. These price 
distortions combine to decrease food exports, or more frequently to in- 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































147 Food Subsidies and the Poor 
study for Egypt (Scobie, 1983) suggested that a 10 per cent increase in food 
subsidies would increase inflation by 5 per cent and cause an effective 
devaluation of the free-market exchange rate of more than 3 per cent. 
Food-subsidy schemes may cause foreign-exchange difficulties not only 
by their size but also by their stabilizing effect on domestic demand. If 
food-subsidy schemes increase the government commitment to insulating 
consumers from price fluctuations, then other importing sectors are forced 
to bear the burden of adjustment to fluctuations in domestic food produc- 
tion or world food prices. Scobie (1983) shows that, for Egypt, the volume 
elasticity of food imports to total import expenditures is only 0.05, i.e., that 
maintaining food imports has had very severe effects on other sectors in the 
economy. 
Food subsidies do have one potential macro-economic benefit: they can 
be a useful domestic response to adverse external shocks. They provide a 
reasonably convenient way for governments to bolster domestic consump- 
tion in the face of (temporary) external shocks. 
Food subsidies often impose costs on the agricultural sector. Implicit 
agricultural taxation is very common among countries with food subsidies 
(not that it is absent elsewhere). In particular the poor developing countries 
frequently have implicit agricultural taxation at the same time as they sub- 
sidize consumers. Only the more affluent Latin American countries with 
larger non-agricultural sectors seem to be able to subsidize both consumers 
and producers. Countries that hold down output prices frequently have off- 
setting input subsidies, which do not usually fully offset the output taxes. 
For example, Brown (1978) estimates that, for Pakistan, input subsidies 
were only about 10-20 per cent of the value of the output tax. 
Output price distortions cause several problems. First, there are overall 
disincentives to agriculture and food production. Second, the output mix is 
distorted. And third, design and implementation of procurement schemes 
can harm producer incentives, adding to the adverse effects of low prices. 
Because agricultural incentives are a major topic in their own right, the 
discussion below is rather brief. 
Table 6.1 provides some information on the relative level of consumer 
and producer prices. Without further information on marketing costs, it is 
not possible to ascertain whether producers are being taxed and, if so, to 
what degree. However, the operation of many government procurement 
schemes suggests that producers are taxed. Governments frequently impose 
levies, quotas, or some other means of compulsory procurement. For exam- 
ple, in Egypt there are levies on rice, beans, lentils, and sugar-cane, as well 
as on some export crops. In India there has been a rice levy (at the milling 
stage), although wheat is procured on the open market. India also operates 
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zoning restrictions that restrict trade between surplus and deficit states. An 
ostensible reason for these restrictions is to reduce price variation, but in 
fact they reduce the government's procurement costs, and if anything in- 
crease price disparities (Krishna and Raychaudhuri, 1980). China also has a 
procurement system with several tiers of producer prices, ranging from a 
quota price, a second tier of quotas (euphemistically called `above quota' 
amounts), a third tier of prices negotiated between state and producers once 
both quotas have been filled, and finally a rural market price (Lardy, 1983). 
Several African countries have legal state monopolies over important food 
crops. 
Some countries also have state export monopolies, I which have to be sup- 
plemented by border controls. For example, in times of crisis Bangladesh 
has enforced laws restricting the amount of grain that can be held or traded 
within a certain distance of the border. 
A final procurement technique is the one employed, for example, by 
Bangladesh, where small farmers may be forced to sell very quickly after 
harvest, either because of lack of storage capacity on the farm or because of 
liquidity requirements. Such farmers thus sell at the time when free-market 
prices are at a seasonal low, and hence may find it more profitable to sell to 
the government although, taking an all-year average, free-market prices 
may exceed government ones. Hence the government can reduce its pro- 
curement costs, at the expense of the poorest farmers. 
The size and importance of the adverse effect of low producer prices on 
aggregate output are highly debated topics. Recent World Bank documents, 
such as those on Africa, have emphasized the harmful effects. However, 
other researchers have argued that factors such as infrastructural invest- 
ment and agricultural research have stronger effects. It has also been argued 
that the use of world prices as a benchmark is misleading, given that only a 
small fraction of output is traded, and that internal terms of trade between 
sectors are more important. 
Empirical evidence surveyed by Scandizzo (1984) suggests that the long- 
run price elasticity of aggregate output is in the range of 0.3 to 0.5. Scan- 
dizzo also concludes that prices can be an effective component of policy 
packages to increase aggregate output. Thus, food subsidies, which increase 
the pressure hold down producer prices, may have some adverse effects on 
total output. However, the distortions between crops are probably more 
marked. 
Government procurement policies often distort the output mix because 
governments frequently discriminate against the crops that enter the subsidy 
scheme. In Egypt, this type of pricing policy led to a decrease in rice produc- 
tion, an increase in wheat production, and an increase by small farmers in 
labour-intensive livestock production (Alderman and von Braun, 1984). In 
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Sri Lanka, procurement policies were run adroitly in the 1960s, with a high 
rice procurement price, partly because of the availability of cheap imported 
wheat, which did not compete with a domestic crop. However, coconuts 
and starchy staples such as cassava, both significant sources of calories in 
the diet, were neglected. In China, the existence of a 10:1 poultry-to-grain 
price differential in contrast to a grain conversion rate to poultry of only 3:1 
apparently had an incentive effect on poultry production that may not have 
been socially desirable (Lardy, 1983). 
If they are badly designed, procurement schemes can have disincentive ef- 
fects beyond those resulting from low prices alone. For Bangladesh a series 
of problems have been cited relating to inadequate infrastructure (Ahmed et 
al., 1980). Farmers disliked having to make two separate trips to procure- 
ment centres - one to sell grain and one to exchange their sale vouchers for 
cash. It was also argued that insufficient numbers of purchasing centres and 
personnel caused small farmers to sell at a discount to an intermediary 
dealer, rather than waiting to sell directly at the government price. A lack of 
bags for grain created inconvenience because farmers had to guard their 
grain at the purchase centre before selling. Finally, there were complaints 
related to the lack of an objective measure of moisture content and quality 
of rice that affected the government price offered. Some similar problems 
were also reported in Sri Lanka (Yoshimura et al., 1975), although the 
magnitude of problems seems much greater in Bangladesh. 
Food subsidies have important potential benefits. Given that the poor 
spend a large proportion of their income on food (as much as 70-80 per cent 
in South Asia, for example), changing the price of food can affect income 
distribution and nutrition of the poor. Food subsidies are also potentially 
more egalitarian than subsidies on other expenditure items because the in- 
come elasticity of demand for food is low. It is also possible to select the 
particular subsidized food so as to target the subsidy somewhat towards 
poorer households, i.e., some foods have self-targeting properties. One 
condition for such properties is that the income elasticity of the food should 
decline (or even become negative) as income increases. It is also desirable 
that the price elasticity of demand should decrease with income. Both 
criteria ensure that richer households are less sensitive to the subsidy, and 
there is thus less spillover of the subsidy to non-target households. 
Table 6.2 provides some figures on the expenditure elasticities for some 
subsidized foods in different countries. These show that wheat is a better 
subsidy vehicle than rice in the three countries chosen, and that oil, sugar, 
and bean subsidies in Egypt favour the poor less than a wheat subsidy. 
The income-distribution effects also depend on eligibility for subsidized 
food. Several countries have restricted eligibility to certain more-affluent 
groups, in which case political rather than nutritional or income-distri- 
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TABLE 6.2 
Expenditure elasticities for various subsidized foods 
Bangladesh Sri Lanka Egypt (urban) 
percentile percentile quartile 
Food item 10 75 20 50 90 Lowest Other 
Rice 0.94 1.19 0.45 0.36 0.13 0.36 0.13 
Wheat -0.24 -0.10 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 0.09a -0.06a 
Sugar 0.14 0.20 
Oil 0.08 0.10 
Beans 0.09 0.14 
a Coarse (balady) flour 
SOURCE: Pitt (1983) for Bangladesh; Alderman and Timmer (1980) for Sri Lanka; Alderman 
and von Braun (1984) for Egypt 
bution considerations are paramount. These include China, where state 
employees are the main recipients, and Bangladesh, where certain urban 
groups, including government employees, are favoured. Several countries 
restrict the eligibility of rural households. In Pakistan, wheat-producing 
rural areas are not eligible for the wheat ration (although they receive 
sugar), despite the fact that such households on average purchase 61 per 
cent of their wheat intake (Horton and Taylor, 1986). Colombia did target 
its food-subsidy scheme for more-disadvantaged areas of the country, but 
doing so may only have been politically feasible for such a small scheme. 
Even in countries where rural households are in theory eligible for sub- 
sidies, there is, in practice, an urban bias. In India the population served per 
ration shop is higher in rural areas, despite the lower population density, 
indicating that much of the rural population is inadequately served (Swamy, 
1979). In Egypt, bread is available more frequently in urban areas, and 
workplace co-operatives selling subsidized frozen meat, etc., are mainly an 
urban phenomenon (Alderman and von Braun, 1984). However, rural 
Egypt benefits relatively more from the flour subsidy. In Mexico only 43 of 
the 1467 national distribution agency's (DICONSA) outlets were in rural areas 
in 1970 (Grindle, 1975). Food subsidies in Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Mali, 
and elsewhere in Africa have been almost wholly urban oriented. The two 
exceptions are Kerala and Sri Lanka's discontinued ration scheme. In the 
latter, the aim was to have ration shops within three miles of any member of 
the population. In both cases, high population density may have contri- 
buted to the success of the shop network. 
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In order to minimize the cost of transferring nutrients, there are some 
additional requirements. First, the income and own-price elasticities of 
demand for food should be high, to minimize leakage to non-food items. 
Second, increased income should lead predominantly to consumption of a 
larger quantity of food, rather than a higher quality. McCarthy (1978) 
found that in Pakistan, for example, over half the increase in expenditure 
on wheat went to increased quality wheat, with little change in nutrient con- 
tent. Third, cross-price elasticity with respect to non-food items should be 
high, and with respect to other foods should be low, so that the increase in 
consumption of the subsidized food is not at the expense of other food 
items. Fourth, the subsidy vehicle should preferably be a good source of 
nutrients. 
We can compare the criteria above with empirical evidence to examine 
how well actual subsidy schemes minimize the costs of transferring nutrients 
and reach target households. One finding is that food-subsidy income may 
have a greater effect on nutrient intake than cash income, because it has 
been observed empirically that the marginal propensity to consume food 
(MPCF) obtained by food rations or food stamps is higher than if the food is 
purchased from cash income. Gavan and Chandrasekera (1979) found, for 
Sri Lanka, that the MPCF out of money income ranged from 0.22 to 0.58, 
but was on average 0.85 of the value of the food ration. Kumar (1979) 
found, for Kerala, that ration transfers had an effect on nutrition (as 
measured by child nutritional status and household dietary quality) that was 
6-10 times as large as that of an equivalent increase in money income. West 
and Price (1976) found, for the United States, that the MPCF out of money 
income was 0.05, as compared to 0.30 out of food stamps, and even more 
out of income transfers in kind, such as school lunches. However, other 
studies in the United States (Madden and Yoder, 1972; West, 1978) did not 
find that in-kind transfers acted differently from cash ones. This issue 
deserves careful empirical testing because it could provide a justification for 
food subsidies rather than equivalent income transfers. 
Figures obtained from the analysis of conventional household- 
expenditure surveys can be very helpful in evaluating how appropriate the 
subsidy vehicle is. Estimates of the price and income elasticities of demand 
for nutrients can help to evaluate how effective a subsidy will be in transfer- 
ring nutrients. Table 6.3, from Pitt (1983), provides some useful evidence 
for Bangladesh on the characteristics of different foods as potential subsidy 
vehicles. The figures show that rice is a poor subsidy vehicle in this particu- 
lar country because rice has less nutrient content per unit of expenditure, 
and also because the pattern of substitution among foods is much better 
whens the wheat price changes, than when the rice price does. A good sub- 
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TABLE 6.3 
Nutrient price elasticities, tenth percentile 
Carbo- Ribo- 
Protein Fat hydrate Calories Calcium Iron Thiamine flavin Niacin 
Uncompensated nutrient price elasticities 
Rice -0.191 -0.441 -0.553 - 0.484 - 0.087 0.129 0.055 0.009 - 0.394 
Wheat -0.261 - 0.112 - 0.203 - 0.210 - 0.177 -0.391 -0.373 - 0.329 - 0.254 
Compensated nutrient price elasticities 
Rice 0.201 0.041 -0.061 -0.011 0.308 0.403 0.362 0.365 0.065 
Wheat - 0.186 - 0.020 - 0.109 -0.119 -0.102 -0.339 -0.314 -0.261 -0.170 
SOURCE: Pitt (1983) 
sidy vehicle should have large, negative, uncompensated nutrient-price 
elasticities, in order for the subsidy to increase nutrient intake. Wheat is bet- 
ter than rice under this criterion. 
Thus, food subsidies in practice have been rather costly as a way to im- 
prove income distribution and nutrition, and arguably could have been 
more cost effective by being restructured. Their design has, of course, been 
influenced by political considerations. It is no accident that politically vocal 
groups such as urban consumers, civil servants, and government employees 
have been beneficiaries of many food-subsidy schemes. The political dif- 
ficulty of reforming or reducing subsidies is exemplified by unrest in Egypt, 
the Dominican Republic, Poland, Tunisia, and Morocco, following rises in 
the price of subsidized foods. 
Recently interest has shifted to the possibility of targeting subsidies in 
order to reduce costs and to minimize leakage of benefits to non-needy 
groups. However, targeting is neither costless nor perfectly accurate in prac- 
tice. Means-testing, as practised in developed countries - for instance, in the 
u.s. food-stamp scheme - is much more difficult in developing countries. In 
the latter no good data on income flows are accessible to the government. It 
is particularly difficult to monitor incomes where a large proportion of the 
population is rural or self-employed. The Sri Lanka food-stamp scheme in- 
troduced in 1979 provides an example. Although households with incomes 
above the mean were not officially eligible to receive stamps, one study 
found that 30 per cent of them did (Edirisinghe, 1987). 
Alternative targeting methods have been used in various countries. These 
include the use of household characteristics such as age, family size, and 
geographic location as indicators of need, the imposition of work require- 
ments (food for work programs), and the use of rationing and queuing. 
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These all have administrative costs and entail leakage (see Horton, 1985), 
but can potentially improve allocation of benefits. The trade-off between 
additional administrative costs and better targeting is likely to be of future 
interest to researchers and policy-makers. 
2 History and Description of the Tanzanian Maize Subsidy 
The explicit consumer subsidy on sembe (maize-meal) was begun in Tan- 
zania in 1980, as a way of protecting urban consumers while the government 
introduced various measures designed to deal with the country's economic 
difficulties. It ended in 1984, partly because the economic difficulties 
proved so severe that the fiscal costs of a subsidy could not easily be met. It 
was administered by the National Milling Corporation (NMC), the 
marketing body for most food grains and some other food crops. 
To understand the effects of the subsidy, and of its removal, it is useful to 
know some background details about the agricultural marketing system in 
Tanzania, about food and agricultural policy, and about how the subsidy 
was operated. It is particularly important to examine the background to the 
subsidy in Tanzania because economic difficulties were so pervasive as to 
constrain seriously the operation of government policies. 
The history and role of the agricultural marketing boards in Tanzania 
have been described in some detail by Kaberuka (1984), Temu (1984), 
Wagao (1982), Clark (1978), and others. State intervention has been of long 
standing. There were marketing boards during the Second World War, and 
following the war until 1956 the Grain Storage Department operated in the 
food-crop market. There was a brief period of free-market operation until 
the 1962 Agricultural Products (Control and Marketing) Act led to the 
establishment of several crop marketing boards, including the National 
Agricultural Products Board (NAPB) for food crops as well as boards for 
various export crops. The government continued to extend it influence in 
the food sector and in 1967 nationalized seven private milling companies, 
which formed the National Milling Corporation (NMC). 
Throughout the 1970s, the government continued to extend its influence. 
One move was to limit the role of the co-operatives, at first by encouraging 
ujamaa (communal) villages to deal directly with the crop boards, and in 
1976 by abolishing co-operatives and transferring their functions to the 
marketing boards. Another move was to allow the food-crop boards to par- 
ticipate directly in production. In 1973 the NAPB was broken up, and NMC 
assumed responsibility for trade in cereals. It was granted monopsony 
powers over the main food crops (maize, paddy/rice, wheat, cassava, 
sorghum, millet, and beans) in 1976 when co-operatives were abolished. 
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The pan-territorial pricing policy (whereby a single price was paid to 
farmers and by consumers, irrespective of geographic location) was institu- 
ted in 1973 and continued until 1981. The institutional structure of food 
marketing has remained unchanged from 1976 to the present, although in 
1984 the government announced that co-operatives would be allowed to 
return. The National Milling Corporation has functions ranging from pro- 
duction, distribution, milling, processing, storage, imports, and exports to 
managing the strategic Grain Reserve. It also has interests in a winery, a 
paper-bag factory, and other enterprises. 
The agricultural parastatals have been widely criticized. They have been 
often accused of inefficiency: Lamade (1970) documents this for the 1960s, 
and figures for 1978/9 (see table 6.4) show that agricultural producers were 
paid between 26 and 62 per cent of the realized value of their output (the 
range for food crops was 39-62 per cent). A Marketing Development Board 
(MDB) Study (MDB, 1980) found that marketing costs also increased rapidly. 
In the five years from 1972/3 to 1977/8, sales of the NMC increased by 49 
per cent, but operating costs rose by 672 per cent. The NMC has also been 
criticized for high storage losses (7.5 per cent on imported grain as against 4 
per cent on domestic) and losses in milling. For instance, in maize, the 
extraction ratio achieved was only 50 per cent instead of the intended one of 
90 per cent (MDB, 1982). The .deficiencies of the boards are described in 
more detail in World Bank (1983), Stewart (1984), and Kaberuka (1984). 
Increased marketing costs and inefficiency had consequences for the agri- 
cultural and food sectors, which have been analysed by Ellis (1982) and 
others. Real producer prices declined over time, more particularly for 
export crops than food crops. Table 6.5 from Lipumba (1983) presents 
figures for 1972/3 to 1982/3, although the decline had begun even earlier. 
Production statistics are not very reliable: however, available evidence sug- 
gests that a result of the fall in producer prices was a stagnation in the 
volume of agricultural exports, a switch into non-controlled crops such as 
fruits and vegetables, and the development of a parallel market in con- 
trolled food crops. One consequence of the last development was a rather 
large fluctuation in official cereal procurement, depending on conditions in 
the parallel market. 
The development of a parallel market in foods was quite important. For 
one thing, it exaggerated the substitution out of export crops (because 
opportunities to sell export crops on the parallel market are more limited). 
The difference between parallel market and official prices are quite substan- 
tial. Lipumba and Mbogoro (1984) give figures for the ratio of parallel 
market to official consumer prices in thirteen lake-region villages. The 
figures are 4.98:1 (maize), 2.42:1 (paddy), 4.58:1 (cassava), 4.68:1 
(sorghum), and 4.63:1 (millet). MDB (1985) gives similar figures for 
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TABLE 6.4 









White sorghum 50 
Finger millet 62 





SOURCE: Export crops: Msambichaka, Ndulu, and Amani (1983), ch. 3; food crops: MDB 
(1982) using official consumer prices and assuming milling ratios of 85 per cent (wheat and 
maize) and 65 per cent (rice) 
September 1983 to August 1984, based on the average for all regions of the 
country: 3.32:1 (maize), 2.19:1 (wheat), and 2.79:1 (rice). Because the 
parallel market is illegal, prices tend to fluctuate greatly in it. It thus makes 
management of the food sector much more difficult for the government, 
and complicates the lives of producers and consumers as well. It also makes 
it more difficult to conduct economic analysis because published price 
indexes only imperfectly include parallel market prices, and because figures 
are not available on quantities transacted. 
The inefficiencies of the NMC were related directly to the need for a con- 
sumer subsidy. Throughout the 1970s, the efficiency costs were passed on to 
the producers in the form of lower real product prices. In fact, assuming a 
shadow exchange rate, it is likely that producers were implicitly subsidizing 
consumers for grain going through the NMC. However, there were limita- 
tions on the extent to which producer prices for food crops could be held 
down because of shifts between crops and the development of the parallel 
market, which limited NMC's ability to procure grain. Thus, by 1980, the 
government was forced to either raise consumer prices or operate an explicit 
subsidy. It chose the latter course. Since the abolition of the explicit subsidy 
in 1984, there has been a reversion to an implicit subsidy on grain passing 
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grain, and is sold below the world price if that is measured at a reasonable 
shadow exchange rate. 
The consumer subsidy on maize was introduced along with other mea- 
sures to aid economic recovery. Tanzania was experiencing severe economic 
difficulties in the late 1970s, following two oil price shocks, the war with 
Uganda, the dissolution of the East African Economic Community, and 
terms-of-trade problems. Domestic policy may have weakened the 
country's ability to respond to external shocks, particularly the relative 
neglect of agriculture and agricultural exports. A series of economic sur- 
vival measures were introduced in the 1980s: e.g., the 1981 National 
Economic Survival Plan, the 1982/3 to 1984/5 Structural Adjustment Plan, 
and the 1983 National Agricultural Plan. As part of these measures, the 
minimum wage was raised in 1980 and 1981 and wheat and rice prices were 
raised, but at the same time maize flour was given an explicit subsidy. 
The maize subsidy did not prevent the continued erosion of the real value 
of the minimum wage, but it was intended to protect food consumption 
somewhat (see table 6.6). In terms of the ratio of the minimum wage to the 
maize price, consumers were better off in 1980/1 than in any year since 
1973/4. In 1984 when the maize subsidy was reduced, the minimum wage 
was raised to compensate. However, the real value of the minimum wage 
continued to fall, and the ratio of the minimum wage to the maize price 
declined markedly. 
The maize subsidy was paid for 75 per cent by explicit government expen- 
diture and 25 per cent by a tax on sugar. The subsidy was put on maize flour 
but not on unmilled grain, and the latter, in fact, cost 33 per cent more than 
flour, after the subsidy. Maize flour in 1980 was absolutely cheaper (at 
1.25 sh/kg) than the less-preferred staples such as sorghum flour (3.00 
sh/kg), millet flour (3.05-3.25 sh/kg), and even cassava flour (1.50-1.65 
sh/kg). The subsidy was also unfortunately commenced at a time when NMC 
had relatively low stocks of sembe. 
NMC is not supposed to deal directly with the public. Subsidized grain was 
distributed mainly to institutions (the armed forced, hospitals, parastatals, 
universities), who distributed it to their employees in a manner of their 
choice. For instance, the University of Dar es Salaam made allotments on a 
departmental basis and sold grain through the co-operative shop. The rest 
of the grain was distributed to ration shops (maduka ya kaya). Each urban 
household since 1983 has had a ration card, which entitles it to purchase 
subsidized grain and scarce items (e.g., sugar, soap, cooking oil). The 
system is apparently not as formalized as in South Asia, however, and there 
is little written information available on it. Supplies of scarce commodities 
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There is little information available on allotments of NMC grain to dif- 
ferent institutions, and any figures that are available are in any case thought. 
to be unreliable. The reason is that certain individuals do have access to 
NMC grain, through connections. This type of transaction is not officially 
sanctioned, but apparently amounts recorded as going to the ration shops 
may, in fact, be diverted. 
The main problem is that NMC is only able to satisfy a portion of urban 
demand, which is not easy to quantify. If one uses the 1976/7 Household 
Budget Survey, one can estimate that urban consumers purchased 114 thou- 
sand tonnes of sembe in a year in which NMc distribution was 120 thousand 
tonnes, i.e., NMc apparently supplied most of urban requirements. How- 
ever, the implied per capita annual consumption (50 kg) is suspiciously low, 
perhaps by a factor of two or more. The MDB has made an alternative esti- 
mate for 1984/5 (MDB, 1984) based on estimates of the share of maize in 
calorie intake. The board estimates that 5 per cent of production, or 24 per 
cent of marketed production, of maize will be through the NMc. The urban 
population was in 1976/7 about 14 per cent of the total mainland popula- 
tion. Hence, even if all NMc maize goes to urban areas, and assuming urban 
consumption is no more than 15 per cent of the total, NMc would supply no 
more than a third of urban demand in 1984/5, and probably less. Dar es 
Salaam has also taken the lion's share of subsidized grain. In 1976/7 it 
received about 40 per cent of NMC's maize, slightly less than its percentage 
of the urban population (about 50 per cent). By 1983 or 1984, its share of 
NMc maize had risen to about 70 per cent. 
By 1984, Tanzania's economic difficulties were very serious. Over three 
and one-half years, the subsidy had cost 1233 million shillings; in addition, 
NMc had accumulated a deficit of 750 million shillings from the late 1970s. 
The cost of the maize subsidy was expected to raise to 800 million shillings 
in 1984-4. The government, therefore, abolished the subsidy in the 1984 
budget and introduced a package of reform measures. These included end- 
ing the fertilizer subsidy, increasing fees such as those for passports and 
examinations, introducing secondary-school fees, raising certain taxes, 
reducing the number of parastatals, reducing the number of items con- 
trolled by the Prices Commission (from about 2000 to 75), and partially 
liberalizing the use of private foreign exchange. 
The maize subsidy has not entirely ended. There remains a 1 shilling sub- 
sidy on maize grain, financed by a tax on rice and wheat. Also maize 
remains implicitly subsidized because consumer and producer prices remain 
below world prices measured at the shadow exchange rate, and below paral- 
lel market prices. Competition to obtain cheaper NMc foodstuffs remains 
intense. 
160 Susan Horton 
The NMC also continues to cross-subsidize certain regions at the expense 
of others. The much-criticized policy of pan-territorial pricing was discon- 
tinued in 1981. This policy gave a uniform producer price for a particular 
cereal, irrespective of geographic location. It tended to discourage efficient 
spatial location of production and increased transportation costs. However, 
political considerations rather than economic efficiency seem to have 
governed the setting of consumer prices spatially since 1981. In a free 
market, the areas of greatest deficit would tend to have the highest price, to 
induce food to move over longer distances from surplus areas. However, 
Dar and Dodoma (the intended site of the new capital), both heavy deficit 
areas, face lower maize-flour prices than the national average (6.60 and 
7.40 sh/kg respectively, compared to the average of 8.00 sh/kg), whereas 
areas that are almost self-sufficient are penalized (the price in Rukwa is 9.80 
and in Ruvuma 9.20 sh/kg). Thus the NMC is operating a cross-subsidy 
favouring Dar es Salaam and Dodoma. 
3 Analysis of the Tanzanian Maize Subsidy 
In analysing the Tanzanian food subsidy, using the framework derived 
from the cross-country survey in section 1, this section examines the costs of 
the subsidy (macro-economic, agricultural) and the benefits (income distri- 
bution and nutritional). 
The fiscal costs of the maize subsidy were relatively small compared to 
those in China and Sri Lanka. The cost was 1233 million shillings over three 
and one-half years (United Republic of Tanzania, 1984), or about 0.9 per 
cent of GDP, 2.2 per cent of government expenditure, and 5.1 per cent of 
government recurrent revenue annually. These costs were, however, per- 
ceived as high in a situation in which the government's ability to raise addi- 
tional revenue was limited, and where control over the domestic credit 
expansion was perceived as important.a 
However, abolition of the consumer food subsidy has not solved the 
problem of deficits of the agricultural parastatals. Since the early 1980s, the 
real producer prices of export crops have been raised, in recognition of 
the problems caused by stagnant export volumes and receipts. However, the 
government was for several years (until 1986) unwilling to devalue further 
(which would raise the shilling value of export-crop sales), and the result 
was large deficits by the export crop parastatals. These were 907 million 
shillings in 1982/3 and 500 million in 1983/4 (MDB, 1983), and were similar 
in magnitude to the annual costs of the sembe subsidy. 
The balance-of-payments effects of the subsidy were probably not a 
serious constraint, since a large proportion of food imports are given as aid. 
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Of more serious concern was the high foreign-exchange intensity of urban 
food supply (see figures in section 2) resulting from inefficiencies in 
transport and in regional pricing. Also the choice of technology and crop 
mix in agriculture has large balance-of-payments implications. The wheat 
sector in particular uses tractor technologies that are very foreign-exchange 
intensive. Thus the negative balance-of-payments effect of the subsidy was 
probably unimportant relative to balance-of-payments effects of other 
distortions in the agricultural sector. 
Similarly, it might be argued that the sembe subsidy had a relatively 
minor distortionary effect on agriculture, given the existence of other 
distortions. The real producer price for preferred staples had declined con- 
tinuously since 1975/6 (refer back to table 6.5) and continued to decline 
while the subsidy was operative. 
In any case, the existence of the parallel market limited somewhat the 
adverse effects of low official producer prices. Instead, it probably 
distorted incentives between producers with different volumes of output. 
Those farmers with large surpluses were more likely to come under pressure 
to sell at least partly through official channels. It probably also distorted in- 
centives across regions. Regions closer to Dar es Salaam and other urban 
areas were more likely to be able to transport grain and sell it on the parallel 
market, whereas in more distant areas illegal grain movements were easier 
to detect. For instance, according to MDB (1984) a large proportion of 
NMC's procurement in 1983/4 was due to a crack-down on procurement in a 
single region, Arusha. 
One question that might be asked is whether the consumer subsidy led to 
an expansion of the parallel market and, if so, whether that expansion was a 
bad thing. It seems likely that the subsidy did encourage the parallel market. 
Theory suggests that if the income elasticity of demand for maize is fairly 
high, then income transfers via a subsidy will increase demand for maize. If 
demand is not satisfied through official channels, it must be met through 
the parallel market. Theories of rent-seeking would also suggest that the 
wider the gap between the subsidized and the parallel market price for 
maize, the more resources will be diverted to (and wasted, from the social 
point of view) obtaining subsidized maize. However, there is very little em- 
pirical evidence that can be used to examine the effects of the subsidy on the 
parallel market. 
Hence, the main conclusion regarding costs of the subsidy is that 
although they were not trivial, they were small relative to the costs of other 
existing distortions. Partial analysis is less helpful in Tanzania's case than 
for other countries. The reason is that the severe economic difficulties in 
Tanzania put serious constraints on the operation of government policy. 
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The shortage of one key input (foreign exchange) has made individual sec- 
tors of the economy much more dependent on what happens elsewhere. 
The income-distribution effects of the subsidy were potentially substan- 
tial. As table 6.6 shows, removal of the subsidy halved the purchasing 
power of the minimum wage in terms of NMC maize. However, there are 
several reasons why removal of the subsidy is unlikely to have substantially 
worsened inequality in income distribution. First, the subsidy was urban 
biased and favoured the most wealthy city, Dar es Salaam. Second, within 
urban areas it seems likely that higher income earners had greater access. 
Third, the consumption characteristics of maize suggest that it was not the 
best subsidy vehicle, if income distribution were thought to be important. 
The following paragraphs examine the evidence for each of these assertions. 
First, with regard to the urban/rural distribution of benefits, the Tanza- 
nian subsidy (like most of those surveyed in section 1) is urban biased. In 
most countries it is obvious that urban incomes are on average higher than 
rural, and hence an urban subsidy is inegalitarian. For Tanzania however, 
the ILO (1982) has made calculations suggesting that urban minimum wage 
earners, in fact, had lower real incomes by the 1980s than smallholders, in 
which case an urban food subsidy might not have worsened overall income 
distribution. The ILO's methods have been disputed (see, for example, ILO, 
1983). It is immediately obvious that purchasing power of the minimum 
wage has been severely eroded. However, it is less obvious that calorie in- 
take in rural areas has remained constant over time, a crucial assumption 
underlying the ILO's calculations. 
I would use two pieces of evidence to argue that the ILO has overstated the 
case, and that urban real incomes probably remain above rural ones, 
although the differential almost certainly has narrowed. However, resolu- 
tion of the debate requires better data. Possibly ongoing work by Collier (at 
Oxford University, Institute for Economics and Statistics) will help resolve 
the issue. Collier has traced a sample of urban and rural households from 
the 1976/7 Household Budget Survey and resurveyed them in 1983. 
I would advance the following evidence: first, there is evidence on birth 
weight from Bantje (in progress). He has information from particular hos- 
pitals in four rural and one urban area (Dar). His data suggest that birth 
weight may have fallen somewhat since the late 1970s, in both urban and 
rural areas, but that urban birth weights are consistently higher than rural. 
Of course, birth weights depend on many different factors. However, these 
factors do include maternal nutrition in the third trimester of pregnancy 
and health services. Bantje's explanation is that crop yields have been 
declining slowly since the late 1970s because of the shift to sedentary agri- 
culture without a simultaneous intensification of inputs - an occurrence 
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barely remarked upon by agricultural economists (Bantje, personal com- 
munication). Bantje's data do not include those rural areas that were 
affected by the drought. 
Second, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that published statistics 
may underestimate real incomes in Dar es Salaam. Urban residents appar- 
ently increasingly supplement their incomes by other activities. These in- 
clude cultivating shambas (small farms) in the region around the city, pro- 
ducing food in small plots within the city, working in a second job. These 
activities frequently divert resources: for example, the cultivation of sham- 
bas may use official transport and gasoline on weekends, having a second 
job may reduce time and effort on the main one. Income supplementation 
of this type is more feasible in Dar es Salaam - the political centre, main 
port, and headquarters of aid agencies and of most government agencies - 
than it is elsewhere. Income supplementation is probably more feasible for 
higher-income earners, but even for minimum-wage earners such opportu- 
nities are likely to be most favourable in Dar. Thus, although urban 
incomes have undoubtedly fallen sharply, it is by no means clear that they 
are on average below rural incomes. 
Within urban areas, it has been argued that operation of the maize sub- 
sidy favoured higher-income groups. Rugumisa and Semboja (1984) argue 
that richer households obtained more NMC grain, either through direct con- 
tacts with NMC or because they were associated with large institutions. 
Poorer households relying on the ration shops received a lower priority. 
There is little evidence available to quantify this statement, however, Bryce- 
son (1985) uses 1976/7 household-budget data to show that low-income 
households (those with less than 6000 shillings annually) derived 61 per cent 
of their sembe from non-market sources in 1976/7, as opposed to only 16 
per cent for other (higher-income) urban households. Comparable figures 
for the 1980s are not available, but the figures suggest that poorer house- 
holds were less able to rely on marketed grain (both NMC and non-NMC 
marketed grain). It is also possible that the subsidy was initially operated in 
a more egalitarian way than at the end (Helleiner, personal commu- 
nication). 
Analysis of the consumption characteristics of maize suggests that 
although maize was not the worst item to subsidize as far as income distri- 
bution was concerned, it was also not the best. Figures on the income 
elasticity of demand for specific foods are not available, but table 6.7 gives 
information on budget shares by expenditure group. These show that maize 
is not a luxury, unlike rice and wheat (maize's share of food expenditure 
declines as expenditure rises). However, the budget shares of millet, 
sorghum, and starches, particularly cassava, also decline. Table 6.8 gives in- 
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TABLE 6.7 
Share of certain items in total food expenditure, for urban households in Tanzania, 1976/77 
Annual expenditure group (in shillings) 
0-3999 4000-5999 6000-9999 10,000 + 
Category Low i Low a Medium High 
Cereals 0.348 0.268 0.230 0.177 
Rice and paddy 0.070 0.109 0.120 0.095 
Maize 0.146 0.121 0.090 0.037 
Millet and sorghum 0.062 0.004 0.002 0.001 
Wheat 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.024 
Others 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.013 
Cost of grinding 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Starches 0.130 0.068 0.055 0.046 
Cassava 0.046 0.015 0.010 0.000 
Maize 
Grain 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Flour 0.142 0.119 0.089 0.037 
Share of food/total 
expenditure 0.760 0.598 0.499 0.275 
Per cent of all households 32.6 19.5 25.1 22.8 
NOTE: The low/medium/high categorization is one used by the Household Budget Survey. 
The low-income group has been subdivided. 
SOURCE: Calculated from Bureau of Statistics, Household Budget Survey (1985) 
formation on the share of the lowest third of urban households, in total 
urban consumption of particular foods. The lowest third consume less than 
one-third of total maize, and hence a maize subsidy benefits the rich 
relatively more. However, the poorest third consume more than one-third 
of total cassava, starch, millet, and sorghum available; hence these items 
are potentially better subsidy vehicles. 
The least-preferred staples may have some disadvantages as subsidy 
vehicles. Cassava is bulky; it stores and transports badly; and NmC has suf- 
fered losses on this crop in the past. Markets in the drought staples may be 
rather thin, and there has been relatively little research on technical change. 
The NMc also had losses on sorghum and millet in the late 1970s, when it ac- 
cumulated quantities it could not easily sell. However, greater attention to 
tastes (people strongly prefer traditional varieties whereas improved vari- 
eties are sometimes cheaper to produce) and attention to the millet/maize 
price differential facing consumers could help. For these reasons NMC might 
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TABLE 6.8 
Share of lowest-expenditure group of households (below 4000 sh) in total consumption 
of particular foods, Tanzania 1976/77, urban areas 
Category Share 
Number of households 0.326 
Urban rice consumption 0.224 
Urban maize consumption 0.285 
Maize grain 0.409 
Maize flour 0.261 
Urban millet + sorghum consumption 0.705 
Urban wheat consumption 0.041 
Urban starch consumption 0.338 
Urban cassava consumption 0.485 
SOURCE: Calculated from Bureau of Statistics, Household Budget Survey (1985) 
not have wanted to subsidize the least-preferred staples instead of maize. 
However, it should at least have subsidized them to the same extent, rather 
than making maize absolutely cheaper. 
Thus, several considerations suggest that the maize subsidy had few, if 
any, benefits in relation to income distribution, and that its removal was not 
a highly regressive measure. Compared to food subsidies in other develop- 
ing countries (see, for example, Horton and Taylor, 1986), the Tanzanian 
subsidy was not well designed to benefit income distribution. Nor was state 
administrative capacity such that the subsidy could be administered in an 
egalitarian manner. 
However, it is undoubtedly true that those among the urban poor who 
had had access to subsidized grain had negative effects on their real incomes 
because of the removal of the subsidy. At the time the subsidy was removed, 
other measures could have been implemented aimed at buffering the effect 
on the urban poor. Ultimately, long-run improvements in agricultural and 
food policy were required to ensure an adequate supply to urban areas. 
However, short-run solutions such as school feeding, food distribution via 
health centres, or a redirection of NMC grain towards shops in the poorer 
urban areas might have been considered (although the economic crisis 
seriously constrained the government's ability to implement many of these 
options). 
It is difficult to obtain direct evidence on the nutritional benefits of the 
maize subsidy. If the subsidy favoured higher-income groups, then we 
would infer that its effect on maintaining nutrient intake of poorer house- 
holds may have been limited. This conclusion is hard to substantiate 
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because there is very little information on nutritional status over time for 
Tanzania. The ILO (1983) uses a number of small surveys of different 
regions and concludes that the percentage of the population exhibiting 
severe protein-energy malnutrition (PEM) declined from 4.8 to 2.3 per cent 
between 1970 and 1981, but the percentage with moderate PENT rose from 22 
per cent to 40-60 per cent. This finding has an appealing interpretation 
(Tanzania's policies reduced income inequality but per capita incomes and 
food intake fell on average), but the survey evidence is very shaky. 
Bantje's (1985, and in progress) evidence on birth weights is likely to be 
more reliable. Birth weights are sensitive to nutrition in the last trimester of 
pregnancy, and hence the impact of food shortages shows up quite quickly. 
However, other factors are involved. Bantje finds that birth weights have 
declined slightly over time in Dar es Salaam since the late 1970s. The 
declines are more pronounced in certain groups (females, and first and 
second births). Seasonal dips are also becoming more apparent over time, 
and were especially low in March 1980 and even lower in March 1981. It 
should be noted that by March 1981, the food subsidy had been in operation 
for almost a year. Things might have been worse in the absence of the sub- 
sidy, but apparently the subsidy was not entirely successful in protecting the 
nutritional status of vulnerable groups. 
Finally, concerning possible nutritional benefits resulting from greater 
food security, the Tanzanian food subsidy was apparently not particularly 
successful. The NMC's ability to intervene in food markets is rather cir- 
cumscribed because it sells mainly to urban areas and deals with only a 
small proportion of total production and of marketed output. (The figures 
are 5 and 24 per cent, respectively, for maize; 11 and 21 per cent for rice; 
and 43 and 58 per cent for wheat [MDB, 1984, estimates for 1984-5]). Its 
purchases of maize have varied greatly over time (ranging from 23.9 million 
tons in 1974/5, to 220.4 in 1978/9 and 71.0 in 1983/4), since the existence of 
the parallel market tends to make NNtc the buyer of last resort (i.e., NNtc 
provides a floor price for sellers). The NNtc, therefore, tends to accumulate 
grain in years with good harvests, when consumer purchases from NNtc are 
also low. Thus, there is potentially a role for stabilizing prices intertem- 
porally. In practice, NMc does not have the necessary finance, storage 
capacity, and probably management capability (to turn over stocks). Nor is 
holding physical stocks necessarily the best way to provide food security. 
However, one alternative, the use of trade in food to improve food security, 
is not viable. Export possibilities are limited because at the present exchange 
rate, Tanzania is a relatively high-cost producer and food imports are con- 
strained by lack of foreign exchange. 
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NMc also has had problems in balancing the supply and demand for in- 
dividual crops. The price of drought staples was raised after the 1973/4 
food crises and led to an accumulation of stocks that could not easily be 
sold in the late 1970s. The NMC is currently accumulating stocks of cassava, 
which may lead to a similar problem (NMC, various years). 
4 Some Policy Findings 
The cross-country survey suggested that food-subsidy programs can have 
considerable macro-economic and agriculture-sector costs. They also have 
important potential benefits. Because food represents such a large share of 
the expenditure of the poor, food-price interventions have important effects 
on the real incomes of those poor households who participate in food 
markets. Moreover, there are potential 'self-targeting' properties if the 
food-subsidy vehicle is selected carefully. Thus, food subsidies can poten- 
tially improve income distribution, as well as improve the nutrition of poor 
households. However, political considerations (which are not discussed 
here) often affect program design, and many existing schemes are urban 
biased and probably regressive. 
If the Tanzanian subsidy is examined in the above framework, it would 
seem that its costs were not particularly high, especially when compared to 
costs of existing distortions in the agricultural sector. However, the subsidy 
did not succeed very well in maintaining consumption of lower-income 
urban households. There are several reasons for this result. The NMC pur- 
chases only a small fraction of maize production and even of maize 
marketed, and satisfies only a fraction of urban demand. Thus, it does not 
have the market power to maintain a low consumer price without adminis- 
trative fiat. Moreover, bureaucratic resources are already strained, without 
the extra responsibilities of a food subsidy financed partly by a procurement 
that effectively taxes producers. The subsidy was even more difficult to run 
because the subsidized consumer price was set very low in real terms, rela- 
tive to prices over the previous decade, and absolutely below the price of 
less-preferred staples. Thus, the result was that the parallel market flour- 
ished, there was strong competition for the subsidized grain, and the benefi- 
ciaries were likely not the urban poor. 
In Tanzania, any food subsidy would have been difficult to run. Tinker- 
ing with one small policy area did not produce the expected results in an 
economic system subject to serious constraints, and with large existing 
distortions. Perhaps aiming for a substantial explicit subsidy was too ambi- 
tious, whereas a more modest effort such as the existing (small) cross- 
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subsidy between maize, and rice and wheat, is more feasible. The analysis of 
the preceding section suggests that millet, sorghum, and cassava should also 
be involved in any such cross-subsidy because they are predominantly con- 
sumed by the poor. 
Ultimately, securing the consumption of the urban poor in Tanzania 
might require an examination of overall food and agriculture policy. Parti- 
cular aspects might be the role of drought staples, and a reconsideration of 
the role of wheat, a crop which is foreign-exchange intensive to produce and 
with luxury-consumption characteristics. Other analysts have stressed 
broader requirements, such as provision of more resources to the agricul- 
tural sector and a rationalization of the use of bureaucratic resources (which 
might include delegating some of their existing functions). 
More generally, African policy-makers have argued that running food 
subsidies in sub-Saharan African is different from (and perhaps more diffi- 
cult than) elsewhere. Food subsidies are inevitably more urban biased 
because there is less of the problem of rural landlessness than in Asia, and 
because rural populations probably participate less in markets. African 
countries are also rather smaller and more likely to experience domestic pro- 
duction variability. The usual recommended response to the latter (to trade 
in food) may be limited by current foreign-exchange shortages, as well as 
over-valued exchange rates, which restrict the ability to export agricultural 
products. In addition, managerial capacity is less well developed, and 
private marketing and distribution mechanisms are less likely to exist. The 
tax base may also not be adequate to finance explicit subsidies. Studies of 
food subsidies in a variety of countries (e.g., Horton and Taylor, 1986) 
seem to bear out in practice the arguments that food subsidies work least 
well in sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, food subsidies may be a less-appropriate policy intervention in 
Africa. Urbanization is a relatively recent problem and the urban poor tend 
to maintain stronger ties to the rural areas than are maintained in Asia or 
Latin America. Thus, in times of food scarcity, urban residents have more 
potential capability to obtain food from family members who remain 
behind in the rural areas, or to migrate temporarily back to their village. 
Urban food subsidies run the risk of accelerating rural-to-urban migration. 
Long-run improvements in the food-marketing system in Africa may be a 
better method of ensuring food security for urban residents than (possibly 
ineffective) food subsidies. 
There is a need for more studies of African food policy. Analysis of the 
Tanzanian case was hampered by the lack of data, in particular lack of data 
on real incomes after 1976/7, on the parallel market, on nutritional status 
over time, etc. There are also fewer studies of food subsidies in other 
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African countries and such studies face similar data problems to those for 
Tanzania. Tanzania's food-marketing system is similar to that of other 
countries in East Africa, but Tanzania's experience is not necessarily 
representative. 
Notes 
I would like to thank the faculty of the Department of Economics, and the 
research staff of the Economics Research Bureau, of the University of Dar es 
Salaam, as well as Gerry Helleiner of the University of Toronto, for their help 
while I was researching the Tanzanian case study. Research travel was funded 
by the International Development Research Centre of Canada, and enabled by 
a postdoctoral fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada. The survey of other countries is based on a longer paper 
written in conjunction with Lance Taylor. The author alone remains responsi- 
ble for any errors or omissions remaining. 
1 Scandizzo and Swamy (1982) calculate that for India this has a substantial 
effect on decreasing consumer prices. 
2 Hanak (1982) cites that the 1980 agreement with the IMF failed when Tan- 
zania exceeded the money-supply guidelines. 
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7 
Agricultural and Rural Policies 
for the Poor 
R. ALBERT BERRY 
Most poor people in developing countries live in rural areas; the poorer the 
country the more marked is this pattern. Hence, it seems plausible to expect 
that in any economic strategy that puts weight on poverty alleviation, 
agricultural policy and, more generally, any policies particularly affecting 
rural populations will be quite important if not dominant components of 
the overall policy package. 
We accept that in most of the poorer LDCS (less developed countries) 
growth of output and productivity in agriculture is the pivotal first step for 
successful development, and that the process of agricultural growth is cer- 
tain to have impacts of one sort or another on a large group of the country's 
poor. In most countries there is no significant agricultural frontier to permit 
output increases at constant costs through `horizontal' expansion of the sec- 
tor, so capital formation and technological improvement must be central to 
the growth process. Population growth, meanwhile, has reached extreme 
levels in many of the poorer countries, especially those in Africa, and is 
usually higher in rural than in urban areas. In many countries rural poverty 
is associated with the state of being landless (or not having good access to 
water, in countries where it is the key input). In most countries there is some 
degree of urban or industrial bias in policy (Lipton, 1977), either in the 
sense that industry is protected at the expense of agriculture or in the sense 
that a disproportionate share of government expenditures or of imports 
benefits an urban elite or the urban population as a whole. 
Rural poverty could be alleviated in most LDCs by improved income 
distribution in rural areas (as after the Chinese or other revolutions) or 
between rural and urban areas, or by growth whose fruits are reasonably 
widely distributed. In many poorer LDCS, redistribution, while it would 
help, could not be the key element of a long-term strategy to eradicate 
poverty (and such a strategy usually has to be long term) because the size of 
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the existing pie is too small and the population growing too fast. So the 
growth process is central to poverty alleviation in general. In other coun- 
tries, especially those of Latin America, redistribution could eradicate 
poverty. 
From a technical point of view, it now appears that substantial output in- 
creases of agricultural products and of other rural activities are quite feasi- 
ble in most, perhaps all, developing countries. At the same time, it is evident 
that if population growth continues unchecked at 2.4 per cent per year, 
most of the outputs gains will be eaten up just to feed the expanding popula- 
tion and will not lead to permanently raised standards of living. Population 
growth impinges especially negatively on the poor because it depresses the 
equilibrium wage rate on which the poor, especially, depend for their living. 
So no policy package can provide any guarantee of a resolution of the prob- 
lems of rural poverty, or of poverty in general, if it does not include a mech- 
anism whereby population growth will be curtailed. Thus, a successful set 
of policies would (1) raise output fairly quickly, (2) assure a widespread 
distribution of the resulting benefits, and (3) lead to a slowing of population 
growth. 
In most developing countries, adequate allocation of resources to 
research, infrastructure, and other investments, together with effective 
administration of those resources, would probably assure a growth of 
agricultural output that would exceed population growth, at least for a 
decade or two, while the opportunities that are now visible are run through. 
Such success would probably be more difficult in many of the countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa than elsehwere in the third world because of the greater 
reliance on uncertain rainfall and the smaller benefits thus far obtainable 
from the major genetic breakthroughs (especially in wheat and rice) coming 
from international research centres. In terms of taking advantage of the 
growth potential of agriculture, however, many LDCs seem to have re- 
mained far below their potential, and this fact required an explanation in- 
volving primarily non-technical considerations. 
Achievement of widespread distribution of the fruits of growth, and 
more generally of an acceptable distribution of rural income, is also techni- 
cally simple: all it seems to require is a fairly equitable distribution of 
resources, and especially land (or sometimes water). But it is not surprising 
that this distribution does not often happen, for economic and political 
power are highly correlated. 
Reduced population growth in most of the countries that have achieved it 
has been mainly the result of rising standards of living and more education 
and urbanization; public policy has played a role in a good number of coun- 
tries but seldom, with the probable exception of China, has it been the 
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major factor at work. Of particular interest in the present context is how 
agricultural policy, and in particular the adoption of a small-farm strategy, 
bears on population growth. If such a policy were to delay the reduction of 
birth rates, then its advantages on other counts would be seriously reduced. 
The next section of this chapter describes what appears to be the best 
rural development strategy for rapid alleviation of poverty. It goes without 
saying that the appropriate components would vary across countries 
according to their natural resources, level of development, and so on, and 
that various of the components may be politically or administratively 
unfeasible in many countries. Available evidence gives us many highly rele- 
vant ideas about what policies produce better results than others, but when 
one gets to the practical level of asking which among the policies feasible in 
a given setting are likeliest to produce good results, our `knowledge' shrinks 
and modesty becomes the order of the day. Much of the problem lies in our 
innocence of the `how to' of development. The institutions, attitudes, 
administrative skills, and other determinants of how a given objective will 
be pursued in a given country are often more important than the precise 
policy followed (see Johnston and Clark, 1982). There is much still to be 
learned in this area as well as in the area of how much the results of alter- 
native rural development strategies differ. Though it appears that the strat- 
egy outlined in the next section is a clear front-runner, it is less clear how 
great an advantage it may have over other approaches, and how this advan- 
tage varies across economic and political settings. It seems logical to expect 
that the implementation of some less-attractive agricultural and rural strat- 
egy would have lower costs in a middle-level country where agriculture's 
relative role has already been greatly diminished than in a really agrarian 
society. 
The last quarter-century of thinking about development problems has 
seen a shift from the nearly exclusive emphasis on growth to a broader con- 
cern that also encompasses equity. The new conventional wisdom - that 
because the trickle down is not a guaranteed solution to poverty, I conscious 
attention must be given to income distribution and employment - is concep- 
tually obvious enough, though it might be argued that for want of evidence 
that attention has not yet paid off in much new insight. This problem 
plagues the analysis of rural poverty, as that of poverty in general, making 
it hard to assess 'growth-first' types of strategies. 
Neither economic nor administrative/institutional theory is anywhere 
nearly adequate to the task of accurate prediction of the outcome of various 
strategies and structures, so careful analysis of the historical record is the 
main and ultimately the only reasonably safe guide to policy. The shared 
view of most students of rural development on the best-bet strategy is 
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rooted in the experience of a few countries that have followed or approx- 
imated it, especially Taiwan. Less-careful attention has been given to the 
record in countries following different routes; in this essay I take a partial 
look at the particular experiences of Brazil and India, along with that of 
Taiwan, in an attempt to get a better feel for how sensitive outcomes may be 
to policies or patterns of rural development. 
A further methodological point should be noted here. Whether the attack 
on rural poverty is mainly a matter of rural and agricultural policy depends 
partly on the way rural/urban migration occurs and on other rural/urban 
linkages, such as the intersectoral terms of trade and remittances. If migra- 
tion is sufficiently sensitive to urban/rural income gaps, any policy whose 
direct effect is to raise incomes in a given sector will lead to migration into 
that sector with a different distribution of benefits than what would have 
occurred in the absence of such migration. In many LDCS, rural/urban 
migration does appear to respond rather sensitively to relative employment 
opportunities, so it may make little sense to treat rural poverty separately 
from overall poverty. In the context of many of the poorer LDCS, however, 
the major group of poor people is, in any case, found in rural areas. Hence, 
even if impacts of policies are effectively spread throughout the economy, 
their main effect would still be on rural people, so it would make sense to 
assess the relationship between agricultural/rural policy and rural poverty. 
1 A Policy Package for Rural Growth with Equity, and the Obstacles 
to Its Implementation 
The professional's model for successful agricultural development is that 
corresponding to Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, involving an equitable distri- 
bution of land, good public-sector support in terms of development and dis- 
semination of improved seed varieties, infrastructural improvements, sup- 
portive rather than damaging price and marketing interventions, and good 
coverage of rural education. The contribution of a good rural educational 
system to the package's success may be less obvious than that of the other 
components and, in current application to the poorer countries, one would 
add a population policy as an important ingredient. One would accept as 
given that administrative competence, together with farmer interest and in- 
volvement, is very important to success. In each of the cited countries, after 
their land reforms in the early post-Second World War years, agricultural 
output rose quickly, as did rural incomes and wage rates.z The agricultural 
labour force began to fall in Taiwan in the 1970s and in Korea probably 
around 1980. In each case, labour productivity in the agricultural sector 
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rose rapidly. Land distribution was equalized in the original reforms, and 
reconcentration was discouraged by land ceilings; mean farm size was just a 
few hectares. In terms of agricultural price policy these have been cases 
more of support than of below-equilibrium prices.3 The recognition of 
agriculture's importance and the structure of domestic politics has been 
reflected in a relatively high level of public expenditure on the sector and, as 
important, in effective use of that expenditure. 
An additional feature of the experience in Taiwan and Japan, though less 
so for Korea, has been the prevalence of non-agricultural employment op- 
portunities in the rural areas. The share of farm families' income coming 
from off-farm employment surpassed 50 per cent fairly early in both Japan 
and Taiwan. Research has not focused enough on this issue to clarify why 
such opportunities have been greater in these countries than in most LDCs. 
Probably the fairly high level of rural incomes and their relatively equitable 
distribution have been factors, as has the fact that inputs for small-scale 
agriculture are easier to manufacture locally than those of larger farms. The 
relative density of rural populations in these countries is another likely fac- 
tor. Perhaps a more positive attitude toward small industry (rural non- 
agricultural enterprises are nearly all small) has contributed. There appears, 
in any case, to be a relationship between the existence of a small peasantry 
and public support for it with the existence and potential of rural non- 
agricultural activities. These latter may be doubly important in a successful 
small-farm strategy because they can provide a satisfactory outlet for ener- 
gies, savings, and pressures in the system. The basic need for land redistri- 
bution, farm-size ceilings, and the like lies in the absolute limit to available 
land, in contrast with the cases of capital, labour, etc. The individual who 
wishes to expand to better exercise his capacities can be frustrated if no 
oulet is available. Rural non-agricultural activities provide local and known 
investment opportunities. 
These cases of what Johnston and Cownie (1969) referred to as a uni- 
modal agricultural strategy are the exception rather than the rule in LDCs. In 
some countries the total public-sector support for agriculture has clearly 
been less than optimal; further, it has typically been biased, often strongly, 
in favour of large farms or of farms favoured by the existing regime 
(see, for example, Bates, 1981). It is often the mirror image of the 
Japan/Korea/Taiwan model. Research is limited and focused on export 
crops or on the products of large farms. Prices are often held below their 
equilibrium levels, either because export crops are heavily taxed or because 
there are price controls on food products. Credit and modern inputs are fre- 
quently subsidized for favoured (usually large) farmers but unavailable for 
smaller ones. Public-sector marketing agencies often introduce inefficien- 
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cies into the process of intermediation. Even in cases where public policy is 
very discriminatory in its treatment of different groups of farmers, output 
growth may be satisfactory (e.g., Brazil), but the fruits of that growth are 
very unlikely to be well distributed. In the poorer countries, where 
agricultural population is certain to continue rising for the foreseeable 
future, such a scenario has the seeds of social crisis implicit in it. 
What changes of scenario, of decision-making skills, or of other factors 
could lead to better decisions as far as poverty-related agricultural/rural 
policies are concerned? At first glance the problem appears intractable, 
inasmuch as the bimodal sort of strategy just described reflected the 
perceived interests of the power groups; one cannot, therefore, expect it to 
be changed just because technocrats might argue that GDP would rise faster 
or be better distributed under some other approach. A closer look does sug- 
gest that some of what we may here label `defects' in rural policy-making 
may be more easily attacked than others because they are or appear to be 
less in conflict with the major vested interests. Even with respect to the 
probably least-tractable problem - that of unequal distribution of land - 
some enlightened oligarchs can be persuaded that there must be some give if 
social unrest is not to reach the boiling point. So it is not irrelevant to con- 
sider even land-distribution policy, though it is clearly the least likely of 
those discussed here to come in for major non-revolutionary change in 
developing countries. 
Strategies exist that will achieve both growth and equity, so there is no 
essential or unavoidable conflict between the two. And it is clear also that 
some policy combinations will tend to produce neither. An important gen- 
eral question is how much the achievement of one of the two goals will deter 
achievement of the other, if at all, for in-between cases. Of particular im- 
portance, perhaps, is the issue of whether, when growth occurs under the 
more-or-less typical policy package that favours the larger and powerful 
farmers, the fruits will usually be limited to these groups or will be spread 
more widely in the rural population. Is there, in other words, a significant 
amount of trickle down to poorer people when the growth process is `dual- 
istic'? 
At a more detailed level are questions of how success would be affected, 
in various types of LDCS, by the absence of specific components of the 
locally desirable package. How successful can a credit program for small 
farms be in a country where land is mainly concentrated in large farms? 
How will the fruit of agricultural research be distributed in a country where 
land is concentrated and labour-saving innovations are favoured by the tax- 
and import-incentive systems. Common sense suggests that the dilemmas 
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created by not having an ideal setting for growth with equity in the rural 
area are more serious in a still mainly agricultural country where the 
agricultural population continues to rise quickly than in a middle-level 
developing country where agricultural employment is a reduced share of 
total employment and is perhaps falling in absolute terms. 
Assessing the impact of alternative policy combinations in various set- 
tings involves drawing on any evidence or understanding of how specific 
component policies would be likely to affect income distribution and pov- 
erty, but also on the historical record of how poverty trends have behaved 
under various policy combinations. The more the countries for which such a 
record is available the better, but it would be important at a minimum to be 
able to compare cases involving `good' and `bad' policy packages for pairs 
of countries where the rural population has fallen to a moderate share of the 
total and others in the earlier stages of development where that share is still 
quite high. India falls in the latter category and its growth experience has 
not been very successful, despite the adoption of new high-yielding varieties 
of seeds in parts of the country. The Brazilian case has become the major 
locus for debate on whether the introduction of those varieties helps or 
hinders the poor. The Asian trio of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan can be com- 
pared to a country like Brazil to get some feel for how much difference 
agricultural and rural policy as a whole makes in the middle and later stages 
of LDC growth. In the first three, the record of successful broad-based 
growth is well known; where debate lies, naturally enough, is on the ques- 
tion of which policies and characteristics of these economies led to a growth 
whose fruits have been relatively widely shared. Focusing mainly on Taiwan 
and Korea, one finds arguments in support of land reform, of the agricul- 
tural policy package as a whole, of a broad-based educational system, and 
of an outward-oriented trade strategy as key contributors to the outcome. 
Disentangling the casual mechanisms at work will doubtless be a slow pro- 
cess for economic historians of this period. But in contrast to a case like 
Brazil, it is of interest to note that Brazil also moved to an outward-oriented 
strategy, albeit more recently than the other two countries. If one then 
hypothesized that the difference in the scope of rural education (much less 
in Brazil) was mainly a result of the generally greater income inequality in 
that country (especially vis-A-vis Korea, where much [secondary] education 
is privately financed), it could be argued that the leading candidate to 
explain the different outcomes would be agricultural policy. First, however, 
it is worth contrasting the outcomes in more detail, and in particular assess- 
ing the distribution of the fruits of growth in rural Brazil. To provide a 
benchmark of success, we turn briefly to the Taiwanese success story. 
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2 Evidence from Selected Country Experiences 
A Taiwan 
In Taiwan, per capita income had by 1980 reached a level 5.1 times that of 
1953 (Kuo, 1983, pp. 96-7), for an average increase of 6.2 per cent per year. 
Population growth was rapid, about 3.5 per cent over 1953-63 and 2.7 per 
cent over 1963-73 (Kuo, 1983, p. 336). Over the decade 1973-83 it was 
down to 1.9 per cent and by 1983-4 had fallen to 1.5 per cent (Republic of 
China, 1984, p. 2). The labour force grew at nearly 3 per cent per year over 
1953-83; the share located in agriculture fell from 60.5 per cent in 1952 to 
30 per cent in 1973 and to 18.6 per cent in 1983 (Republic of China, 1984, 
pp. 50-1). The agricultural labour force peaked in the late 1960s at about 
1.75 million persons and had by 1983 fallen to about 1.3 million (Galenson, 
1979, p. 387; Republic of China, 1983, p. 50). Industry's share (i.e., the 
secondary sector, including mining) rose from 18.4 per cent of the labour 
force in 1952 to 41.1 per cent in 1983. 
Taiwan's income distribution history is dramatic; the Gini coefficient 
among families as of 1953 may well have been around 0.50 or higher, and 
by 1980 it had fallen to 0.30; in other words, in 1953 it was probably in or 
near the Latin American range, and by 1980 it was perhaps the lowest 
among all Lncs and one of the lowest in the world.a If the figures are even 
close to accurate, the 1950s, when land reform was implemented,I witnessed 
a marked drop in inequality; so did the short period 1968-70, a time of 
rapid growth of demand for labour resulting from the successful growth of 
exports.6 Those two phenomena were doubtless very important aspects of 
Taiwan's success story. A closer look at the evolution of the income-distri- 
bution pattern suggests some of the details of the process of change and 
some hypotheses about other factors at work. 
In Kuznets's (1963) original description of why distribution so often 
deteriorates in the early stages of modern economic growth with industrial- 
ization and urbanization, he focused on the widening gap between urban or 
non-farm incomes and farm incomes. Eventually, this gap narrows or the 
farm sector is small enough that its low average income has little effect 
on overall inequality.? In Taiwan, farm-familys incomes rose quickly 
throughout the post-1953 period. Over 1952-65 as a whole, average income 
per worker in agriculture grew at the same rate as that for non-agricultural 
workers, being around 43 per cent of the latter in both years (Kuo, 1983). 
Over 1964-79, Kuo reports some widening of the gap between farm and 
non-farm family incomes, though not enough to prevent a decline in overall 
inequity; there was a decline in inequality within both the farm and the non- 
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farm groups. And between 1966 and 1980, there was a marked decline in 
the Gini for the least-urbanized quarter of the population and a greater gain 
in life expectancy for this group than for other groups (Kuo, 1983). An im- 
portant factor in preventing a greater widening of the farm/non-farm in- 
come gap was the increase in non-farm income of farm families from 34.1 
per cent of their total income in 1966 to 72.7 per cent in 1979. The agricul- 
tural income of these families did not grow in real terms, so the nearly 5 per 
cent annual increase in their total income was more than completely ac- 
counted for by the 11 per cent annual increase in non-agricultural income. 
Kuo identifies the increased degree of multiple cropping and the fast agri- 
cultural diversification as key facets of agricultural change during Taiwan's 
transition period of the 1950s and 1960s. With Taiwan still characterized by 
labour surplus, the multiple-cropping index rose from 171.9 in 1952 to its 
peak of 190.0 in 1966, subsequently falling to 179.3 in 1971 as the economy 
moved toward full employment. The number of working days per hectare 
of land rose from about 170 in 1948-50 to about 260 in 1963-5 (Kuo, 1983). 
A shift towards more labour-intensive crops such as vegetables and fruits 
raised output per hectare and also paved the way for the rapid expansion of 
food processing. Such marked and rapid shifts in the composition of output 
are easier to achieve in a small trading economy than in a larger one like 
Brazil or (especially) India. Some of Taiwan's success was thus probably a 
result of its smallness. 
Taiwan's land reform focused substantially on replacing tenancy with 
ownership; unlike the current evidence from many countries, which tends 
not to show significantly higher (and sometimes lower) land productivity on 
owner-operated than on tenanted farms, ownership in Taiwanese agricul- 
ture has been associated with above-average land productivity. Replace- 
ment of tenancy probably not only contributed to output increases9 but also 
tended to diminish the share of land devoted to rice production, as rice was 
a medium of rental payment (Kuo, 1983). A very considerable `hidden' tax 
on rice - which took several forms - existed up to 1971 and also contributed 
to the shift away from this crop; it did help to stabilize the rice price but the 
government was also stabilizing prices of other more remunerative prod- 
ucts. By the 1970s, the farm-gate rice price was relatively high. 
The Taiwanese experience suggests that it may be very difficult, perhaps 
impossible, for technology to transform agriculture without a concomitant 
restructuring of the institutions of traditional agriculture. Certainly a major 
restructuring occurred in Taiwan. It. placed a great demand on administra- 
tive, organizational, and technical skills, which Taiwan did not possess, and 
which therefore had to be brought from Japan. To promote scientific 
agriculture, the Japanese government invested heavily in institutional 
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development, especially the farmers' associations (FAS). According to Ho 
(1978, pp. 63, 64): 
FAs eventually took charge of such important functions as the improvement and 
extension of seeds, the maintenance of a seed multiplicatior system, the prevention 
and control of animal and plant diseases, the training of agricultural technicians, the 
execution of agricultural surveys, the purchase of fertilizers, seeds, and equipment 
needed by members, and the management of warehouses ... 
Supporting the FAs were other newly formed organizations such as the Small 
Agricultural United (SAu) and the credit cooperatives. 
Although these rural institutions were separately administered, their efforts to 
develop agriculture were coordinated through the influence and supervision of the 
colonial government. Between the FAs and the agricultural cooperatives, the 
Japanese had created an institution that was second only to the government in size. 
In the late 1920s and the early 1930s, when they were at their heights, the FAs and the 
agricultural cooperatives employed approximately 40,000 people. Of these 13,000 
were extension workers, 9,000 of who were agricultural advisers working with the 
small agricultural units at the village level. On a per farm household basis, this would 
amount to approximately one extension worker for every 32 farm households. The 
size of the operation is perhaps indicative of the magnitude of effort needed to 
transform traditional agriculture. 
Rural primary education expanded very rapidly in Taiwan under Japan- 
ese reoccupation. 1o Many observers have felt that widespread primary 
education contributed to the raising of factor productivity in Taiwanese 
agriculture (Ho, 1966). It is a serious hypothesis that for technological 
improvements to be at the heart of the agricultural growth process in small- 
farmer agriculture, widespread education is an important complement to 
successful research, as is an extension system that can reach the many 
farmers involved. 
There seems no reason to doubt that the land reform had a significant im- 
pact on rural and overall income distribution." In 1951-3, agriculture and 
related industries accounted for 33.2 per cent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) (Kuznets, 1979). Nearly half of farm households benefited from the 
redistribution of land (public land sale and land allotted to the tiller pro- 
gram) (Ho, 1978) and 43 per cent from the rent-reduction program; for 
poorer farm households these shares would be greater. 
Rural poverty alleviation can be aided by emigration to urban areas or by 
the expansion of non-agricultural activity in rural areas. With respect to the 
latter, we saw above that Taiwan's experience is dramatic: the share of 
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farm-family income coming from non-farm sources rose from 13 per cent in 
1952 to 25 per cent in 1962, 43 per cent in 1975 (Ho, 1979) and - if the 
figures presented by Kuo can be believed - 72.7 per cent in 1979. He men- 
tions that in Korea, whose evolution has in many important respects paral- 
leled that of Taiwan but whose industries are concentrated in or near the 
principal cities of Seoul and Pusan, this share has remained roughly con- 
stant at around 23 per cent since 1962.12 In contrast 
Taiwan's industrialization has followed a more decentralized pattern, which has 
enabled its economy to grow as an organic unit by promoting interaction among its 
components. In other words, by allowing rural industry and agriculture to grow in a 
mutually reinforcing manner, decentralized industrialization has created rural 
employment opportunities and enabled greater numbers of Taiwan's rural popula- 
tion to participate in industry without having to leave the countryside. This has not 
only reduced the total need for urban housing and infrastructure but also made the 
transition from agricultural to non-agricultural activity less abrupt, with fewer 
disruptions of family life and the rural social fabric. The evidence from Taiwan also 
shows that decentralized and rural industrialization brings to the countryside impor- 
tant income distribution benefits. (Ho, 1979, pp. 77, 78) 
Because off-farm income is more important for families with small farms 
(or appears to have been in the 1960s), off-farm activities probably helped 
to lessen inequalities. t3 
Although other factors (including the density of the agricultural popula- 
tion) no doubt played a role, Ho (1979) argues that decentralized industri- 
alization in Taiwan was facilitated by the presence of a highly commercial- 
ized and productive agricultural sector, the development of a diversified 
agro-industry, and the early development of infrastructure and human capi- 
tal in rural areas. Agricultural development transformed rural Taiwan into 
a well-developed and important market for non-farm goods and services. 
Although it is difficult to say to what extent this increased demand is 
responsible to the growth of rural non-farm activities, it is clear, according 
to Ho, that practically all the services as well as many of the non-food con- 
sumer goods demanded by farm households can be and probably have been 
produced in rural areas. As noted earlier, rural Taiwan early possessed a 
highly literate population, a result of the Japanese colonial government's 
initiating in the 1930s an intensive program to educate the Taiwanese. Rural 
electrification also began early in Taiwan and, by the 1960s, electricity had 
reached 70 per cent of its farm households. Transportation was also quite 
adequate. 
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TABLE 7.1 
Fertility rates by degree of urbanization: 1971, 1977, and 1983 










1971 105 110 119 3.355 3.670 4.085 
1977 86 96 105 2.360 2.800 3.090 
1983 70 84 89 1.920 2.325 2.415 
a Average number of births per thousand women in the age range 15-49 
b Average number of births per woman passing through the child-bearing years 15-49 and 
being characterized in each age category by the age-specific fertility rates of the year in 
question 
SOURCE: Republic of China (1984), p. 30 
In the spectrum of developing countries, Taiwan seems to be an extreme 
case in its moderate rural/urban differentials14 - in income levels, in 
employment structure, and in other dimensions. Of particular interest is the 
relatively small gap in female fertility rates by place of residence (see table 
7.1). 
B Brazil 
Brazil's recent rural and agricultural history is of interest as a test of the 
existence of trickle down to the rural poor in a setting where policy is mainly 
designed to assist the better-off layers of society, rural and urban. Land 
distribution is highly unequal, rural education is amazingly limited, and 
income-distribution considerations appear to be nearly absent from the 
decision-making process. But Brazil has grown fast, and its agricultural 
labour force appears to have peaked and begun falling around 1970 or soon 
thereafter. Can rapid overall economic growth, and perhaps the ending of a 
surplus labour condition, partially substitute for the sort of successful 
unimodal small-farm strategy pursued par excellence in Taiwan? 
Brazil's well-known combination of fast growth and extreme income in- 
equality was especially notable during the 1960s and 1970s. Over that 
twenty-year period, GDP grew by an average of about 7 per cent per year, 
per capita output by about 4.5 per cent, and per capita income by about 5 
per cent (World Bank, 1982). Most Gini coefficient estimates are in the 
range 0.55 to 0.60. 
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The extreme income inequality in Brazil results from a highly unequal 
distribution of income-earning assets, including land and human capital. 
Parts of the economy toward the modern end of the technological spectrum 
are quite capital intensive, whereas at the other extreme many people work 
with virtually no capital. This general feature is manifest in agriculture 
where the labour/land ratio varies greatly between small and large farms. 
And, as in most countries, incomes are lower in agriculture and in the rural 
economy generally than in urban areas.15 The country also suffers wide 
regional income gaps associated with major differences of economic struc- 
ture; the southeast region is far more developed than, at the other extreme, 
the northeast. 
Another strand of thinking reflected in part of the literature is a concern 
that recent decades have witnessed a trend towards proletarization - a shift 
from self-employment to wage labour - and an associated increase in the 
concentration of land in the larger farms. Certainly it would be consistent 
with Brazil's pro-large bias if such patterns were occurring, and they would 
create a context in which one might predict a widening gap between the rich 
and the poor in the sector where most of Brazil's poor are found. It is im- 
portant to trace, in the degree possible, the fate of the rural and agricultural 
poor over the last few decades, and to study how this group has benefited 
from or coped with the dramatic growth that has occurred. 
The few available studies that have made use of the 1980 population cen- 
sus results have concluded that, after the widening inequality generally ac- 
cepted to have characterized the 1960s, little overall change occurred during 
the 1970s; probably there was a slight decline in inequality. Denslow and 
Tyler (1984) note that the near constancy of distribution in the 1980s was 
the result of two offsetting factors: narrowing of the gap between rural and 
urban income, and greater inequality in the rural sector. Their figures in- 
dicate an increase in the average income of deciles of rural income earners in 
the range of 30-40 per cent for most deciles, but highest by far for the tenth 
decile. A look at the figures pertaining to agriculture indicates, as one 
would expect, that the patterns of rural income trends reflect those of agri- 
culture - gains for all groups but greatest for those at the top. Assuming 
these positive patterns are an accurate reflection of the true course of 
events, it is of interest to look at the underlying events in Brazilian 
agriculture that could be responsible for those events. 
The sector's labour force appears to have peaked (though if the present 
economic crisis endures, its earlier upward trend might be restored). 
According to population census figures, it grew at 1.8 per cent per year over 
1950-60, 1.0 per cent over 1960-70, and then fell a little over 1970-80. 
Meanwhile, total farm land reported in the agricultural census rose by a 
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total of 7.6 per cent over 1950-60, by 17.7 per cent over 1960-70, and by 
25.6 per cent over 1970-80. Land cultivated, which is a small share of total 
land in farms (12.0 per cent in 1975), rose more rapidly, at an annual rate of 
2.9 per cent over 1950-80, and the reported stock of cattle rose at over 3 per 
cent per year. Value added in agriculture rose by a little under 5 per cent (4.8 
per cent) per year over 1950-75, a high rate by international standards and 
one which implied a rapid increase in average labour productivity of over 
3.5 per cent per year. Accepting the agricultural census figures on area in 
farms and the population census data on the agricultural labour force, we 
would conclude that the land/labour ratio fell by a total of 10 per cent over 
1950-60 and rose by 10 per cent over 1960-70 and 30 per cent over 1970-80. 
Thus, for 1950-80 as a whole, the ratio of land in farms to labour rose by 
about 30 per cent. Because intensity of use rose over the period, however, 
the ratio of cropped land to total labour force (the large majority of whom 
were engaged in crop production) rose by 70 per cent or so over 1950-80, 
i.e., by 1.75 per cent or a little more per year. 
Data on wages, income, and housing conditions suggest that, for poorer 
rural people, the 1970s witnessed quite different trends from the 1960s. 
Landless families tend to be the poorest of Brazil's rural groups, 16 and data 
on rural wages are scanty. The longest wage series refers to daily wages of 
rural casual labourers in the state of Sao Paulo, where from the late 1940s 
to the early 1970s there was no trend, though fluctuations were marked 
(Pfefferman and Webb, 1979). But between 1970 and 1977 a doubling oc- 
curred, suggesting a qualitative change in labour-market conditions, 
perhaps an end of a 'surplus-labour' condition. In the rest of Brazil the 
casual rural wage grew less but still sharply in the 1970s; the smallest in- 
crease registered in any state over 1968-77 was 38 per cent in Rio Grande do 
Norte (Pfefferman and Webb, 1979). Income data from population cen- 
suses and samples (see table 7.2), while they cannot be relied upon to give a 
fully accurate picture of income trends, support the evidence of the wage 
statistics and imply an equally marked improvement for the self-employed 
in the 1970s.11 
The 1970s was a decade of rapid income increase for paid employees from 
top to bottom, probably in the neighbourhood of 50 per cent for most 
deciles except the top one, where the increase was considerably faster. For 
the self-employed, the bottom few deciles gained by less than 50 per cent but 
the top six probably by considerably more, with the top decile or so prob- 
ably by over 100 per cent. 18 
With respect to trends in the structure of the agricultural labour force, it 
seems likely, on the basis of the available data, that (a) there has been no 
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TABLE 7.2 
Income levels (1970 cruzeiros per month) of selected percentiles of male agricultural 
workers in Brazil by occupational category and by year: 1960-80 
Occupational category November 
and percentile in the August September 1976 August 
income ranking 1960 1970 (males & females) 1980 
Paid workers 
10th n/a 30-40 55.8-66.7 49.9-61.5 
25 46.0-51.0 58.4 87.7-104.8 81.6-100.5 
50 87.5 88.1 128.6-153.7 122.0-150.3 
75 133.7 132.1 198.5-237.3 178.0-219.4 
90 < 189.1 176.4 281.6-236.7 244.1-300.4 
95 215.4 196.3 394.0-470.9 399.0-417.1 
Independent farmers 
10 n/a 30-40 57.2-68.4 41.3-50.9 
25 > 61.9 59.5 95.3-114.0 80.1-98.7 
50 110.4 90.3 153.5-183.5 137.3-169.2 
75 172.1 145.4 283.3-338.3 225.5-277.8 
90 266.1 212.7 611.9-731.5 469.6-577.9 
95 341.6 293.7 722.2-923.0 715.3-880.1 
All income earners 
10 0 0 0 
25 Very low 30-40 56.5-69.6 
50 77.1 78.0 116.8-144.0 
75 141.6 130.9 195.2-240.5 
90 212.0 191.4 374.1-461.0 
95 312.5 277.4 626.4-771.8 
99 < 682.3 < 756.6 2256.4-2780.2 
SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: The current price figures for 1980 are deflated to 1970 
cruzeiros using the conservative index of the price of consumption expenditures in GDP 
developed by Denslow and Tyler (1984, p. 1027nl7); deflation by that index provides the 
lower of our two figures in 1980. For the upper figure we assumed prices rose 23-fold 
(rather than the 28.34-fold of the previous index), a little less than the 24.7-fold increase of 
the wholesale price index and above the approximately 21-fold increases of the various cost- 
of-living indexes I have seen - mostly adjusted for the alleged irregularities of the early 
1970s. 
Between 1960 and 1970 we assumed a price index of 36.26 (above that of the GDP 
deflator, 35.7, or the wholesale price index, 33.3, but below that of the Sao Paulo cost-of- 
living index of 38-40). 
Between 1970 and 1976 we assumed a high price index of 4.90, based on the GDP deflator 
plus 4 per cent, in an attempt to approximate the Denslow-Tyler consumption index, and 
allowing two months for the difference in date between the 1970 and 1976 data. For the 
lower price increase, we assumed an index of 4.10. 
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measurable longer-run (i.e., 1950-80) tendency toward proletarization in 
Brazilian agriculture, but (b) there may have been such a tendency in the 
1970s, in which case it would appear to be a reversal of an earlier trend in 
the opposite direction, and to have corresponded to declines in the impor- 
tance of share-cropping and of unpaid family help, but not of the `self- 
employed.' One obvious interpretation of a shift toward paid employment 
in the 1970s would be that it was a result of rising demand for wage labour, 
as reflected in the sharply rising wages (see table 7.3). 
Some authors have suggested that, during the 1960s at least, labour was 
increasingly pushed into the smallest farms as the demand was stagnant on 
larger farms. Data from the agricultural censuses, although not comparable 
to and less reliable than those of the population censuses, do suggest such a 
trend over 1950-75, but with a still-to-be-explained reversal during 1975-80. 
The labour/land ratio was probably stable (as suggested by the figures in 
table 7.4) or falling for most farm-size classes over these thirty years, 19 being 
much higher on the smaller than on the larger farms, partly, of course, 
because of differences in access to market, land quality, etc. 
Given constant or falling labour/land ratios, it seems highly probable 
that labour productivity was rising on the smaller farms as well as on the 
larger ones during this decade. Although data inconsistencies prevent any 
firm conclusions, it appears that, for agriculture as a whole, labour produc- 
tivity was rising very rapidly in the 1970s, probably in the range of 3.6 per 
cent per year. Even if labour productivity on farms of below ten hectares 
fell from 43.5 to 37.3 per cent of the sectoral average between 1970 and 
1980, as our figures suggest, if the sectoral average rose by say 50 per cent 
over the decade (a little over 4.0 per cent per year), these data would suggest 
an increase of a little under 30 per cent on the smallest category of up to ten 
hectares.20 
Part of the improvement in the situation of the poorer people in agricul- 
ture suggested by the income figures reviewed earlier has been the result of a 
sharp change in the intersectoral terms of trade in favour of agriculture.21 
But increased labour productivity has, it would appear, also contributed 
significantly, and it is important to consider the factors that may have 
played a role in generating that result. 
The wide gap in land productivity in favour of the smaller farms seems 
not to have changed much in the 1970s; the ratio of value added to the 
declared value of land remained, for example, about three times as high on 
farms of up to 10 ha as on farms of 100-1000 ha (Berry, undated). Over 
1960-70 the increase in the share of land in farms with mechanical power 
was striking; for that decade the trends are not available by farm size. But 
during the 1970s, the rapid extension of the use of machinery to fairly small 
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TABLE 7.3 
Brazil: distribution of the agricultural labour force by job position: 1960, 1970, and 1980 
1960 1970 1980 
Job position No. Per cent No. Per cent No. 
Total labour force 11,826 100.00 13,090 100.00 12,661 
Employer 226.6 1.92 209.0 1.60 303.9 
Self-employed 4,611.0 38.99 5,294.0 40.44 5,041.0 
Paid worker 2,986.9 25.26 3,330.0 25.44 4,572.8 
Share cropper 820.0 6.93 1,676.1 12.80 6,485.0 
Unpaid 3,180.6 26.90 2,581.0 19.72 2,030.8 
No information 0.8 0.90 - - 63.9 










Labour intensity (labourers/hectare) in Brazilian agriculture, by farm size, 1950-80 
Farm size 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 
<10 0.608 0.642 0.644 0.713 0.702 
< 1 3.876 2.675 3.299 3.285 3.375 
1-2 1.649 1.676 1.617 1.640 1.650 
2-5 0.751 0.769 0.714 0.769 0.762 
5-10 0.395 0.389 0.359 0.393 0.389 
10-100 0.116 0.119 0.103 0.112 0.111 
100-1000 0.0322 0.0296 0.0200 0.0238 0.0246 
1000-10,000 0.0083 0.0075 0.0053 0.0064 0.0067 
> 10,000 0.00171 0.00141 0.00107 0.00145 0.00195 
Total 0.0392 0.0506 0.0499 0.0514 0.0478 
NOTE: Males and females, 14 and up, except 1950, where 15 and up 
SOURCE: The agricultural censuses of the years in question, except for 1975, whose data came 
from the survey of that year 
farms was striking; for example, the share of farms of less than 10 ha using 
such power rose from 2.4 per cent in 1970 to 15.7 per cent in 1980; for those 
of 5-10 ha, it rose from 4.35 to 24.55 per cent. For the smallest farms 
(under 10 ha), animal use seemed to be rising along with mechanical power, 
whereas for the larger categories, there was a decline in the use of animal 
power, machines presumably substituting for draft animals. Use of modern 
inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, animal feed, etc.) also rose notably over the 
period 1959-80, by perhaps fourfold on a per hectare basis. Use per hectare 
is more intensive on small farms than on larger ones, but the gap has nar- 
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rowed markedly over the two decades; the ratio of modern input to output 
is greater on the larger farms. Still, one of the reasons for rising productiv- 
ity on small farms is, no doubt, this form of modernization; depending on 
the price of deflators used, the per hectare use of these inputs has risen by 
two- and to threefold over the period. 
Credit availability was, as one would expect, better for the larger farms; 
in 1980 the ratio of credit to value of production was 3-4 times greater on 
the farms of above 100 ha than on those of below 10 ha. Between 1960 and 
1980, the per cent of farms receiving credit in the previous year rose from 
8.3 to 21.0; the increase was most notable for farms of 10-1000 ha; it was 
not large for those of under 5 ha, where still less than 10 per cent had re- 
ceived credit, though the increase was considerable for those in the 5-10 ha 
range. 
The evidence of change on small as well as on large farms might have 
owed something to improving education, but its level in rural Brazil remains 
strikingly low, and its advance was slow over 1960-80. In 1980 the share of 
persons 15 and up who had not completed grade 1 was around 50 per cent, 
down from 60 per cent twenty years earlier. For the cohorts of persons 
15-19 years of age, who would by that age have received any lower-level 
schooling they were destined to get, the share failing to complete grade 1 fell 
from 53 per cent in 1960 to 36 per cent in 1980, a more marked improve- 
ment. But to have about one-third of the rural population not reaching 
school (a few would enter but not complete grade 1) is for a country with 
Brazil's per capita income very surprising. Many countries with per capita 
income far lower than Brazil's do better than this. 
Over 1970-80 there was a considerable increase in non-agricultural 
employment in rural areas (about 54 per cent or 4.4 per cent per year), with 
doubling or near doubling occurring in manufacturing and in services. In- 
cluding `vegetable extraction' (rubber tapping, wood products, etc.) this 
category rose from 15.2 to 23.4 per cent of rural employment over the 
decade. Rural non-agricultural employment was more prevalent in the more 
developed regions of the country. 
The message that seems implicit in the Brazilian story is that, even under 
a system of great built-in inequality, rapid growth can eventually produce a 
considerable trickle-down, to the point where the incomes of the bottom 
rural deciles could rise by 30-40 per cent or so over a decade. Together with 
the evidence from the 1960s, when growth was also fast but when it appears 
that less of its fruits accrued to the poor, this picture suggests that some sort 
of turning point was reached in the early 1970s - perhaps a marked tighten- 
ing of the labour market. It remains to be seen how things have changed 
under the economic crisis of the 1980s. 
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c India 
India's GDP growth averaged a very modest 3.5 per cent per year over 
1960-80, but particularly striking was the unsatisfactory growth of 
agricultural output - 1.9 per cent per year (World Bank, 1982). The labour 
force in agriculture fell only from 74 per cent of the total in 1960 to 69 per 
cent in 1980 (ibid.) and thus rose in absolute terms at over 1 per cent a year, 
implying an increase in agricultural labour productivity of only perhaps 0.7 
per cent or so per year. Though output in industry and services rose at an 
acceptable 5 per cent per year, the agricultural sector was clearly India's 
albatross over these decades. 
Given this record, it is hardly surprising that little or no progress was 
made in the alleviation of poverty during these years, at least on a national 
level. A major issue of debate since the mid 1960s has been whether the ad- 
vent of HYVS (high-yielding varieties) in India has been a boon to the poor 
or, as some have argued, perhaps even an additional scourge.22 
The income-distribution impact of biological improvements (HYVS) is a 
matter of obviously great importance in LDCS; even a finding that the distri- 
butional impact is strongly negative would not imply that such improve- 
ments should not be sought because there seems little hope of winning the 
war against food shortages without them, but it would imply that different 
types of improvements should be sought or that the setting in which they are 
disseminated would perforce have to be changed. 
The early evidence and analysis on this issue seem moderately reassuring, 
though for several reasons they must still be regarded as tentative. The most 
relevant research has focused on who adopts (especially by farm size and 
tenure category), what the implications of the new technology on labour in- 
puts have been, and how wages have moved. Few, if any, studies have tried 
to link this type of technological change in any detailed way to trends in 
rural or overall income distribution, though doing so is clearly the final 
necessary step in throwing light on the issue.23 Apart from the failure to take 
this final step, however, the results of the new technologies have thus far 
been analysed essentially in a short-run static framework, and there can be 
no assurance that the medium- and long-run impacts will be similar. 
Especially will it be important to focus on the impact on land distribution - 
any such effects are likely to show up gradually and probably be difficult to 
isolate - and on the second-round effects of technology change through 
mechanization or other processes set in motion by higher incomes. 
These caveats aside, the evidence from India, the most studied and most 
important case, is, as noted above, fairly reassuring (Prahladachar, 1983). 
Although small farmers tend not to adopt HYvs as rapidly as larger farmers, 
192 R. Albert Berry 
the evidence suggests that in a fairly short time they tend to catch up or to 
substantially narrow the gap. Where the gap has not been pretty well erased 
after a few years, it seems often to reflect the inability of small farmers to 
buy pumps, finance fertilizers, and the like (Prahladachar, 1983).24 Reviews 
by Vyas (1975) on wheat and Herdt (1980) suggest a tendency, though with 
lots of exceptions, for yield or net income per hectare of HYVS to be higher 
on large than on small farms. But the interpretation to be placed on such 
results is again not clear because variables such as irrigation and access to 
fertilizer were not generally taken into account and because many of the 
studies were no later than the early 1970s. 
On the question of tenancy and adoption, the evidence seems much more 
limited, since some studies have failed to distinguish owner cum tenants 
from pure tenants. Parthasarathy and Prasad (1971), who did make the 
distinction in their study of a village in Andhra Pradesh, reported that 
owners had an advantage over tenants. Most other studies are ambiguous, 
so that issue remains one in need of further research. There seems no reason 
to believe that tenants need have any particular problem in adopting when 
the conditions are satisfactory. 
It seems clear that the direct impact of HYVS on labour utilization (in 
wheat and rice, at least) has been positive.21 A number of studies seem to 
suggest an increase in labour use in the range of 20-30 per cent (Prahlad- 
achar, 1983). Several studies indicate also a shift often interpreted as 
resulting from the need to carry out certain agricultural operations within a 
short, specific period of time. The labour-demand effect seems to be borne 
out by wage data. In his study of real wages in Indian agriculture, Lal con- 
cludes that whereas during the period 1956-7 to 1964-5, real wages were 
constant or fell in eight of the fifteen states of India, in the following `green 
revolution' period, 1964-5 to 1970-1, they rose sufficiently to offset the 
earlier decline (Lal, 1976). A particularly interesting recent study by 
Nicholson (1984) attempts to isolate the effects of green-revolution tech- 
nology by comparing Punjab with Gujarat state, which though dynamic 
economically has not had access to the benefits of the green revolution 
because it lacked the ample ground water and the good irrigation system 
that the Punjab had. He reports that over 1961-71 agricultural wages in the 
Punjab rose by 23 per cent to become the highest in India,26 while those of 
Gujarat rose by 6 per cent. (Gujarat's agricultural output rose by 58 per 
cent during the 1960s, Punjab's by 78 per cent [Nicholson, 1984].) Nichol- 
son argues that, in combination, the new technology and rural institutions 
slowed down long-term trends toward greater inequality that the dual pro- 
cesses of population growth and commercialization of the rural sector had 
set in motion. The favourable impact of the green revolution on the demand 
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for labour was, according to the Day-Singh model and other analyses, 
counteracted from the outset by the trend toward mechanization and 
increasing capital intensification (Day and Singh, 1977, p. 142). But without 
the new HYVS, events would have unfolded less satisfactorily. 
Though the literature clearly suggests that the benefits of the green 
revolution have usually been widely distributed, it seems to suggest also a 
worsening of distribution because of a substantial fall in the labour share. 
In one district, to illustrate, wages of hired labour were 33 per cent higher 
per acre of HYV than per acre of traditional varieties, while cultivator in- 
come rose by 76 per cent (Chinnappa and Silva, 1977). This is probably not 
a necessary and perhaps not even a general result, but it has thus far shown 
up with regularity. In areas where land distribution is relatively equal and 
social cohesion high, equality might not suffer; perhaps it could even be im- 
proved.27 But where land is unequally distributed and labour in surplus, 
such a favourable outcome would be surprising. 
An important question in the context of the Punjabi success story and its 
broader implications is the role played by rural institutions, in particular the 
co-operative. Nicholson argues that the new technology was so appropriate 
to conditions in Punjab that it is difficult to argue that rural institutions 
made any but a marginal contribution to its initial spread. He also disagrees 
with critics in judging that the rural co-operatives were highly equitable in 
delivering production credit to the smaller farms. Their role was marginal 
because other markets were able to do the job. Where conditions are less 
obviously `right,' it is very likely that positive institutional developments 
would be important if not essential for fast advance. 
It remains to be seen in India and elsewhere whether the green revolution 
has contributed or will contribute to income inequality and poverty through 
land concentration. In most countries the data needed to assess trends are 
woefully inadequate.28 The problems of unclear, inconsistent, and in- 
complete data coupled with changing definitions are well laid out by Cain 
(1983). One can only hope that the effort to sort out these data will match 
the importance of the issue. 
Tracing changes in land distribution over time is part of a more general 
need to monitor the longer-run and less easily discernible effects of the 
biological revolution in agriculture. It is intriguing to take note, from a dif- 
ferent setting, of the Muda River Project in Malaysia, studied by Goldman 
and Squire (1982). In a very short period (1970-5) the availability of water 
permitted farmers both to switch from single to double cropping of paddies 
and to adopt improved varieties. The result was more than a doubling of 
output between 1969 and 1974. Goldman and Squire found no significant 
changes in the distribution of owned or operated paddy land. Rice was an 
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import substitute so expanded output did not affect prices. Between the pre- 
project and immediate post-project situations, labour use per acre rose by 
92 per cent. The authors report that all family-farm categories benefited 
greatly from big income gains. but, despite this dramatic beginning, all did 
not continue rosy in the project: 
First, since 1977, there has been a substantial increase in mechanized harvesting and 
threshing, a development which will have eliminated many jobs for landless workers. 
Second, general inflation in the Malaysian economy has reduced the real income 
gains generated by the project. This has been exacerbated by two crop seasons since 
1977 when drought left the project reservoirs with insufficient water for off-season 
water. Unrest among farmers has grown to the extent that in early 1980 violent 
demonstrations occurred in the area, involving farmers demanding an increase in rice 
prices, which are already supported above the world price level. (Goldman and 
Squire, 1982, p. 775) 
What appears destined to remain unclear for a while longer is (1) whether 
the green revolution concentrates land distribution in a socially damaging 
way and (2) whether inequality of land distribution, together with other 
contextual factors, promotes employment-reducing mechanization with 
serious consequences. 
3 Key Rural and Agricultural Policies Bearing on Poverty Alleviation 
It is obvious that many of the things that Taiwan seems to have `done right' 
will not come to pass in most LDCs; recent events in Brazil suggest that do- 
ing things differently from Taiwan need not preclude significant gains for 
the rural poor, though it will certainly make them more difficult. Trends in 
India and similar countries highlight the crucial need to get agriculture mov- 
ing if there is to be any chance of eradicating poverty in a reasonable period 
of time. The poor in such countries are much more likely to pay a long-run 
price for their government's incapacity or lack of concern than are those in 
middle-income countries like Brazil. 
Priority areas for policy focus will, naturally, vary by type of country. 
But some generalizations are hesitantly attempted in the remainder of this 
section.29 Relative priorities naturally vary according to whether one focuses 
on the potential contribution of a particular policy in a technical sense or on 
its potential after allowing for social, political, and administrative obstacles 
to its successful implementation. As discussed in the introductory section, it 
is tautological to say that high priority must, in nearly all countries, be given 
to policies that raise productive capacity (among which policies to promote 
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technological improvements are central) and to population policies. Land 
reform and other policies, which have the effect of redistributing productive 
potential, also appear to have great technical potential but are probably 
somewhat less essential than the other two, except where they are important 
contributors to successful pursuit of the other two, a definite possibility in 
many contexts. Other interesting policy categories involve consumption 
programs (food subsidies, health, education, etc.) and incentive policies 
(price policies). Each of these categories also can play a quite significant 
role, but, with the same caveat just stated, they seem likely to be of lower 
priority than the first two. Some consumption problems, of course, also 
raise the danger of a trade-off between poverty alleviation now and later. 
A Population 
In the numerous countries where the great bulk of the population remains in 
rural areas, yet the problem of population growth threatens to create a criti- 
cal obstacle to economic progress, there is no assurance that the country can 
afford to wait for the processes of urbanization, industrialization, and 
education to slow population growth. The lucky developing countries 
already well along the development path, with the rate of population 
growth in most cases now decelerating, can reasonably expect that growth 
to fall to the point where it no longer threatens to derail the economic train. 
But for the poorer LDCS, many already seriously overpopulated and most 
lacking a really strong national resource base, to count on this easy way out 
could be to court disaster. In many such countries, success in development 
and poverty alleviation may require that population growth be stopped in 
the rural areas. This may be more important than anything else that hap- 
pens there. Though genetic and other output-raising innovations have 
proved their capacity to raise agricultural output, it would be tempting fate 
to assume that such progress can go on for a matter of decades without run- 
ning out of stream or putting the environment at risk. In some countries 
population growth must either slow down in the short run under the influ- 
ence of public policy or in the longer run under the influence of poverty, the 
Malthusian outcome. A successful population policy has the advantage of 
virtually guaranteeing successful development sooner or later; no obviously 
attainable success in other policy areas can guarantee triumph in the face of 
population growth at 3-4 per cent per year. 
What methods may be used to slow population growth and the potential 
success of the more gentle forms of control associated with provision of in- 
formation, subsidized control devices, and so on remain to be seen. If they 
are not successful, the more aggressive approach pursued by the People's 
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Republic of China may become a major determinant of successful overall 
development. 
Improved educational levels in the rural areas, along with greater instruc- 
tion in the problems of large family size, would probably have some desir- 
able effects on rural family size. If it remains impossible to get rural family 
sizes down to urban levels, encouragement of rural-to-urban migration 
could become one component of population policy. If it turns out (though 
the Taiwanese case argues the contrary) that population control is much 
harder even in a prosperous semi-industrialized rural setting than in urban 
areas, much or all of the advantage of achieving such a setting may be off- 
set. Doubtless the debate will continue when population programs can have 
major impacts, but recent experience in a few countries, including Indo- 
nesia and Mexico, seems to imply that vigorous well-managed programs can 
have a significant input, even when they are much less Draconian than 
China's (Clinton and Backer, 1980). There seem grounds for optimism that, 
when countries' birth rates begin to decline, the rate of decline can be much 
faster than in the historical experience of now-developed countries (Kirk, 
1971). Population programs probably have a greater impact when coupled 
with a socio-economic setting favourable to a desire for reduced family size, 
so creation of that desire becomes a central goal. Though analysis of the 
determinants of population growth remains a difficult and hazy area, both 
the importance of the issue and the evidence that policy may be able to 
make a difference suggests placing high priority on this matter. 
B Research and Technological Improvement 
Research on improved varieties, techniques of cultivation, machines, etc., 
will in most countries be the main single key to the advance of agriculture. 
There appears to be considerable scope for a country to choose the focus of 
its research and technological borrowing, and the orientation adopted prob- 
ably has a considerable, perhaps even definitive, effect on the extent to 
which output growth contributes to poverty alleviation. A major distinction 
must be made between biological and mechanical improvements. In most 
countries, most new machine technology is imported and involves relatively 
capital-intensive technology - especially so for large tractors and associated 
machines. In the case of biological improvements, even if based on develop- 
ments abroad, there must at least be adaptation within the country, so there 
is considerable freedom with respect to the directions to be taken. 
As a broad category, technological change is at the same time essential 
and dangerous. Both mechanical and biological improvements are likely to 
be biased towards a society's power groups.30 In the case of labour-saving 
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machine technology, usually imported, one of the technician's objectives is 
to make sure that its price is not a subsidized one and that any price inter- 
vention goes in the other direction. Some inappropriate machine technology 
is financed by foreign aid; close and careful surveillance may help to impede 
it. 
Biological improvements are most likely to be poverty alleviating when 
they involve staple food crops and are produced by small farmers and in 
labour-intensive ways. The well-known yield increases in rice and wheat 
were perhaps unrealistically expected to meet these conditions. Evidence 
from countries like India suggests that even if the benefits accrue dispropor- 
tionately to the rich, as they are more than likely to do unless land distribu- 
tion is equitable, the poor are likely to be co-beneficiaries. It remains to be 
seen what the long-run distributional impact of the green-revolution 
technology will be, both for reasons discussed earlier and because it is as yet 
unclear whether future research oriented towards finding varieties more 
suited to the small producer will be as successful as past efforts not so 
directed. 
It is much to be hoped that the biological research process will be per- 
ceived as a mutual interest of the rural poor and of other groups: it is at the 
heart of the growth process; and also, as distinct from land redistribution, 
allocation of credit, etc., would seem not a likely candidate for conflict of 
interest between these groups. The frequently inadequate investment in this 
area seems to owe as much to the short time horizon of government policy- 
makers as to any bias against such expenditures. To the extent that a lack of 
awareness of the pay-offs to such expenditures is a contributory factor, 
education on the issue deserves particular attention. 
The question of appropriate mechanical improvements is only partially 
separate from that of biological progress and its impact. There seems to be 
no serious grounds for doubting the common view that the process of ̀ large 
tractorization' (with complementary machines) is a dangerous one - that 
such mechanization tends mainly to displace labour without raising output 
much. Clearly there are few third-world situations where such mechaniza- 
tion would occur in the context of an efficient agricultural sector and 
perfect factor markets. In those settings, small operated units would achieve 
high land productivity by heavy use of labour.31 But in second-best situa- 
tions, where large units are currently operating at low levels of efficiency, 
one must countenance the possibility that such mechanization will raise out- 
put and perhaps even increase the demand for labour at the same time. 
Failure to predict an increase in labour-saving mechanization has an out- 
come of biological improvements seems to have underlain an overly op- 
timistic view of the latter's impact on income distribution and poverty. As 
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adoption of such varieties occurs, not only large farmers (who may in any 
case already be relatively mechanized) but fairly small ones as well may take 
this route. In the case of smaller farmers, investment in machines may 
partly respond to the increase in income generated by the high-productivity 
varieties, together with a lack of profitable outlets for savings. 
The ultimate and only satisfactory gauge of how all these factors have 
worked out is the income-distribution evidence in their wake. Evidence on 
changes in the distribution of land and in the composition of the rural 
labour force as between the landed and the landless is also indicative, 
though by no means conclusive because a shift toward landlessness can oc- 
cur in the context of growth of income opportunities (leaving a marginal 
plot for more lucrative paid employment, as, perhaps, in Brazil of the 
1970s) as well as push factors (losing land one would like still to have). Un- 
fortunately the record remains quite incomplete on both counts. When the 
agricultural censuses taken in or around 1980 in many developing countries 
have been carefully studied in conjunction with earlier ones, the degree and 
character of structural change will, one hopes, become clearer. 
C Agrarian Reform 
Land reform as the first step towards equitable growth has no substitute: it 
seems the key step in helping a country move toward a wide distribution of 
political power, a resulting equity in the access to education, and so on. The 
inertia built into socio-economic systems is tremendous. Even when the 
dominant group is virtually fully replaced - by a country's acquiring in- 
dependence, for example - patterns of inequality can remain more or less 
intact, as in the case of Kenya.32 
Major agrarian reforms are usually the result not of technical judgment 
or voluntary social interaction but of political upheaval of one sort or 
another. Some are associated with communist revolutions, others with non- 
communist revolutions as in Mexico and Bolivia, and others with extensive 
foreign involvement as in Japan and Korea. In only a few twentieth-century 
cases (e.g., Iran) have major changes occurred in non-revolutionary frame- 
works. For the most part, the non-communist reforms give evidence of the 
economic potential of the shift to smaller-scale family units, but the basic 
limitation of such reforms is suggested by the fact that the only fully suc- 
cessful ones - contributing to fast, equitable growth both in agriculture and 
economy-wide - are those where considerable outside control helped to 
steer the course. When the reform occurs in a revolutionary context, the 
outcome so far is either a communist take-over or a partial reform. Mexico 
and Bolivia are striking examples of the latter. Large amounts of land 
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changed hands, and the reform sectors have remained more or less intact 
since the reforms, but the governments, instead of supporting the new 
peasant sectors, have focused their assistance on newly developing large- 
scale sectors. This danger of benign (or not-so-benign) neglect of small-scale 
agriculture by unsympathetic government33 is a basic concern when one asks 
whether partial reforms - the only type likely to occur in non-revolutionary 
contexts - are worth much at all. This serious possibility raises the premium 
on full-scale reforms that are associated with, and can help to produce, 
major realignment of power groups in a society. While situations with the 
potential for such change are infrequent, one possibly valuable role for the 
international community and the aid agencies would be to provide timely 
financial resources and advice. Usually the context is one of strife and chaos 
(;k la Mexico or Bolivia), of decision making under inadequate information, 
and of resource scarcity. Agricultural assets are often destroyed or lost dur- 
ing the uncertain period of transition. One hopes that better understanding 
of which agrarian structures and policies hold out the promise of successful 
growth would help decision-makers; possibly some financial resources from 
the outside could tilt the process more in favour of the poor. 
On the information front, although it is probably not surprising that 
most LDC decision-makers involved with the agricultural sector have little 
confidence in the potential of small farms - and this is indeed the case - 
these views are perhaps more surprising when held by their counterparts in 
countries where reform has occurred (as in Mexico or Bolivia) or where 
governments have engaged or tried to engage in major restructuring of the 
agrarian sector (as recently in Tanzania and Ethiopia). Two major miscon- 
ceptions seem to afflict the uninitiated in these matters, including most 
decision-makers. The first is that there are significant economies of scale in 
agriculture, putting small productive units at an automatic disadvantage. 
This belief flies in the face of the by now `stylized' fact that land productiv- 
ity is virtually everywhere higher on small farms than on large ones. It seems 
to originate partly in the observation that farms in developed countries are 
large, partly in the (irrelevant) fact that a family cannot earn a high income 
from a very small plot, partly from the higher marketed surplus from large 
farms, and partly from the fact that the most modern and capital-intensive 
farming does tend to be seen on (some) large farms. In classist societies it 
gets a big boost from the fact that decision-makers share their class with 
large farmers, not with ragged peasants. In any case this belief can incline 
the equity-oriented decision-maker away from the small productive unit and 
in favour of large private units, co-operatives, or whatever. The second 
misconception is that much can be expected of production co-operatives as 
a source of important economies of scale, above-average quality of manage- 
ment, or whatever contributes to economic efficiency. 
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Competent professional advice might matter in some of these cases, and 
observers have suggested the need for an international agency for agrarian 
reform, one of whose functions could be the provision of such advice - 
perhaps a counterpart to the role played by Wolf Ladejinsky for the u.s. 
government in the Asian post-war reforms. Such an agency could also help 
out financially; the capacity to buy off pockets of resistance could be im- 
portant, as could the opportunity to buy time while the new reform units 
were achieving their potential - funds to assure adequate supplies of 
agricultural inputs, or even to import food to keep urban prices from 
skyrocketing, would be important. 
The occasions when major reforms occur or are in the air are few, 14 so the 
major relevance of land reform is in non-revolutionary settings, where some 
land is transferred, some changes in tenancy arrangements decreed, or some 
other partial changes made. In these cases, the many ways in which good in- 
tentions may be sidetracked or sabotaged tend to reveal themselves. Par- 
ticularly risky, it would appear, are reforms whose focus is the transfer of 
land from tenancy arrangements to ownership. Whether out of unconcern 
or incompetence, the supporters of such legislation usually fail to predict 
that it will create a powerful incentive for owners to discourage tenancy. 
Similarly, in reform-legislation guidelines laid down to determine which 
farms should be expropriated, `adequate exploitation' providing exemption 
from expropriation is usually defined to include cultivation in capital- 
intensive ways but not share-cropping, even though from a social point of 
view, the latter is likely to be preferable. 
Even without full-scale expropriations to redistribute land, it is likely that 
there is considerable economic potential in a well-designed land policy. A 
major aspect of how land policy in land-scarce countries will evolve in 
future involves the political power of landless and new landless, and the 
extent to which they influence the political process. The distribution of 
newly settled lands is in some countries quite important; changes in land 
values resulting from works of infrastructure are important in others. A law 
prohibiting the sale of land in large blocks would have a positive effect over 
time, while not seriously penalizing large holders. Rent ceilings with tenure 
guarantees seem to work sometimes. It is hard to imagine a successful 
transition to a relatively egalitarian rural income distribution without a 
reasonably equal distribution of rights in land. 
D Price Policy and the Development Squeeze on Agriculture 
Because it is the initial locus of economic activity, the early growth of the 
secondary and tertiary sectors of an economy is usually financed by a 
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surplus from agriculture (Lewis, 1975). It may pass through financial 
markets, private portfolios overlapping both sectors, or the government; 
the transfer may also occur via the price mechanism, if agricultural prices 
are low. How resources are transferred between agricultural and non-agri- 
cultural, and intersectoral terms of trade patterns, constitute an important 
determinant of the distribution of incomes and of rural poverty, especially 
when labour is not highly mobile intersectorally. Mechanisms to encourage 
savings by lower-income rural people are obviously a more equitable way to 
effect the transfer than are regressive taxes. When migration out of agricul- 
ture is responsive to intersectoral earnings differences, the effect of tax or 
price policy on rural poverty or on poverty in general becomes unclear. If 
the poorest are the first to migrate in response to a fall in agricultural prices, 
for example, the effect on poverty could be very limited - in the opposite 
case it would be large. Some rural dwellers could benefit from controlled 
food prices also, if their earnings were less sensitive to those prices than 
their cost of living. 
There are no doubt a variety of situations in which price interventions 
would, were they administered in the manner the technician desired, be 
good for the poor. But the dangers attendant on such interventions cannot 
be taken lightly. Neither economic theory nor the experience in success 
stories like Japan and Taiwan suggests that intervention cannot improve on 
market-determined prices; it is when the country lacks a coherent and firmly 
administered rural development strategy that such intervention is likely to 
be damaging. Bates (1981) makes the case persuasively, for the African con- 
text, that price interventions are systematically used for non-developmental 
political purposes. Low food prices are usually part of the `urban bias,' a 
response to the greater political threat from disenchanted urban consumers 
than from disenchanted rural producers. Subsidized agricultural credit and 
input prices can be used to offset such farmer disenchantment but, better 
for the politican, serve also to strengthen political support when used in a 
discriminatory fashion to help the richer more-important farms, or one's 
political allies. The unfavoured mass of farmers are left out in the cold. In 
such settings even originally well-intentioned interventions are likely to 
become perverted. Where credit is subsidized, it will mainly find its way to 
large farmers; where subsidized inputs are available, they will be similarly 
directed; and so on. 
In the context of price policy it is useful to raise the more-general ques- 
tion of the burden agriculture and in particular the rural poor are made to 
bear in the overall development process. There seems little doubt that in 
most LDCs agriculture has borne a large part of the burden associated with 
the transition to a modern industrial economy, through heavy taxes, unat- 
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tractive intersectoral terms of trade, and relative neglect in government 
expenditure allocations. An important issue in this context is the strength of 
the economic or political factors that seem to make this the typical sequence 
of events. 
In some low-income countries there appear to be valid economic reasons 
for focusing the development squeeze mainly on agriculture. Some versions 
of land tax have, in some countries, probably been easier and more efficient 
ways to collect taxes than available alternatives. The same goes for export 
taxes on agricultural products (often taking the form of a differential be- 
tween the price paid to producers by a public-sector marketing board and 
the export price), especially when the country has some degree of world 
monopoly power in the product and hence some incentive to curtail its out- 
put. But these conditions appear to be met less and less. Few countries now 
use land taxes to any significant degree, and monopoly power in export- 
product pricing is probably less common than before. The maintenance of 
low terms of trade for agricultural products usually backfires; it discourages 
the output of those products and in the case of exports encourages ineffi- 
ciency in the public-sector marketing agency. Avoidance of rising urban 
food prices is as likely to be regressive from a distributional point of view as 
progressive. The possible growth argument in support of such a policy is 
that low food prices are necessary to keep industrial (or non-agricultural) 
profits high - by keeping real wages expressed in non-agricultural products 
low - and to provide the needed incentive for expansion of that sector. This 
view could have some validity in countries whose food supply was price in- 
elastic while industrial investment was sensitive to the profit rate. But the 
profit rate can be buoyed by other policies, including the level of protection 
from imports. It seems unlikely that there are many situations in which the 
tendency to squeeze agriculture as a whole could be defended on efficiency 
grounds. The same goes for the tendency to squeeze the rural poor, often 
the main victims. If their supply is price- or profit-inelastic, whereas that of 
the rich is elastic, such an argument could exist, for example, where small 
farms are already relatively efficient and large farms could be induced to 
raise their productivity by sufficient incentives. This may be a good way to 
characterize the practical alternatives for some labour-surplus countries, 
where land redistribution is not a feasible option. It raises the premium on 
countries learning how to facilitate the generation and channelling of the 
surplus in ways that are less regressive. 
It has sometimes been argued that poor third-world farmers who are 
essentially unintegrated into markets are virtually unaffected by price 
policy. But the third-world farmers, even relatively small ones, are more 
integrated than is often believed, and much more than they were a few 
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decades ago. And in spite of their famous and understandable `risk aver- 
sion,' they are still victims of downward price movements, given their 
always precarious economic base. Further, the only proven route out of 
poverty does involve the production of a marketable surplus, so even a 
peasantry that is isolated now cannot afford to remain so. 
Though judging just how important a good price policy is in alleviating 
rural poverty is difficult and probably quite country specific, some general- 
izations are possible. First, a low agricultural price policy, whether with the 
objective of benefiting urban consumers or not, is very dangerous; sooner 
or later (probably sooner), it will discourage output, innovation, and 
growth in agriculture, leading to food shortages. And it will keep rural in- 
comes down. Only where rural land is held in a very concentrated fashion or 
where the country's comparative advantage in non-agriculture permits 
extensive food imports would there be potential logic to such an approach. 
Second, input subsidies (to credit, fertilizer, or whatever) may make sense in 
theory but are likely to be very risky in practice: subsidies are honey to 
which the better off are strongly attracted. Third, maintaining agricultural 
prices above world levels can be a sensible policy, within reason, as it may 
raise the incomes of the rural poor. But here, too, the benefits need to be 
carefully and well identified. 
4 Direct Anti-poverty (Consumption) Policies 
While it is evident that rural poverty (or any poverty) can only be dealt the 
coup de grace by an increase in productivity, it is not immediately clear to 
what extent provision of government services is important as a complement 
to (or, in a partial sense, a substitute for) such progress. Provision of public 
education, health, water, and other services is certainly relevant; the ques- 
tion is the priority such expenditures should receive. In many countries if 
these services are not provided by the public sector they will not be provided 
much at all because of the importance of economies of scale. 
Certain rural health expenditures seem to have a quite high pay-off; prob- 
ably few if any investments can yield better returns than selected im- 
provements in preventive health care in rural areas. The fact that countries 
like Sri Lanka and China, with per capita incomes of less than 300 U.S. 
dollars in 1980, could have a higher life expectancy (66 and 64 years respec- 
tively) than Brazil (per capital income of $2050 and life expectancy of 63) 
bears witness to this investment, although other factors - and most gener- 
ally the distribution of income - also enter directly.35 Education at least to 
the point of good literacy and numeracy is also no doubt a wise direction to 
go for the majority of LDCS, for whom the job of rural development will be 
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inherently less easy than in land-abundant Latin countries like Brazil. In- 
vestment in this type of education would be especially beneficial where such 
expenditures are not at the expense of productivity-raising ones, as where 
broad budgetary allocations are made by ministry in the first instance and 
subsequent allocation occurs within the ministry, so that rural education is 
likely to be at the expense of some type of urban education. Most rural ser- 
vices are inexpensive, though this circumstance is, of course, in part a 
reflection of their poor quality. Their role in rural poverty alleviation may 
be significant partly because it can be rather independent of the evolution of 
the productive side of the economy and of agrarian structure. It is easier to 
provide broad access to rural health services than to land. 
A related question is whether it is reasonable to expect the government to 
provide some sort of `welfare net' in rural areas; social-security systems, 
food rations, and the like are usually urban oriented because they reflect ris- 
ing income levels, because the urban poor and middle groups have more 
political clout than their rural counterparts, and because of economies of 
scale in the provision of the services. And it is indeed here where particular 
caution does seem to be warranted. Although there may be a moral impera- 
tive to save people who are starving in the wake of a drought, the long-run 
effects of such acts may be of little significance if underlying productive im- 
provements are not put in motion. Food-subsidy programs also need careful 
assessment of their benefits and costs; their attractiveness stems, of course, 
from the fact that the benefits are immediate and obvious. The costs have to 
do partly with negative side-effects on the incentive for small farmers to 
produce and on their incomes, partly with the imperfect targeting of such 
programs46 (they usually benefit urban residents more than rural ones), and 
partly with their high-profile character, which tends to remove them from 
political control and contribute to turning them into machines out of con- 
trol that can eventually have very serious budgetary implications. 
One powerful reason for giving very serious priority to rural nutrition 
and health programs is the possibility that both they and family-planning 
programs will be more successful if linked to each other. As Johnston and 
Clark (1982) note, `the shortcomings of conventional family planning pro- 
grams appear to be especially great in many of the low-income countries in 
tropical Africa, where the environment is so unfavourable that the cost- 
effectiveness of conventional programs is very low. In these countries, ef- 
forts to improve the survival prospects for infants and small children may 
be very effective in improving the context in which attitudes and motiva- 
tions with respect to family planning are shaped' (p. 119). At the same time, 
nearly all successful health schemes `have included the promotion of family 
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planning because of the favourable effects of child spacing on the health of 
mothers and infants' (p. 131). 
Food-subsidy programs have to jump a number of hurdles, some of them 
noted above, to be major successes. Nutritional interventions, designed to 
raise the level of nutrition without the large price ticket associated with 
major subsidy programs, seem also of limited promise, though certainly 
they have their place where specific deficiencies can be identified and dealt 
with. In general, though, there is little evidence of significant progress in 
reducing malnutrition in the rural areas of the lower-income developing 
countries through these techniques. This lack of progress may be related to 
the current view that protein-energy malnutrition is basically a result of in- 
adequate intake of food rather than a `protein gap' associated with the com- 
position of food intake (Johnston and Clark, 1982). At the same time, small 
children and pregnant and lactating women do have special nutritional 
problems, which are not duly recognized in many societies. Attention to 
these problems could raise standards of health with little expenditure of 
resources, apart from those involved in the learning process. 
5 The Crucial `How To' Questions 
In most LDCS, it would appear that success in rural development may de- 
pend as much on how well policies can be implemented as on the choice of 
superior policies .17 Indeed, this is a misleading way to phrase an alleged 
dichotomy because, in any practical and detailed sense, rural policy cannot 
be made at all independently of its implementation, a point strongly em- 
phasized by Johnston and Clark (1982). Intellectual cogitation cannot pro- 
duce a blueprint for policy; inputs from the rural population and from the 
facilitators (extension agents, rural health workers, etc.) are likely to be just 
as important, especially in dealing with the rural population's most strongly 
felt needs and with feasible ways to organize the provision of services or in- 
puts and the co-operation (or at least non-conflict) of the rural population. 
There do appear to be some situations in which a sufficient condition for 
rural progress is the availability of a few great new crop varieties, which will 
spread on their own. But this simple blueprint is unlikely to provide a 
general solution, especially when one recognizes that a slowing of popula- 
tion growth is in most countries as important as an acceleration of output 
growth. 
Because the answers to `how to' questions are likely to vary a lot across 
settings, it is not possible to generalize much on administrative and institu- 
tional questions. But some distinctions can be validly made. There must be 
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some way to meld the inputs of the planners at the centre (who deal with 
decisions on price policy, credit, research allocations) with those of the 
facilitators and the rural population. The system requires continuous com- 
munication and interaction among these groups, one requirement for which 
is a good dose of humility among the planners at the centre of the system. 
Broad-based rural development is a more complicated process than narrow- 
based growth; success in dealing with the `how to' of the former is impor- 
tant to rural poverty alleviation. 
6 The Package Approach and Integrated Rural Development 
With the passage of time the recognition has grown that successful rural 
development involves many components - those noted above plus lots of 
others. And there has been widespread awareness of the inefficiencies 
associated with overlapping and non-cooperating bureaucracies, each of 
which focuses on its component of the package. Especially in the context of 
the new fertilizer and water-responsive high-yielding varieties has emphasis 
justifiably been placed on the need for a package approach to the provision 
of needed inputs. How much output may have been lost because of lack of 
integration among these services is not readily apparent. Broader ideas of 
`integrated rural development' (IRD) - a term that seems to mean rather dif- 
ferent things to different people - have also been prevalent in the last decade 
or so, in the context of the goal of broadly based economic advance in rural 
areas. The idea is doubtless a relevant one, but the thought thus far 
expended in this area has not yet produced a useful blueprint to assist in the 
process of equitable rural development. There seem to be two main reasons 
for this deficiency. One is that the pilot or limited-area application of iRD 
projects facilitates the resolution of many organizational problems (by pro- 
viding centralized authority and atypically good access to resources) that 
arise when their generalization to the national level is attempted. The 
second is that understanding is still extremely partial as to what elements of 
a policy package are particularly complementary; indeed, the needed com- 
ponents and the relationships among them probably vary widely across set- 
tings. 
A number of approaches to rural development have been based on the 
idea that the rural poor must band together to get anywhere (not per se im- 
plausible) and that such co-operation will be easily achieved. Experience has 
been generally unkind to these expectations; though there have been suc- 
cesses, it is now clear that success should not be expected unless rather strin- 
gent conditions are met. That efforts to organize the rural poor in self-help 
efforts have not been very successful results in part from the fact that the 
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rural poor are usually a very diverse group, including landless workers as 
well as small, marginal farmers (Korten, 1980). Co-operative types of 
schemes have fared little better. Hunter (1971) noted that perhaps two- 
thirds of all co-operatives attempted in East Africa and India `have proved 
unviable or semi-viable; and a large proportion of those which have suc- 
ceeded have ... resulted in rewards for the ... "big men" of rural society as 
distinct from the humble farmers.' Johnston and Clark (1982, p. 10) note 
that `Programs of community development, adopted with much to-do in 
their 1950 decade of prominence, delivered so little that most were termi- 
nated or drastically reduced as early as 1965. Nonetheless, under new names 
to hide the past, many of the same mistakes are being repeated in today's 
New Directions programming.' 
. It seems unfortunate that attempts should be repeated so systematically 
to pursue rural development in ways which have failed too frequently, when 
a very promising blueprint - the subject of section 1 - does exist. 
Notes 
I Few of the earlier development economists ever claimed that it was; rather, 
they tended simply not to address the poverty issue in any formal or direct 
way; see, for example, Arndt (1983). 
2 The only other setting in which such quick improvements seem to have been 
forthcoming for the rural population appears to be that of the communist 
countries, e.g., China and Cuba. 
3 As of 1970, these three countries had the highest producer paddy prices of 
nine Asian countries studied by Timmer and Falcon (1975). Earlier, Taiwan's 
farmer price was lower, and Kuo (1983) attributes the diversification of 
Taiwan's agricultural sector in considerable degree to a low price of rice 
relative to other, less traditional crops. 
4 See Kuo (1983), table 6.1. Possibly these figures exaggerate the decline (though 
the available estimate for 1953 is 0.56) because prior to 1964 the sources are 
not comparable. But there seems no doubt that a sharp decline in inequality 
did occur. 
5 A recent reduction program had been implemented in 1949. The sale of public 
land to tenant farmers occurred in 1953, followed by the redistribution of 
private tenanted land to tenant cultivator (Kuo, 1983, p. 27). 
6 The year 1968 was dubbed by Fei, Ranis, and Kuo (1979) as the time when 
labour surplus ended. 
7 See Kuo (1983), table 6.1. The figures, taken literally, imply a growth of fam- 
ily income at 14.5 per cent per year over this period for the bottom 20 per 
cent. If the lowest quintile's share of total income had been 5 per cent in 1953 
instead of the 3 per cent reported in the table, the annual income growth 
would still be an amazing 9.3 per cent per year. 
8 A farm family is one whose head is registered as a farmer (Kuo, 1983, p. 134). 
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9 There is some ambiguity in the figures of Kuo's table 3.2 (p. 28) where 
farmers are classified only by tenure status, not simultaneously by size. 
10 The enrolment of students in primary schools increased from 17,579 in 1901 to 
670,000 in 1940. The post-war period also witnessed a rapid expansion in 
primary education, as attendance in primary school climbed from 850,097 in 
1945 to 1,766,445 in 1960. 
11 Ho has estimated the effects of the program on the income of an average 
tenant with one chic of medium-quality paddy land in Taoyuan Hsiom, con- 
cluding that in the absence of the reform his income would have risen by 16 
per cent over 1948-59, whereas in fact it rose by 107 per cent (Ho, 1978, pp. 
167-8). 
12 Ho (1979), p. 77. Further, not only has industrialization been spatially more 
concentrated, but growth of commerce and services in rural areas has also 
been limited (p. 91), and the Gini ratio for Korea's farm households rose from 
0.29 in 1967 to 0.32 in 1974 (p. 92). 
13 Chinn (1979) used the 1967 farm-income survey data for the Taichung rice 
region to calculate the hypothetical loss in income if non-farm employment 
opportunities were lost to farm households. His calculations show that the 
percentage decline in income from the loss of non-farm employment was more 
than five times greater for farm households cultivating less than 0.5 chia 
(1 chia = 0.97 ha) of land than for those cultivating 3 or more chia. 
14 Possibly this result is to some extent a result of the definitions of rural and 
urban used in Taiwan. 
15 In 1970, the mean income of rural income earners was 37 per cent that of 
urban earners (Denslow and Tyler, 1984). 
16 The most reliable source of agricultural incomes (partly because of better 
coverage of non-monetary incomes) is the 1974/5 national household expen- 
diture and nutrition survey (EMDEF). It indicates that in all major regions of 
Brazil except the northeast, small farmers (farmers not hiring labour) receive 
on average about twice as much family income as wage labourers (Pfefferman 
and Webb, 1979, p. 69). (In the northeast the differential is minor.) The bot- 
tom quartile of families in the two groups seem to have similar levels of 
income however. 
17 For paid workers, these figures indicate no clear change over the 1960s, with 
the possible exception of some increase in the bottom quartile. The decline 
estimated for the self-employed over this decade is probably not real, since 
income underreporting in agriculture appears to have increased markedly 
between the two censuses. The income increases for 1970-6 are probably over- 
estimates, especially for the self-employed (where improvement in reporting of 
income was probably concentrated), but nevertheless suggest that substantial 
increases did occur for the self-employed as well as for paid workers. 
18 Available indicators of the quality of housing and assets owned are generally 
consistent with the patterns just described. For example, the share of families 
owning a radio rose from 12 per cent in 1960 to 40 per cent in 1970 and to 72 
in 1980. 
19 The figures of table 2.4 are based on the agricultural censuses, which show a 
much more rapidly rising agricultural labour force than the more reliable 
population census data; the latter, however, are not available by farm size. 
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20 For details see Berry (1985). This result, or any other conclusion about trends 
in productivity by farm size, must be viewed as tentative until discrepancies in 
output figures between the agricultural census and the national accounts are 
explained. 
21 Relative prices of agricultural produce were rising during much of the period 
since the Second World War. Pfefferman and Webb's (1979) three indexes of 
intersectoral terms of trade show marked increases between the late 1940s and 
1960 and another significant jump from the late 1960s to 1977 (the last year 
for which they present data). 
22 Nicholson (1984) summarizes the fears as follows: 
`1. The new technology increased the profitability of agriculture and, in 
consequence, led landowners to reassert control over their land, forcing 
tenants off. Land values rose, and this tended to squeeze small and marginal 
farmers off the land. 
`2. The beneficial effects of the new technology depended on the availabil- 
ity of cash to purchase needed inputs and the capital to invest in improve- 
ments such as tubewells. The small farmer therefore either was excluded from 
the new seed or operated at a disadvantage because of lower profits even if he 
did have access to credit. 
`3. Because of labor constraints, the need to maximize family survival possi- 
bilities, and the low profit margins of small-scale grain farming, the smaller 
farmers may have found the monoculture revolution centered on hybrid wheat 
or rice unattractive and unprofitable.' 
Each of these fears is backed by enough micro level evidence to lend it 
credibility. 
23 Most attempts to study the effect of new technology on income distribution 
have used the farm as the unit of observation rather than the family, a serious 
limitation. For this and other reasons, including the variation of results from 
different studies, the overall distributional impact of the HYvs remains in need 
of further analysis. 
24 In a village in the Punjab, Leaf (1983) describes the dramatic improvements 
that occurred between 1965 and 1978, and credits the new co-operatives, 
which took over much of the marketing function, with making it `far more 
reasonable for small farmers to adopt new crops and methods at the same 
time large farmers do. Formerly it was much the wiser course for smaller 
farmers to lag a few seasons behind those better able to absorb a loss.' 
25 See Bartsch (1977) for an extensive review of the literature as of that time. 
26 Corroborating the favourable trends in the Punjab, Mundle (1984) reports that 
the per cent of population under the poverty line fell from 40.5 over 1963-4 to 
1965-6 to 30.2 over 1971-2 to 1973-4. The improvements seem to follow, with 
a lag, gains in agricultural production, according to Mundle's recent analysis. 
27 In his review of change in a Punjabi village over 1965-78, Leaf (1983) suggests 
that the gains in income `have been accompanied by increased equity and 
political stability ... The gains have gone at least as much to the poorer 
villagers as to the wealthy' (p. 268). The data presented do not seem to 
demonstrate this, but they leave no doubt that all groups benefited substan- 
tially. A major question, though, is whether this quite positive outcome was a 
reflection of features of Sikh society not replicated in much of India. Leaf 
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refers to the farmers' identification of `Sikh values of equality and indepen- 
dence with economic policies to support the activities of small scale indepen- 
dent peasant farmers' (p. 267). 
28 To exemplify, Nicholson (1984) reports a dramatic difference in the evolution 
of the distribution of operational units as between Gujarat and Punjab over 
1961-71, with the Gini coefficient in Gujarat rising only from 0.52 to 0.55, 
while in Punjab it rose from 0.38 to 0.63, as the number of small farms of 
under two hectares increased dramatically. Meanwhile, according to Mundle 
(1984), the Gini coefficient of the distribution of land ownership among 
households in the Punjab increased a little over 1961-2 to 1971-2, although 
the share with no land at all fell from 12.3 to 9.1 per cent. The Gini was also 
about constant for the distribution of land by operator, though the share of 
households operating no land rose from 39 to 54 per cent. 
29 Its debt to such detailed studies as those by Johnston and Clark (1982) and by 
Chambers (1984) will be evident. 
30 Similar issues arise with respect to public investment in roads, storage, dams, 
migration works, and the like. Most governments undertake such activities in 
the interest of the larger, richer farmers, even though pay-offs would be 
greater if the focus were different. Many of the points made in this section 
hold also for these expenditures. 
31 For a recent evaluation see John H. Sanders and Wayne R. Thirsk (1984). 
These authors, after a detailed review of the evidence and the literature, con- 
clude that it is mainly large crop farms that buy farm machinery and that 
`most of the impetus for adopting mechanical technologies stems from the 
subsidized cost of capital rather than the rising real cost of labour' (p. 54). 
They also conclude that governments in Latin America have viewed mech- 
anization as a relatively cheap method of stimulating the growth of crop out- 
put, whereas the biochemical technological improvements which would have 
been more suitable on smaller farms would have required larger investments 
before they come to be transferred to or developed for these economies 
(p. 55). 
32 How the elite and protected position of the large European farmers was 
translated into a comparable position for an African elite after independence 
is laid out clearly in Weys (1974). 
33 Thiesenhusen (1984) distinguishes three broad reasons for the failure of land 
reform in Latin America to live up to expectations in terms of reducing 
inequality of income: (1) cases in which the reform itself introduces inequal- 
ities among beneficiaries or potential beneficiaries; (2) cases in which post- 
reform policies (price policies, credit distribution, etc.) were inequity produc- 
ing, offsetting any potential the reform itself had; and (3) counterreform - the 
case of Chile under Pinochet. 
34 Probably not many new cases will arise where substantially foreign-imposed 
reform will really work (Japan, Taiwan [to some degree], and Korea worked; 
El Salvador has not so far); where revolutions with substantial popular bases 
will lead to thorough-going reforms (those of Bolivia and Mexico were too 
partial) without Marxist authoritarianism (as in Ethiopia now); or where the 
opportunity provided by independence in a country with considerable foreign 
landholding will be taken advantage of (in Kenya much potential was lost; in 
Zimbabwe it remains to be seen how things will work out). 
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35 China's `barefoot doctor' appears to have provided broad access to basic 
health services in rural areas, in a very economical fashion. Even there, the 
usual bias of the medical profession towards curative interventions had to be 
countered by the personal intervention of Chairman Mao. See Maru (1977). 
36 Johnston and Clark (1982, p. 16) include under this sort of indictment `school 
lunch programs, which have been a popular element in aid programs 
throughout the developing world. The health gains secured by such programs 
have been positive but marginal, and often they have been offset by changed 
consumption patterns in the home. Moreover, when measured in terms of the 
forgone opportunities for improving the nutritional status of the most needy 
mothers and preschool children not reached by the lunch programs, the cost 
has been enormous. In an important sense the school lunch programs have 
been too feasible: they have provided a convenient outlet for the urge to "get 
on with it" and thus have reduced the pressure to search for more efficient 
and more effective alternatives.' 
37 The question of the relative importance of policy selection vs policy implemen- 
tation has received considerable discussion in another important aspect of 
development strategy - trade policy. The success of the outward-oriented 
approaches of Korea and Taiwan is attributed by some observers nearly as 
much to the organized and competent application of an export approach as to 
its choice in the first place. 
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in the orientation of many researchers concerned with developing countries. 
One important factor has been the marked slowdown in world growth since 
the first OPEC crisis of 1973-4. The ensuing difficulties facing many develop- 
ing countries, often exacerbated by the unkindness of nature and the unfor- 
tunate effects of ill-judged government policies, have to some extent inevi- 
tably turned attention back to the `basic need' of these countries for 
economic growth - and away from the basic needs of the poorest members of 
society. At the same time, and for much the same reasons, a second factor is 
that many observers have become increasingly convinced that, at least to 
some extent, governments in both the developed and developing worlds have 
brought these problems upon themselves. Just as Keynesian `fine-tuning' of 
the economy is out of fashion in most Western countries, so many Western 
observers of development have perceptibly shifted away from the view im- 
plicit in much of the earlier development literature that, once a problem was 
defined, the solution necessarily lay in the implementation of an appropriate 
government policy. The latest `new view' on development, although not 
always clearly articulated, appears to be that government intervention, par- 
ticularly when information is poor, is as likely to hurt as to help the growth 
prospects of developing countries - and, by implication, the chances for the 
poor in those countries to attain a better life. 
From one perspective, this latest development may appear to bring us back 
full circle to the trickle-down theory mentioned earlier. In reality, the 
demonstrated fallibility of governments does not, of course, mean that the 
distributive results of the unfettered market are any more acceptable now, 
either in principle or in practice, than they were twenty years ago. It does sug- 
gest, however, that a closer look at the effects of government policy on the 
poor is necessary. If governments are to do less - or, at least, to do different 
things - in the name of increasing growth than before, then those concerned 
with the well-being of the poorest members of society must inevitably scruti- 
nize what they do more closely and carefully than before. It is no longer 
enough, if it ever was, to look at official rhetoric or even at budgetary alloca- 
tions by expenditure function and draw conclusions about the distributive 
effects of government policies. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the evidence appears to sup- 
port the common perception that even those policies specifically intended to 
aid the poor have not been very successful - and, indeed, have sometimes 
had quite perverse results. Expenditure policies, intended to make housing, 
health, education, and so on more accessible to the poor, for example, seem 
seldom to have reached their supposed target groups, and have often ended 
up subsidizing more favoured segments of society. Partly for this reason, 
there has been increased emphasis recently by the World Bank and others 
